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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"chengjian (D)" <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>,
	neilb@suse.com, Anna.Schumaker@netapp.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	"Xiexiuqi (Xie XiuQi)" <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>,
	Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>,
	yanaijie@huawei.com, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	Linux Security Module list 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434!
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:20:08 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSk1_fWooexHK0+5cKum55qTvj3uv5sRE=aJ4mv2GHJZg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190415150520.GA13257@redhat.com>

On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 11:05 AM Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 04/15, Paul Moore wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 9:43 AM Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > Well, acct("/proc/self/attr/current") doesn't look like a good idea, but I do
> > > not know where should we put the additional check... And probably
> > > "echo /proc/self/attr/current > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern" can hit the
> > > same problem, do_coredump() does override_creds() too.
> > >
> > > May be just add
> > >
> > >         if (current->cred != current->real_cred)
> > >                 return -EACCES;
> > >
> > > into proc_pid_attr_write(), I dunno.
> >
> > Is the problem that do_acct_process() is calling override_creds() and
> > the returned/old credentials are being freed before do_acct_process()
> > can reinstall the creds via revert_creds()?  Presumably because the
> > process accounting is causing the credentials to be replaced?
>
> Afaics, the problem is that do_acct_process() does override_creds() and
> then __kernel_write(). Which calls proc_pid_attr_write(), which in turn calls
> selinux_setprocattr(), which does another prepare_creds() + commit_creds();
> and commit_creds() hits
>
>         BUG_ON(task->cred != old);

Gotcha.  In the process of looking at the backtrace I forgot about the
BUG_ON() at the top of the oops message.

I wonder what terrible things would happen if we changed the BUG_ON()
in commit_creds to simple returning an error an error code to the
caller.  There is a warning/requirement in commit_creds() function
header comment that it should always return 0.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-15 16:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <6e4428ca-3da1-a033-08f7-a51e57503989@huawei.com>
2019-04-12 15:28 ` kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434! Casey Schaufler
2019-04-15 13:43   ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-04-15 14:48     ` Paul Moore
2019-04-15 15:05       ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-04-15 16:20         ` Paul Moore [this message]
2019-04-16  3:40           ` Kees Cook
2019-04-16 14:46             ` chengjian (D)
2019-04-17 14:30               ` Paul Moore
2019-04-17 14:57                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-04-17 15:39                   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-17 15:40                   ` Paul Moore
2019-04-17 16:27                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-04-17 16:42                       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-18 13:39                         ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-17 23:39                       ` Paul Moore
2019-04-18  0:17                         ` John Johansen
2019-04-18  0:24                         ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-18  2:49                           ` Yang Yingliang
2019-04-19  2:04                             ` Paul Moore
2019-04-19  2:34                               ` Yang Yingliang
2019-04-19 13:24                                 ` Paul Moore
2019-04-19 14:34                                   ` Yang Yingliang
2019-04-19 16:13                                     ` Paul Moore
2019-04-20  7:38                                       ` Yang Yingliang
2019-04-22 19:48                                         ` Paul Moore
2019-04-23  4:08                                           ` Yang Yingliang
2019-04-23 20:18                                             ` Paul Moore

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