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From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
To: Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com>,
	"xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "tee-dev@lists.linaro.org" <tee-dev@lists.linaro.org>,
	Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/5] xen/arm: optee: handle share buffer translation error
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 12:17:00 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <53631114-2bb1-18a8-615d-3768facdcc78@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190823184826.14525-5-volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com>

Hi Volodymyr,

On 8/23/19 7:48 PM, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
> There is a case possible, when OP-TEE asks guest to allocate shared
> buffer, but Xen for some reason can't translate buffer's addresses. In
> this situation we should do two things:
> 
> 1. Tell guest to free allocated buffer, so there will be no memory
> leak for guest.
> 
> 2. Tell OP-TEE that buffer allocation failed.
> 
> To ask guest to free allocated buffer we should perform the same
> thing, as OP-TEE does - issue RPC request. This is done by filling
> request buffer (luckily we can reuse the same buffer, that OP-TEE used
> to issue original request) and then return to guest with special
> return code.
> 
> Then we need to handle next call from guest in a special way: as RPC
> was issued by Xen, not by OP-TEE, it should be handled by Xen.
> Basically, this is the mechanism to preempt OP-TEE mediator.
> 
> The same mechanism can be used in the future to preempt mediator
> during translation large (>512 pages) shared buffers.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com>
> ---
>   xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>   1 file changed, 136 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c
> index 3ce6e7fa55..4eebc60b62 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c
> @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@
>                                 OPTEE_SMC_SEC_CAP_UNREGISTERED_SHM | \
>                                 OPTEE_SMC_SEC_CAP_DYNAMIC_SHM)
>   
> +enum optee_call_state {
> +    OPTEEM_CALL_NORMAL = 0,

enum always start counting at 0. Also, looking at the code, it does not 
seem you need to know the value. Right?

> +    OPTEEM_CALL_XEN_RPC,

I am a bit confused, the enum is called optee_call_state but all the 
enum are prefixed with OPTEEM_CALL_. Why the discrepancy?

> +};
> +
>   static unsigned int __read_mostly max_optee_threads;
>   
>   /*
> @@ -112,6 +117,9 @@ struct optee_std_call {
>       paddr_t guest_arg_ipa;
>       int optee_thread_id;
>       int rpc_op;
> +    /* Saved buffer type for the last buffer allocate request */

Looking at the code, it feels to me you are saving the buffer type for 
the current command and not the last. Did I miss anything?

> +    unsigned int rpc_buffer_type;
> +    enum optee_call_state state;
>       uint64_t rpc_data_cookie;
>       bool in_flight;
>       register_t rpc_params[2];
> @@ -299,6 +307,7 @@ static struct optee_std_call *allocate_std_call(struct optee_domain *ctx)
>   
>       call->optee_thread_id = -1;
>       call->in_flight = true;
> +    call->state = OPTEEM_CALL_NORMAL;
>   
>       spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
>       list_add_tail(&call->list, &ctx->call_list);
> @@ -1075,6 +1084,10 @@ static int handle_rpc_return(struct optee_domain *ctx,
>               ret = -ERESTART;
>           }
>   
> +        /* Save the buffer type in case we will want to free it */
> +        if ( shm_rpc->xen_arg->cmd == OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_ALLOC )
> +            call->rpc_buffer_type = shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.a;
> +
>           unmap_domain_page(shm_rpc->xen_arg);
>       }
>   
> @@ -1239,18 +1252,102 @@ err:
>       return;
>   }
>   
> +/*
> + * Prepare RPC request to free shared buffer in the same way, as
> + * OP-TEE does this.
> + *
> + * Return values:
> + *  true  - successfully prepared RPC request
> + *  false - there was an error
> + */
> +static bool issue_rpc_cmd_free(struct optee_domain *ctx,
> +                               struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
> +                               struct optee_std_call *call,
> +                               struct shm_rpc *shm_rpc,
> +                               uint64_t cookie)
> +{
> +    register_t r1, r2;
> +
> +    /* In case if guest will forget to update it with meaningful value */
> +    shm_rpc->xen_arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_GENERIC;
> +    shm_rpc->xen_arg->cmd = OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_FREE;
> +    shm_rpc->xen_arg->num_params = 1;
> +    shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].attr = OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT;
> +    shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.a = call->rpc_buffer_type;
> +    shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b = cookie;
> +
> +    if ( access_guest_memory_by_ipa(current->domain,
> +                                    gfn_to_gaddr(shm_rpc->gfn),
> +                                    shm_rpc->xen_arg,
> +                                    OPTEE_MSG_GET_ARG_SIZE(1),
> +                                    true) )
> +    {
> +        /*
> +         * Well, this is quite bad. We have error in error path.
> +         * This can happen only if guest behaves badly, so all
> +         * we can do is to return error to OP-TEE and leave
> +         * guest's memory leaked.

Could you expand a bit more what you mean by "guest's memory leaked"? 
What the state of the page from Xen PoV? I.e. is there any reference 
taken by the OP-TEE mediator? Will the page be freed once the guest is 
destroyed?...

> +         */
> +        shm_rpc->xen_arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_GENERIC;
> +        shm_rpc->xen_arg->num_params = 0;
> +
> +        return false;
> +    }
> +
> +    uint64_to_regpair(&r1, &r2, shm_rpc->cookie);
> +
> +    call->state = OPTEEM_CALL_XEN_RPC;
> +    call->rpc_op = OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_CMD;
> +    call->rpc_params[0] = r1;
> +    call->rpc_params[1] = r2;
> +    call->optee_thread_id = get_user_reg(regs, 3);
> +
> +    set_user_reg(regs, 0, OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_RPC_CMD);
> +    set_user_reg(regs, 1, r1);
> +    set_user_reg(regs, 2, r2);
> +
> +    return true;
> +}
> +
> +/* Handles return from Xen-issued RPC */
> +static void handle_xen_rpc_return(struct optee_domain *ctx,
> +                                  struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
> +                                  struct optee_std_call *call,
> +                                  struct shm_rpc *shm_rpc)
> +{
> +    call->state = OPTEEM_CALL_NORMAL;
> +
> +    /*
> +     * Right now we have only one reason to be there - we asked guest
> +     * to free shared buffer and it did it. Now we can tell OP-TEE that
> +     * buffer allocation failed.
> +     */

Should we add an ASSERT to ensure the command is the one we expect?

> +
> +    /*
> +     * We are not checking return value from a guest because we assume
> +     * that OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_FREE newer fails.

s/newer/never/

> +     */
> +
> +    shm_rpc->xen_arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_GENERIC;
> +    shm_rpc->xen_arg->num_params = 0;
> +}
> +
>   /*
>    * This function is called when guest is finished processing RPC
>    * request from OP-TEE and wished to resume the interrupted standard
>    * call.
> + *
> + * Return values:
> + *  false - there was an error, do not call OP-TEE
> + *  true  - success, proceed as normal
>    */
> -static void handle_rpc_cmd_alloc(struct optee_domain *ctx,
> +static bool handle_rpc_cmd_alloc(struct optee_domain *ctx,
>                                    struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
>                                    struct optee_std_call *call,
>                                    struct shm_rpc *shm_rpc)
>   {
>       if ( shm_rpc->xen_arg->ret || shm_rpc->xen_arg->num_params != 1 )
> -        return;
> +        return true;
>   
>       if ( shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].attr != (OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_TMEM_OUTPUT |
>                                                 OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG) )
> @@ -1258,7 +1355,7 @@ static void handle_rpc_cmd_alloc(struct optee_domain *ctx,
>           gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
>                    "Invalid attrs for shared mem buffer: %"PRIx64"\n",
>                    shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].attr);
> -        return;
> +        return true;
>       }
>   
>       /* Free pg list for buffer */
> @@ -1274,21 +1371,14 @@ static void handle_rpc_cmd_alloc(struct optee_domain *ctx,
>       {
>           call->rpc_data_cookie = 0;
>           /*
> -         * Okay, so there was problem with guest's buffer and we need
> -         * to tell about this to OP-TEE.
> -         */
> -        shm_rpc->xen_arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_GENERIC;
> -        shm_rpc->xen_arg->num_params = 0;
> -        /*
> -         * TODO: With current implementation, OP-TEE will not issue
> -         * RPC to free this buffer. Guest and OP-TEE will be out of
> -         * sync: guest believes that it provided buffer to OP-TEE,
> -         * while OP-TEE thinks of opposite. Ideally, we need to
> -         * emulate RPC with OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_SHM_FREE command.
> +         * We are unable to translate guest's buffer, so we need tell guest
> +         * to free it, before returning error to OP-TEE.

Do you mean "reporting" instead of "returning"?
Also s/error/an error/

>            */
> -        gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
> -                "translate_noncontig() failed, OP-TEE/guest state is out of sync.\n");
> +        return !issue_rpc_cmd_free(ctx, regs, call, shm_rpc,
> +                                   shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.tmem.shm_ref);
>       }
> +
> +    return true;
>   }
>   
>   static void handle_rpc_cmd(struct optee_domain *ctx, struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
> @@ -1338,22 +1428,37 @@ static void handle_rpc_cmd(struct optee_domain *ctx, struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
>           goto out;
>       }
>   
> -    switch (shm_rpc->xen_arg->cmd)
> +    if ( call->state == OPTEEM_CALL_NORMAL )
>       {
> -    case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_GET_TIME:
> -    case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_WAIT_QUEUE:
> -    case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SUSPEND:
> -        break;
> -    case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_ALLOC:
> -        handle_rpc_cmd_alloc(ctx, regs, call, shm_rpc);
> -        break;
> -    case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_FREE:
> -        free_optee_shm_buf(ctx, shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b);
> -        if ( call->rpc_data_cookie == shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b )
> -            call->rpc_data_cookie = 0;
> -        break;
> -    default:
> -        break;
> +        switch (shm_rpc->xen_arg->cmd)
> +        {
> +        case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_GET_TIME:
> +        case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_WAIT_QUEUE:
> +        case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SUSPEND:
> +            break;
> +        case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_ALLOC:
> +            if ( !handle_rpc_cmd_alloc(ctx, regs, call, shm_rpc) )
> +            {
> +                /* We failed to translate buffer, report back to guest */
> +                unmap_domain_page(shm_rpc->xen_arg);
> +                put_std_call(ctx, call);
> +
> +                return;
> +            }
> +            break;
> +        case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_FREE:
> +            free_optee_shm_buf(ctx, shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b);
> +            if ( call->rpc_data_cookie ==
> +                 shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b )
> +                call->rpc_data_cookie = 0;
> +            break;
> +        default:
> +            break;
> +        }
> +    }
> +    else
> +    {
> +        handle_xen_rpc_return(ctx, regs, call, shm_rpc);
>       }
>   
>   out:
> 

Cheers,

-- 
Julien Grall

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  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-10 11:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-23 18:48 [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/5] arch/arm: optee: fix TODOs and remove "experimental" status Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-08-23 18:48 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/5] xen/arm: optee: impose limit on shared buffer size Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-09 22:11   ` Julien Grall
2019-09-11 18:48     ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-12 19:32       ` Julien Grall
2019-09-12 19:45         ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-12 19:51           ` Julien Grall
2019-09-16 15:26             ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-17 10:49               ` Julien Grall
2019-09-17 12:28                 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-17 18:46                   ` Julien Grall
2019-08-23 18:48 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/5] xen/arm: optee: check for preemption while freeing shared buffers Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-09 22:19   ` Julien Grall
2019-09-11 18:53     ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-12 19:39       ` Julien Grall
2019-09-12 19:47         ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-08-23 18:48 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/5] xen/arm: optee: limit number of " Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-08-23 18:48 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/5] xen/arm: optee: handle share buffer translation error Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-10 11:17   ` Julien Grall [this message]
2019-09-11 18:32     ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-12 18:55       ` Julien Grall
2019-08-23 18:48 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH 5/5] xen/arm: optee: remove experimental status Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-08-23 19:05   ` Julien Grall
2019-08-23 19:20     ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-09 21:31       ` Julien Grall
2019-09-11 18:41         ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2019-09-12 19:00           ` Julien Grall

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