From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Ian Jackson" <iwj@xenproject.org>,
"xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH][4.15] x86: mirror compat argument translation area for 32-bit PV
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 15:22:33 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <77a36366-9157-c3d3-b1f0-211f4fc39a93@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9eade40b-bd95-b850-2dec-f7def66c3c7b@citrix.com>
On 22.02.2021 15:14, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 22/02/2021 10:27, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Now that we guard the entire Xen VA space against speculative abuse
>> through hypervisor accesses to guest memory, the argument translation
>> area's VA also needs to live outside this range, at least for 32-bit PV
>> guests. To avoid extra is_hvm_*() conditionals, use the alternative VA
>> uniformly.
>>
>> While this could be conditionalized upon CONFIG_PV32 &&
>> CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_GUEST_ACCESS, omitting such extra conditionals
>> keeps the code more legible imo.
>>
>> Fixes: 4dc181599142 ("x86/PV: harden guest memory accesses against speculative abuse")
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>>
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>> @@ -1727,6 +1727,11 @@ void init_xen_l4_slots(l4_pgentry_t *l4t
>> (ROOT_PAGETABLE_FIRST_XEN_SLOT + slots -
>> l4_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)) * sizeof(*l4t));
>> }
>> +
>> + /* Slot 511: Per-domain mappings mirror. */
>> + if ( !is_pv_64bit_domain(d) )
>> + l4t[l4_table_offset(PERDOMAIN2_VIRT_START)] =
>> + l4e_from_page(d->arch.perdomain_l3_pg, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW);
>
> This virtual address is inside the extended directmap.
No. That one covers only the range excluding the last L4 slot.
> You're going to
> need to rearrange more things than just this, to make it safe.
I specifically picked that entry because I don't think further
arrangements are needed.
> While largely a theoretical risk as far as the directmap goes, there is
> now a rather higher risk of colliding with the ERR_PTR() range. Its bad
> enough this infrastructure is inherently unsafe with 64bit PV guests,
The ERR_PTR() range is still _far_ away from the sub-ranges we
use in the per-domain area.
Jan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-22 14:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-22 10:27 [PATCH][4.15] x86: mirror compat argument translation area for 32-bit PV Jan Beulich
2021-02-22 11:26 ` Ian Jackson
2021-02-22 11:35 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-22 14:12 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-22 14:13 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-22 14:20 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-22 14:46 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-22 14:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2021-02-22 14:22 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-02-22 16:47 ` Andrew Cooper
2021-02-22 19:36 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-23 7:13 ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-24 19:04 ` Andrew Cooper
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