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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>,
	Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH][4.15] x86: mirror compat argument translation area for 32-bit PV
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 15:12:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <de119412-7a38-1446-55a0-806bddeda06c@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YDOW+ftkNsG2RH3C@Air-de-Roger>

On 22.02.2021 12:35, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 11:27:07AM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Now that we guard the entire Xen VA space against speculative abuse
>> through hypervisor accesses to guest memory, the argument translation
>> area's VA also needs to live outside this range, at least for 32-bit PV
>> guests. To avoid extra is_hvm_*() conditionals, use the alternative VA
>> uniformly.
> 
> Since you are double mapping the per-domain virtual area, won't it
> make more sense to map it just once outside of the Xen virtual space
> area? (so it's always using PML4_ADDR(511))

This would then require conditionals in paths using other parts of
the per-domain mappings for 64-bit PV, as the same range is under
guest control there.

> Is there anything concerning in the per-domain area that should be
> protected against speculative accesses?

First of all this is an unrelated question - I'm not changing what
gets accessed there, but only through which addresses these accesses
happen. What lives there are GDT/LDT mappings, map cache, and the
argument translation area. The guest has no control (or very limited
when considering GDT/LDT one) over the accesses made to this space.

Jan


  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-22 14:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-22 10:27 [PATCH][4.15] x86: mirror compat argument translation area for 32-bit PV Jan Beulich
2021-02-22 11:26 ` Ian Jackson
2021-02-22 11:35 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-22 14:12   ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-02-22 14:13   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-22 14:20     ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-22 14:46       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-22 14:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2021-02-22 14:22   ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-22 16:47     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-02-22 19:36       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-02-23  7:13       ` Jan Beulich
2021-02-24 19:04         ` Andrew Cooper

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