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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
	Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 09/21] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:36:22 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1461699396-33000-10-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1461699396-33000-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index aa17198cd5f2..ca564590cc1b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -919,6 +919,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
 	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
@@ -928,6 +929,11 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
 		return 0;
 
+	sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
+	    isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
 		struct task_struct *tracer;
 		rc = 0;
@@ -1725,6 +1731,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 	struct smack_known *okp;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 	int may;
 	int mmay;
 	int tmay;
@@ -1736,6 +1743,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
 	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
 		return 0;
+	sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
+	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
+	    isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return -EACCES;
 	mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
 
 	tsp = current_security();
@@ -3546,16 +3557,14 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			if (rc >= 0)
 				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 		}
-		if (!(sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED)) {
-			/*
-			 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
-			 */
-			skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
-			if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
-			    skp == &smack_known_web)
-				skp = NULL;
-			isp->smk_task = skp;
-		}
+		/*
+		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
+		 */
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+		    skp == &smack_known_web)
+			skp = NULL;
+		isp->smk_task = skp;
 
 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
 		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-04-26 19:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-04-26 19:36 [PATCH v4 00/21] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 01/21] fs: fix a posible leak of allocated superblock Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 04/21] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 05/21] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 06/21] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 08/21] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 10/21] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
2016-05-24 15:55   ` Djalal Harouni
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 11/21] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 15/21] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
     [not found] ` <1461699396-33000-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 02/21] fs: Remove check of s_user_ns for existing mounts in fs_fully_visible() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 03/21] fs: Allow sysfs and cgroupfs to share super blocks between user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 07/21] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from " Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 12/21] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 13/21] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership of inodes with unmappable ids Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 16/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 17/21] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
     [not found]     ` <1461699396-33000-18-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27  7:22       ` James Morris
2016-04-27  7:22         ` James Morris
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 18/21] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-07-20  2:44     ` Sheng Yang
     [not found]       ` <CA+2rt426_pshAauQizcxkfAq16vmEpB4sJ4genW_ucosH3j=zQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-07-20 12:52         ` Seth Forshee
2016-07-20 12:52           ` Seth Forshee
2016-07-20 22:28           ` Sheng Yang
2016-07-21  7:25           ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-21  7:25             ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 19/21] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 20/21] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 21/21] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee

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