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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"Daniel Mack" <daniel@zonque.org>,
	"David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Elena Reshetova" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Paul Moore" <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	"Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC v2 04/10] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2016 12:32:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1472121165-29071-5-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1472121165-29071-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net>

The semantic is unchanged. This will be useful for the Landlock
integration with seccomp (next commit).

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
---
 include/linux/seccomp.h |  5 +++--
 kernel/fork.c           |  2 +-
 kernel/seccomp.c        | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 2296e6b2f690..29b20fe8fd4d 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -83,13 +83,14 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
-extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk);
 extern void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
 #else  /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
-static inline void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	return;
 }
+
 static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	return;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 4a7ec0c6c88c..b23a71ec8003 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	free_thread_stack(tsk->stack);
 	rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk);
 	ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk);
-	put_seccomp_filter(tsk);
+	put_seccomp(tsk);
 	arch_release_task_struct(tsk);
 	free_task_struct(tsk);
 }
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 7002796f14a4..f1f475691c27 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ struct seccomp_filter {
 	struct bpf_prog *prog;
 };
 
+static void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter);
+
 /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
 #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
 
@@ -313,7 +315,7 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
 		 * current's path will hold a reference.  (This also
 		 * allows a put before the assignment.)
 		 */
-		put_seccomp_filter(thread);
+		put_seccomp_filter(thread->seccomp.filter);
 		smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter,
 				  caller->seccomp.filter);
 
@@ -475,10 +477,11 @@ static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
 	}
 }
 
-/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
-void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
+/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of a filter */
+static void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
 {
-	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
+	struct seccomp_filter *orig = filter;
+
 	/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
 	while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
 		struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
@@ -487,6 +490,11 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	}
 }
 
+void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	put_seccomp_filter(tsk->seccomp.filter);
+}
+
 /**
  * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
  * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
@@ -926,7 +934,7 @@ long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off,
 	if (copy_to_user(data, fprog->filter, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog)))
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 
-	put_seccomp_filter(task);
+	put_seccomp_filter(task->seccomp.filter);
 	return ret;
 
 out:
-- 
2.8.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"Daniel Mack" <daniel@zonque.org>,
	"David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Elena Reshetova" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Paul Moore" <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	"Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 04/10] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2016 12:32:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1472121165-29071-5-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1472121165-29071-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net>

The semantic is unchanged. This will be useful for the Landlock
integration with seccomp (next commit).

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
---
 include/linux/seccomp.h |  5 +++--
 kernel/fork.c           |  2 +-
 kernel/seccomp.c        | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 2296e6b2f690..29b20fe8fd4d 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -83,13 +83,14 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
-extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk);
 extern void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
 #else  /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
-static inline void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	return;
 }
+
 static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	return;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 4a7ec0c6c88c..b23a71ec8003 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	free_thread_stack(tsk->stack);
 	rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk);
 	ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk);
-	put_seccomp_filter(tsk);
+	put_seccomp(tsk);
 	arch_release_task_struct(tsk);
 	free_task_struct(tsk);
 }
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 7002796f14a4..f1f475691c27 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ struct seccomp_filter {
 	struct bpf_prog *prog;
 };
 
+static void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter);
+
 /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
 #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
 
@@ -313,7 +315,7 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
 		 * current's path will hold a reference.  (This also
 		 * allows a put before the assignment.)
 		 */
-		put_seccomp_filter(thread);
+		put_seccomp_filter(thread->seccomp.filter);
 		smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter,
 				  caller->seccomp.filter);
 
@@ -475,10 +477,11 @@ static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
 	}
 }
 
-/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
-void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
+/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of a filter */
+static void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
 {
-	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
+	struct seccomp_filter *orig = filter;
+
 	/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
 	while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
 		struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
@@ -487,6 +490,11 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	}
 }
 
+void put_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	put_seccomp_filter(tsk->seccomp.filter);
+}
+
 /**
  * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
  * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
@@ -926,7 +934,7 @@ long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off,
 	if (copy_to_user(data, fprog->filter, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog)))
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 
-	put_seccomp_filter(task);
+	put_seccomp_filter(task->seccomp.filter);
 	return ret;
 
 out:
-- 
2.8.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-25 10:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 180+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-25 10:32 [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [RFC v2 01/10] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [RFC v2 02/10] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [RFC v2 03/10] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 04/10] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [RFC v2 05/10] seccomp: Handle Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [RFC v2 06/10] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 18:56   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 18:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 18:56     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 18:56     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 20:10     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:10       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:10       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:10       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:18       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 20:18         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 20:18         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 20:18         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 20:27         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:27           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:27           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:27           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [RFC v2 07/10] landlock: Add errno check Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 11:13   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 11:13     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 11:13     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [RFC v2 08/10] landlock: Handle file system comparisons Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 11:12   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 11:12     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 11:12     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 14:10     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 14:10       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-26 14:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-26 14:57         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-27 13:45         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 13:45           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 13:45           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 13:45           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [RFC v2 09/10] landlock: Handle cgroups Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 11:09   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 11:09     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 11:09     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 14:44     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 14:44       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-26 12:55       ` Tejun Heo
2016-08-26 12:55         ` [kernel-hardening] " Tejun Heo
2016-08-26 12:55         ` Tejun Heo
2016-08-26 12:55         ` Tejun Heo
2016-08-26 14:20       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-26 14:20         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-26 15:50         ` Tejun Heo
2016-08-26 15:50           ` [kernel-hardening] " Tejun Heo
2016-08-26  2:14   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-26  2:14     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-26 15:10     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-26 15:10       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-26 15:10       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-26 15:10       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-26 23:05       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-26 23:05         ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27  7:30         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-27  7:30           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-27  7:30           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-27 18:11           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 18:11             ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-28  8:14             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-28  8:14               ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-28  8:14               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-27 14:06         ` [RFC v2 09/10] landlock: Handle cgroups (performance) Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 14:06           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 18:06           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 18:06             ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 18:06             ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 19:35             ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 19:35               ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 20:43               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 20:43                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 20:43                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 21:14                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 21:14                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-28  8:13                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-28  8:13                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-28  8:13                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-28  9:42                     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-28  9:42                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-28  9:42                       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 18:55                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 18:55                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 18:55                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 20:20                         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:20                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:20                           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:23                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 20:23                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 20:23                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 20:33                             ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:33                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:33                               ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 20:55                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-30 20:55                                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-30 20:55                                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-30 21:45                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 21:45                                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 21:45                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31  1:36                                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-31  1:36                                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-31  3:29                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31  3:29                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31  3:29                                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31  3:29                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-27 14:19         ` [RFC v2 09/10] landlock: Handle cgroups (netfilter match) Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 14:19           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 18:32           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 18:32             ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 18:32             ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 14:34         ` [RFC v2 09/10] landlock: Handle cgroups (program types) Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 14:34           ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 18:19           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 18:19             ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 19:55             ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 19:55               ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 20:56               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 20:56                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 20:56                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-08-27 21:18                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 21:18                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32 ` [RFC v2 10/10] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 10:32   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 11:05 ` [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 11:05   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 11:05   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-25 13:57   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-25 13:57     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27  7:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-27  7:40   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-27  7:40   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-27 15:10   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 15:10     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 15:21     ` [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing (cgroup delegation) Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 15:21       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 15:21       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-27 15:21       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 16:06 ` [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 16:06   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 16:06   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 16:06   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 19:51   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 19:51     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 19:51     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-08-30 19:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 19:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 19:55       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 19:55       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  9:19 ` Pavel Machek
2016-09-15  9:19   ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2016-09-20 17:08   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 17:08     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-24  7:45     ` Pavel Machek
2016-09-24  7:45       ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2016-09-24  7:45       ` Pavel Machek
2016-10-03 22:56     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 22:56       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-03 22:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 22:56       ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 20:30       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 20:30         ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 20:30         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 20:30         ` Mickaël Salaün

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