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From: catalin.marinas@arm.com (Catalin Marinas)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
Date: Fri,  2 Sep 2016 16:02:06 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1472828533-28197-1-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com> (raw)

This is the second version of the arm64 PAN emulation by disabling
TTBR0_EL1 accesses. The major change from v1 is the use of a thread_info
member to store the real TTBR0_EL1 value. The advantage is slightly
simpler assembler macros for uaccess_enable with the downside that
switch_mm() must always update the saved ttbr0 even if there is no mm
switch.

Whether we could simplify these patches further to use some TCR_EL1.EPD0
tricks remains to be confirmed with the ARM architects. However, it is
unlikely that they would deem such idea architecturally safe, hence this
series only switches TTBR0_EL1 in accordance with the ARM ARM.

Changes since v1:

- Using thread_info instead of per-CPU variable for the real TTBR0_EL1
  value (mentioned above)

- Factored out the cpu_do_switch_mm errata workaround to a separate
  macro and avoided the "errata" argument to the uaccess_enable asm
  macro

- Fix build error with allnoconfig by moving the uaccess_* asm macros to
  asm/uaccess.h and avoid some cyclic header includes

- _PSR_PAN_BIT moved to the non-uapi ptrace.h

- Use x21 instead of lr as temporary register in entry.S

As per v1, the code requires more testing, especially for combinations
where hardware PAN and/or UAO are present.

The patches are also available on this branch:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux ttbr0-pan

Thanks for reviewing/testing.

Catalin Marinas (7):
  arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros
  arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro
  arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1
  arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution
  arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled
  arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call
  arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN

 arch/arm64/Kconfig                      |   8 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h      |  37 +++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h     |   6 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h            |  14 ++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h          |  14 ++--
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kernel-pgtable.h |   7 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h    |  32 ++++++--
 arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h         |   2 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h    |   3 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h        | 136 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c    |  10 +--
 arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c         |   3 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c          |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S               |  71 ++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S                |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c               |   8 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S         |   5 ++
 arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S             |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S         |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S           |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S           |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/context.c                 |   7 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                   |  22 ++++--
 arch/arm64/mm/proc.S                    |  12 +--
 arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S              |  19 +++++
 25 files changed, 381 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
Date: Fri,  2 Sep 2016 16:02:06 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1472828533-28197-1-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com> (raw)

This is the second version of the arm64 PAN emulation by disabling
TTBR0_EL1 accesses. The major change from v1 is the use of a thread_info
member to store the real TTBR0_EL1 value. The advantage is slightly
simpler assembler macros for uaccess_enable with the downside that
switch_mm() must always update the saved ttbr0 even if there is no mm
switch.

Whether we could simplify these patches further to use some TCR_EL1.EPD0
tricks remains to be confirmed with the ARM architects. However, it is
unlikely that they would deem such idea architecturally safe, hence this
series only switches TTBR0_EL1 in accordance with the ARM ARM.

Changes since v1:

- Using thread_info instead of per-CPU variable for the real TTBR0_EL1
  value (mentioned above)

- Factored out the cpu_do_switch_mm errata workaround to a separate
  macro and avoided the "errata" argument to the uaccess_enable asm
  macro

- Fix build error with allnoconfig by moving the uaccess_* asm macros to
  asm/uaccess.h and avoid some cyclic header includes

- _PSR_PAN_BIT moved to the non-uapi ptrace.h

- Use x21 instead of lr as temporary register in entry.S

As per v1, the code requires more testing, especially for combinations
where hardware PAN and/or UAO are present.

The patches are also available on this branch:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux ttbr0-pan

Thanks for reviewing/testing.

Catalin Marinas (7):
  arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros
  arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro
  arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1
  arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution
  arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled
  arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call
  arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN

 arch/arm64/Kconfig                      |   8 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h      |  37 +++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h     |   6 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h            |  14 ++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h          |  14 ++--
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kernel-pgtable.h |   7 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h    |  32 ++++++--
 arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h         |   2 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h    |   3 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h        | 136 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c    |  10 +--
 arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c         |   3 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c          |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S               |  71 ++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S                |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c               |   8 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S         |   5 ++
 arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S             |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S         |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S           |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S           |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/context.c                 |   7 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                   |  22 ++++--
 arch/arm64/mm/proc.S                    |  12 +--
 arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S              |  19 +++++
 25 files changed, 381 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)

             reply	other threads:[~2016-09-02 15:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-02 15:02 Catalin Marinas [this message]
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 15:38   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-05 15:38     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 14:52     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-12 14:52       ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-12 15:09       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 15:09         ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 16:26         ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-12 16:26           ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 16:11   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-05 16:11     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 17:20   ` [PATCH v2 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} " Mark Rutland
2016-09-05 17:20     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-06 10:27     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 10:27       ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 10:45       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-06 10:45         ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-11 13:55         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-11 13:55           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-12  9:32           ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-12  9:32             ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-09 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-09 17:15     ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 17:31   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-06 17:31     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:47   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:47     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-07 23:20 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Kees Cook
2016-09-07 23:20   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-09-08 12:51   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-08 12:51     ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-08 15:50     ` Kees Cook
2016-09-08 15:50       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-09-09 16:31     ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-09 16:31       ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-09-09 18:24       ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 18:24         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-09-09 23:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-09-09 23:40   ` David Brown
2016-09-10  9:51 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-10  9:51   ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas
2016-09-10 10:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-10 10:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-11 12:16     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-11 12:16       ` [kernel-hardening] " Catalin Marinas

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