From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@suse.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/8] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 14:01:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1527616920-5415-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1527616920-5415-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Luis, is the security_kernel_post_read_file LSM hook in
firmware_loading_store() still needed after this patch? Should it be
calling security_kernel_load_data() instead?
---
With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents
the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index a565d46084c2..4a87f78098c8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -475,8 +475,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -520,6 +522,12 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
+ break;
+ case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
+ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
default:
break;
}
--
2.7.5
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/8] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 14:01:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1527616920-5415-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1527616920-5415-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Luis, is the security_kernel_post_read_file LSM hook in
firmware_loading_store() still needed after this patch? Should it be
calling security_kernel_load_data() instead?
---
With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents
the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index a565d46084c2..4a87f78098c8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -475,8 +475,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -520,6 +522,12 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
+ break;
+ case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
+ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
default:
break;
}
--
2.7.5
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@suse.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 5/8] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 14:01:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1527616920-5415-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1527616920-5415-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Luis, is the security_kernel_post_read_file LSM hook in
firmware_loading_store() still needed after this patch? Should it be
calling security_kernel_load_data() instead?
---
With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents
the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index a565d46084c2..4a87f78098c8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -475,8 +475,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -520,6 +522,12 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
+ break;
+ case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
+ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
default:
break;
}
--
2.7.5
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kexec@lists.infradead.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-29 18:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 139+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-29 18:01 [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 20:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 20:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 20:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 18:19 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 18:19 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 18:19 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 18:21 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 18:21 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 18:21 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 22:39 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:39 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:39 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:39 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 22:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 22:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 22:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 23:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 23:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 23:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 23:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] ima: add build time policy Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` [RFC PATCH v4 7/8] ima: based on policy prevent loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 19:15 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:15 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:15 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:25 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:25 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-01 19:25 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-05 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-06 6:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-06-06 6:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-06-06 6:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-06-06 22:06 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-06 22:06 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-06-06 22:06 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2018-05-29 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 18:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 22:39 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-29 22:39 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-29 22:39 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-29 23:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-30 21:00 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-30 21:00 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-30 21:00 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-31 15:23 ` [PATCH v4a " Mimi Zohar
2018-05-31 15:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-31 15:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-01 22:28 ` Paul Moore
2018-06-01 22:28 ` Paul Moore
2018-06-01 22:28 ` Paul Moore
2018-06-04 9:19 ` Jessica Yu
2018-06-04 9:19 ` Jessica Yu
2018-06-04 9:19 ` Jessica Yu
2018-06-05 19:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 19:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 19:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 21:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 21:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 21:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 21:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 22:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 22:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 22:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 22:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 22:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:25 ` [PATCH v4 " Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-29 23:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-30 2:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30 2:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30 2:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30 21:09 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-30 21:09 ` Paul Moore
2018-05-30 21:09 ` Paul Moore
2018-06-04 14:03 ` [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 14:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 14:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 14:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-04 19:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 19:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-04 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-04 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-04 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 4:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 4:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 4:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 12:19 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 12:19 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 12:19 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 13:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 13:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 13:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-06-05 13:43 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 13:43 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 13:43 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-05 14:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 14:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-06-05 14:05 ` Mimi Zohar
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