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From: "tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/microcode] x86/microcode: Prepare for minimal revision check
Date: Mon, 09 Oct 2023 12:29:43 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <169685458358.3135.5679462071745255006.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231002115903.718904225@linutronix.de>

The following commit has been merged into the x86/microcode branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     bbaea0e7fc4322ce997d6bc218ce3f2df5c64bb8
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/bbaea0e7fc4322ce997d6bc218ce3f2df5c64bb8
Author:        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 02 Oct 2023 14:00:10 +02:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Fri, 06 Oct 2023 15:12:25 +02:00

x86/microcode: Prepare for minimal revision check

Applying microcode late can be fatal for the running kernel when the
update changes functionality which is in use already in a non-compatible
way, e.g. by removing a CPUID bit.

There is no way for admins which do not have access to the vendors deep
technical support to decide whether late loading of such a microcode is
safe or not.

Intel has added a new field to the microcode header which tells the
minimal microcode revision which is required to be active in the CPU in
order to be safe.

Provide infrastructure for handling this in the core code and a command
line switch which allows to enforce it.

If the update is considered safe the kernel is not tainted and the annoying
warning message not emitted. If it's enforced and the currently loaded
microcode revision is not safe for late loading then the load is aborted.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231002115903.718904225@linutronix.de
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  5 +++-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                | 23 +++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c             |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c            | 19 +++++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c           |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/internal.h        |  3 ++-
 6 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 0a1731a..d762e17 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3275,6 +3275,11 @@
 
 	mga=		[HW,DRM]
 
+	microcode.force_minrev=	[X86]
+			Format: <bool>
+			Enable or disable the microcode minimal revision
+			enforcement for the runtime microcode loader.
+
 	min_addr=nn[KMG]	[KNL,BOOT,IA-64] All physical memory below this
 			physical address is ignored.
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index c46ebd1..d8ff206 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1322,7 +1322,28 @@ config MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING
 	  is a tricky business and should be avoided if possible. Just the sequence
 	  of synchronizing all cores and SMT threads is one fragile dance which does
 	  not guarantee that cores might not softlock after the loading. Therefore,
-	  use this at your own risk. Late loading taints the kernel too.
+	  use this at your own risk. Late loading taints the kernel unless the
+	  microcode header indicates that it is safe for late loading via the
+	  minimal revision check. This minimal revision check can be enforced on
+	  the kernel command line with "microcode.minrev=Y".
+
+config MICROCODE_LATE_FORCE_MINREV
+	bool "Enforce late microcode loading minimal revision check"
+	default n
+	depends on MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING
+	help
+	  To prevent that users load microcode late which modifies already
+	  in use features, newer microcode patches have a minimum revision field
+	  in the microcode header, which tells the kernel which minimum
+	  revision must be active in the CPU to safely load that new microcode
+	  late into the running system. If disabled the check will not
+	  be enforced but the kernel will be tainted when the minimal
+	  revision check fails.
+
+	  This minimal revision check can also be controlled via the
+	  "microcode.minrev" parameter on the kernel command line.
+
+	  If unsure say Y.
 
 config X86_MSR
 	tristate "/dev/cpu/*/msr - Model-specific register support"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
index a760e13..a2776f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
@@ -880,6 +880,9 @@ static enum ucode_state request_microcode_amd(int cpu, struct device *device)
 	enum ucode_state ret = UCODE_NFOUND;
 	const struct firmware *fw;
 
+	if (force_minrev)
+		return UCODE_NFOUND;
+
 	if (c->x86 >= 0x15)
 		snprintf(fw_name, sizeof(fw_name), "amd-ucode/microcode_amd_fam%.2xh.bin", c->x86);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
index a9c373b..591032b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
 static struct microcode_ops	*microcode_ops;
 static bool dis_ucode_ldr = true;
 
+bool force_minrev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MICROCODE_LATE_FORCE_MINREV);
+module_param(force_minrev, bool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
 bool initrd_gone;
 
 /*
@@ -560,15 +563,17 @@ static int load_cpus_stopped(void *unused)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int load_late_stop_cpus(void)
+static int load_late_stop_cpus(bool is_safe)
 {
 	unsigned int cpu, updated = 0, failed = 0, timedout = 0, siblings = 0;
 	unsigned int nr_offl, offline = 0;
 	int old_rev = boot_cpu_data.microcode;
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 prev_info;
 
-	pr_err("Attempting late microcode loading - it is dangerous and taints the kernel.\n");
-	pr_err("You should switch to early loading, if possible.\n");
+	if (!is_safe) {
+		pr_err("Late microcode loading without minimal revision check.\n");
+		pr_err("You should switch to early loading, if possible.\n");
+	}
 
 	atomic_set(&late_cpus_in, num_online_cpus());
 	atomic_set(&offline_in_nmi, 0);
@@ -618,7 +623,9 @@ static int load_late_stop_cpus(void)
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
-	add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+	if (!is_safe || failed || timedout)
+		add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+
 	pr_info("load: updated on %u primary CPUs with %u siblings\n", updated, siblings);
 	if (failed || timedout) {
 		pr_err("load incomplete. %u CPUs timed out or failed\n",
@@ -708,7 +715,9 @@ static int load_late_locked(void)
 
 	switch (microcode_ops->request_microcode_fw(0, &microcode_pdev->dev)) {
 	case UCODE_NEW:
-		return load_late_stop_cpus();
+		return load_late_stop_cpus(false);
+	case UCODE_NEW_SAFE:
+		return load_late_stop_cpus(true);
 	case UCODE_NFOUND:
 		return -ENOENT;
 	default:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
index 8d03ad5..0e7ff3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -471,6 +471,9 @@ static enum ucode_state parse_microcode_blobs(int cpu, struct iov_iter *iter)
 	unsigned int curr_mc_size = 0;
 	u8 *new_mc = NULL, *mc = NULL;
 
+	if (force_minrev)
+		return UCODE_NFOUND;
+
 	while (iov_iter_count(iter)) {
 		struct microcode_header_intel mc_header;
 		unsigned int mc_size, data_size;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/internal.h
index 5e60da8..de37255 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/internal.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ struct device;
 enum ucode_state {
 	UCODE_OK	= 0,
 	UCODE_NEW,
+	UCODE_NEW_SAFE,
 	UCODE_UPDATED,
 	UCODE_NFOUND,
 	UCODE_ERROR,
@@ -36,6 +37,8 @@ struct microcode_ops {
 				use_nmi		: 1;
 };
 
+extern bool force_minrev;
+
 extern struct ucode_cpu_info ucode_cpu_info[];
 struct cpio_data find_microcode_in_initrd(const char *path);
 

  reply	other threads:[~2023-10-09 12:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-02 11:59 [patch V4 00/30] x86/microcode: Cleanup and late loading enhancements Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 01/30] x86/microcode/32: Move early loading after paging enable Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 02/30] x86/boot/32: Disable stackprotector and tracing for mk_early_pgtbl_32() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:38   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 03/30] x86/microcode/intel: Rip out mixed stepping support for Intel CPUs Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Ashok Raj
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 04/30] x86/microcode/intel: Simplify scan_microcode() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:38   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 05/30] x86/microcode/intel: Simplify and rename generic_load_microcode() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:38   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 06/30] x86/microcode/intel: Cleanup code further Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:38   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 07/30] x86/microcode/intel: Simplify early loading Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 08/30] x86/microcode/intel: Save the microcode only after a successful late-load Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:21   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 09/30] x86/microcode/intel: Switch to kvmalloc() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:21   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 10/30] x86/microcode/intel: Unify microcode apply() functions Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 11/30] x86/microcode/intel: Rework intel_cpu_collect_info() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 12/30] x86/microcode/intel: Reuse intel_cpu_collect_info() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:21   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 13/30] x86/microcode/intel: Rework intel_find_matching_signature() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:21   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 14/30] x86/microcode/amd: Read revision from hardware in collect_cpu_info_amd() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-04  8:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 15/30] x86/microcode: Remove pointless apply() invocation Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-06 13:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 16/30] x86/microcode: Get rid of the schedule work indirection Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 17/30] x86/microcode: Clean up mc_cpu_down_prep() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 18/30] x86/microcode: Handle "nosmt" correctly Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 19/30] x86/microcode: Clarify the late load logic Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 11:59 ` [patch V4 20/30] x86/microcode: Sanitize __wait_for_cpus() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 21/30] x86/microcode: Add per CPU result state Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 22/30] x86/microcode: Add per CPU control field Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 23/30] x86/microcode: Provide new control functions Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 24/30] x86/microcode: Replace the all in one rendevouz handler Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] x86/microcode: Replace the all-in-one rendevous handler tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 25/30] x86/microcode: Rendezvous and load in NMI Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 26/30] x86/microcode: Protect against instrumentation Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 27/30] x86/apic: Provide apic_force_nmi_on_cpu() Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 28/30] x86/microcode: Handle "offline" CPUs correctly Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 29/30] x86/microcode: Prepare for minimal revision check Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2023-10-02 12:00 ` [patch V4 30/30] x86/microcode/intel: Add a minimum required revision for late-loads Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-09 12:29   ` [tip: x86/microcode] x86/microcode/intel: Add a minimum required revision for late loading tip-bot2 for Ashok Raj
2023-10-20 11:37   ` tip-bot2 for Ashok Raj
2023-10-24 13:20   ` tip-bot2 for Ashok Raj
2023-10-08  8:54 ` [patch V4 00/30] x86/microcode: Cleanup and late loading enhancements Qiuxu Zhuo
2023-10-08 13:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-09  5:03     ` Zhuo, Qiuxu
2023-10-10  8:00     ` Zhuo, Qiuxu
2023-10-10  8:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-17 21:24 [patch V5 38/39] x86/microcode: Prepare for minimal revision check Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-20 11:37 ` [tip: x86/microcode] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-10-24 13:20 ` tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner

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