From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 05/15] smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 08:24:52 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <16990524-73ab-b5e9-89d5-548be2d9aa9b@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKChNAKb-ySH2X6c49=VKSRn2ff3qw3T1YTDOi9_tS+wA@mail.gmail.com> On 7/25/2017 8:58 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 3:25 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> The Smack bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds >> hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details >> are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via >> prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored >> via bprm->called_set_creds). >> >> Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook, >> and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped. >> >> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > How does this look to you, Casey? I've only got a few unreviewed > patches in this series. Two touch Smack. :) The eyes don't see any problems, but I haven't had a chance to try it out. > > Thanks! > > -Kees > >> --- >> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 21 ++++----------------- >> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> index 7d4b2e221124..4f1967be3d20 100644 >> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> @@ -950,6 +950,10 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) >> bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task; >> bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; >> >> + /* Decide if this is a secure exec. */ >> + if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked) >> + bprm->secureexec = 1; >> + >> return 0; >> } >> >> @@ -967,22 +971,6 @@ static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) >> current->pdeath_signal = 0; >> } >> >> -/** >> - * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec. >> - * @bprm: binprm for exec >> - * >> - * Returns 0 on success. >> - */ >> -static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) >> -{ >> - struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); >> - >> - if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked) >> - return 1; >> - >> - return 0; >> -} >> - >> /* >> * Inode hooks >> */ >> @@ -4646,7 +4634,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { >> >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds), >> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec), >> >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security), >> -- >> 2.7.4 >> > > .
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: casey@schaufler-ca.com (Casey Schaufler) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 05/15] smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 08:24:52 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <16990524-73ab-b5e9-89d5-548be2d9aa9b@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKChNAKb-ySH2X6c49=VKSRn2ff3qw3T1YTDOi9_tS+wA@mail.gmail.com> On 7/25/2017 8:58 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 3:25 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> The Smack bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds >> hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details >> are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via >> prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored >> via bprm->called_set_creds). >> >> Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook, >> and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped. >> >> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > How does this look to you, Casey? I've only got a few unreviewed > patches in this series. Two touch Smack. :) The eyes don't see any problems, but I haven't had a chance to try it out. > > Thanks! > > -Kees > >> --- >> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 21 ++++----------------- >> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> index 7d4b2e221124..4f1967be3d20 100644 >> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> @@ -950,6 +950,10 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) >> bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task; >> bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; >> >> + /* Decide if this is a secure exec. */ >> + if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked) >> + bprm->secureexec = 1; >> + >> return 0; >> } >> >> @@ -967,22 +971,6 @@ static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) >> current->pdeath_signal = 0; >> } >> >> -/** >> - * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec. >> - * @bprm: binprm for exec >> - * >> - * Returns 0 on success. >> - */ >> -static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) >> -{ >> - struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); >> - >> - if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked) >> - return 1; >> - >> - return 0; >> -} >> - >> /* >> * Inode hooks >> */ >> @@ -4646,7 +4634,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { >> >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds), >> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec), >> >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security), >> -- >> 2.7.4 >> > > . -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-26 17:54 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-07-18 22:25 [PATCH v3 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 01/15] binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 0:05 ` John Johansen 2017-07-19 0:05 ` John Johansen 2017-07-19 1:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-19 1:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 02/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 0:08 ` John Johansen 2017-07-19 0:08 ` John Johansen 2017-07-19 1:06 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-19 1:06 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-19 4:40 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 4:40 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 9:19 ` James Morris 2017-07-19 9:19 ` James Morris 2017-07-19 23:56 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-19 23:56 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 03/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 0:00 ` John Johansen 2017-07-19 0:00 ` John Johansen 2017-07-19 9:21 ` James Morris 2017-07-19 9:21 ` James Morris 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 04/15] selinux: " Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-20 0:03 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-20 0:03 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-20 0:19 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-20 0:19 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-20 1:37 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-20 1:37 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-20 13:42 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-20 13:42 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-20 17:06 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-20 17:06 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-20 20:42 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-20 20:42 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-21 15:40 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-21 15:40 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-21 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-21 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-21 19:16 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-21 19:16 ` Paul Moore 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 05/15] smack: " Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-26 3:58 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-26 3:58 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-26 15:24 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2017-07-26 15:24 ` Casey Schaufler 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 06/15] commoncap: " Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 1:10 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-19 1:10 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-19 4:41 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 4:41 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-20 4:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-20 4:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-31 22:43 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-31 22:43 ` Kees Cook 2017-08-01 13:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-08-01 13:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-19 9:26 ` James Morris 2017-07-19 9:26 ` James Morris 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 07/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 1:52 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-19 1:52 ` Andy Lutomirski 2017-07-19 9:28 ` James Morris 2017-07-19 9:28 ` James Morris 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 08/15] LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 0:02 ` John Johansen 2017-07-19 0:02 ` John Johansen 2017-07-19 9:29 ` James Morris 2017-07-19 9:29 ` James Morris 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 09/15] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 0:45 ` Eric W. Biederman 2017-07-19 0:45 ` Eric W. Biederman 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 10/15] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-26 3:59 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-26 3:59 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 11/15] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 12/15] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 13/15] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 14/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 9:42 ` James Morris 2017-07-19 9:42 ` James Morris 2017-07-18 22:25 ` [PATCH v3 15/15] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook 2017-07-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-18 23:03 ` [PATCH v3 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Linus Torvalds 2017-07-18 23:03 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-07-19 3:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-07-19 3:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-07-19 5:23 ` Kees Cook 2017-07-19 5:23 ` Kees Cook
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