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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@amd.com>
Cc: "Oleksandr Andrushchenko" <oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
	"George Dunlap" <george.dunlap@citrix.com>,
	"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
	"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	"Jun Nakajima" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	"Kevin Tian" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	"Paul Durrant" <paul@xen.org>,
	"Volodymyr Babchuk" <volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com>,
	xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12.2 01/15] vpci: use per-domain PCI lock to protect vpci structure
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 15:26:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <18ec3401-4334-40c0-82a0-31abfd9797d0@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240115194309.45683-1-stewart.hildebrand@amd.com>

On 15.01.2024 20:43, Stewart Hildebrand wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
> @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ int msixtbl_pt_register(struct domain *d, struct pirq *pirq, uint64_t gtable)
>      struct msixtbl_entry *entry, *new_entry;
>      int r = -EINVAL;
>  
> -    ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
> +    ASSERT(pcidevs_locked() || rw_is_locked(&d->pci_lock));
>      ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&d->event_lock));
>  
>      if ( !msixtbl_initialised(d) )
> @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ void msixtbl_pt_unregister(struct domain *d, struct pirq *pirq)
>      struct pci_dev *pdev;
>      struct msixtbl_entry *entry;
>  
> -    ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
> +    ASSERT(pcidevs_locked() || rw_is_locked(&d->pci_lock));
>      ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&d->event_lock));

I was hoping to just ack this patch, but the two changes above look
questionable to me: How can it be that holding _either_ lock is okay?
It's not obvious in this context that consumers have to hold both
locks now. In fact consumers looks to be the callers of
msixtbl_find_entry(), yet the list is RCU-protected. Whereas races
against themselves or against one another are avoided by holding
d->event_lock.

My only guess then for the original need of holding pcidevs_lock is
the use of msi_desc->dev, with the desire for the device to not go
away. Yet the description doesn't talk about interactions of the per-
domain PCI lock with that one at all; it all circles around the
domain'd vPCI lock.

Feels like I'm missing something that's obvious to everyone else.
Or maybe this part of the patch is actually unrelated, and should be
split off (with its own [proper] justification)? Or wouldn't it then
be better to also change the other paths leading here to acquire the
per-domain PCI lock?

> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int cf_check vmx_pi_update_irte(const struct vcpu *v,
>  
>      spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock);
>  
> -    ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
> +    ASSERT(pcidevs_locked() || rw_is_locked(&msi_desc->dev->domain->pci_lock));
>  
>      return iommu_update_ire_from_msi(msi_desc, &msi_desc->msg);

This then falls in the same category. And apparently there are more.

Jan


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-23 14:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-09 21:51 [PATCH v12 00/15] PCI devices passthrough on Arm, part 3 Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 01/15] vpci: use per-domain PCI lock to protect vpci structure Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-12 13:48   ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-12 17:54     ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-12 18:14       ` [PATCH v12.1 " Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-15  8:58         ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-15 15:42           ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-15  8:53       ` [PATCH v12 " Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-15 15:08         ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-15 19:43   ` [PATCH v12.2 " Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-19 13:42     ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-23 14:26     ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2024-01-23 15:23       ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-24  8:56         ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-24  9:39           ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-23 14:29     ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-24  5:07       ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-24  8:21         ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-24 20:21           ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-24  8:50         ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-23 14:32     ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-23 15:07       ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-24  5:00         ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-30 14:59           ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-24  8:48         ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-24  9:24           ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-24 11:34             ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-24 17:51               ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-25  7:43                 ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-25  9:05                   ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-25 11:23                     ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-25 12:33                       ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-30 15:04                         ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 02/15] vpci: restrict unhandled read/write operations for guests Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 03/15] vpci: add hooks for PCI device assign/de-assign Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-23 14:36   ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-30 19:22   ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 04/15] vpci/header: rework exit path in init_header() Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 05/15] vpci/header: implement guest BAR register handlers Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 06/15] rangeset: add RANGESETF_no_print flag Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 07/15] rangeset: add rangeset_purge() function Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-10 10:00   ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 08/15] vpci/header: handle p2m range sets per BAR Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 09/15] vpci/header: program p2m with guest BAR view Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-12 15:06   ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-12 20:31     ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-12 20:49       ` [PATCH v12.1 " Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-15  9:07     ` [PATCH v12 " Jan Beulich
2024-01-15 19:03       ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-15 19:44   ` [PATCH v12.2 " Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-17  3:01     ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-19 13:43       ` Roger Pau Monné
2024-01-19 14:28   ` [PATCH v12.3 " Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 10/15] vpci/header: emulate PCI_COMMAND register for guests Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-25 15:43   ` Jan Beulich
2024-02-01  4:50     ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-02-01  8:14       ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 11/15] vpci: add initial support for virtual PCI bus topology Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-12 11:46   ` George Dunlap
2024-01-12 13:50     ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-15 11:48       ` George Dunlap
2024-01-25 16:00   ` Jan Beulich
2024-02-02  3:30     ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 12/15] xen/arm: translate virtual PCI bus topology for guests Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 13/15] xen/arm: account IO handlers for emulated PCI MSI-X Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 14/15] xen/arm: vpci: permit access to guest vpci space Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-17  3:03   ` Stewart Hildebrand
2024-01-09 21:51 ` [PATCH v12 15/15] arm/vpci: honor access size when returning an error Stewart Hildebrand

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