From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Kai Huang <kaih.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com,
dyoung@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
toshi.kani@hpe.com, mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com,
devel@linuxdriverproject.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
alexandre.bounine@idt.com, ku
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 11:50:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160923095015.5nn52ekk2kkqixfi@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c2f7bb1d-cf3c-2373-c563-a1e72ff7b83a@gmail.com>
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 09:33:00PM +1200, Kai Huang wrote:
> How is this even possible? The spec clearly says under SEV only in long mode
> or PAE mode guest can control whether memory is encrypted via c-bit, and in
> other modes guest will be always in encrypted mode.
I was suggesting the hypervisor supplies the EFI ranges unencrypted. But
that is not a good idea because firmware data is exposed then, see same
thread from yesterday.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
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Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Kai Huang <kaih.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com,
dyoung@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
toshi.kani@hpe.com, mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com,
devel@linuxdriverproject.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 11:50:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160923095015.5nn52ekk2kkqixfi@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c2f7bb1d-cf3c-2373-c563-a1e72ff7b83a@gmail.com>
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 09:33:00PM +1200, Kai Huang wrote:
> How is this even possible? The spec clearly says under SEV only in long mode
> or PAE mode guest can control whether memory is encrypted via c-bit, and in
> other modes guest will be always in encrypted mode.
I was suggesting the hypervisor supplies the EFI ranges unencrypted. But
that is not a good idea because firmware data is exposed then, see same
thread from yesterday.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Kai Huang <kaih.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com,
dyoung@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
toshi.kani@hpe.com, mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com,
devel@linuxdriverproject.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 11:50:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160923095015.5nn52ekk2kkqixfi@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c2f7bb1d-cf3c-2373-c563-a1e72ff7b83a@gmail.com>
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 09:33:00PM +1200, Kai Huang wrote:
> How is this even possible? The spec clearly says under SEV only in long mode
> or PAE mode guest can control whether memory is encrypted via c-bit, and in
> other modes guest will be always in encrypted mode.
I was suggesting the hypervisor supplies the EFI ranges unencrypted. But
that is not a good idea because firmware data is exposed then, see same
thread from yesterday.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix ImendA?rffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG NA 1/4 rnberg)
--
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-23 9:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 255+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 9:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-13 9:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-13 9:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 17:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 17:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 15:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 15:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160922183759.7ahw2kbxit3epnzk-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-22 18:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23 9:33 ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23 9:33 ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23 9:33 ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23 9:50 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2016-09-23 9:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-23 9:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23 7:14 ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-23 7:14 ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-23 7:14 ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-24 12:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-24 12:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-24 12:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-13 10:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-13 10:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 17:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 17:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 17:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 20:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 20:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 19:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 19:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 19:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 21:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 21:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 21:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
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