From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 16:52:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161026145207.GM3334@pc.thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161026065654.19166-1-mic@digikod.net>
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On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 08:56:36AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The loaded Landlock eBPF programs can be triggered by a seccomp filter
> returning RET_LANDLOCK. In addition, a cookie (16-bit value) can be passed from
> a seccomp filter to eBPF programs. This allow flexible security policies
> between seccomp and Landlock.
Is this still up to date, or was that removed in v3?
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 16:52:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161026145207.GM3334@pc.thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161026065654.19166-1-mic@digikod.net>
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On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 08:56:36AM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The loaded Landlock eBPF programs can be triggered by a seccomp filter
> returning RET_LANDLOCK. In addition, a cookie (16-bit value) can be passed from
> a seccomp filter to eBPF programs. This allow flexible security policies
> between seccomp and Landlock.
Is this still up to date, or was that removed in v3?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-26 14:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-10-26 6:56 [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 01/18] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 02/18] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 7:19 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-10-26 7:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2016-10-26 13:52 ` David Sterba
2016-10-26 13:52 ` David Sterba
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 03/18] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 19:01 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-26 19:01 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-26 20:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 20:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 20:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-10-26 20:16 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 04/18] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 05/18] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 06/18] fs: Constify path_is_under()'s arguments Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 07/18] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 08/18] landlock: Handle file comparisons Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 09/18] landlock: Add manager functions Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 10/18] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 11/18] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 12/18] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach() Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 13/18] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with struct bpf_object Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 14/18] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 15/18] bpf/cgroup: Move capability check Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 16/18] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 17/18] landlock: Add update and debug access flags Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [RFC v4 18/18] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 6:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 14:52 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2016-10-26 14:52 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Jann Horn
2016-10-26 16:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 17:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-26 17:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-11-13 14:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-11-13 14:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-11-14 10:35 ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-11-14 10:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sargun Dhillon
2016-11-14 10:35 ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-11-14 20:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-11-14 20:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-11-14 20:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-11-14 20:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-11-13 17:38 Alexei Starovoitov
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