From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 19:47:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170606174804.31124-6-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170606174804.31124-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>
Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is
dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not
from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site
isn't relevant in assessing this.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/rng.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
index f46dac5288b9..e042437e64b4 100644
--- a/crypto/rng.c
+++ b/crypto/rng.c
@@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- get_random_bytes(buf, slen);
+ err = get_random_bytes_wait(buf, slen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
seed = buf;
}
err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
-
+out:
kzfree(buf);
return err;
}
--
2.13.0
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 19:47:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170606174804.31124-6-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170606174804.31124-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>
Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is
dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not
from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site
isn't relevant in assessing this.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
crypto/rng.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
index f46dac5288b9..e042437e64b4 100644
--- a/crypto/rng.c
+++ b/crypto/rng.c
@@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- get_random_bytes(buf, slen);
+ err = get_random_bytes_wait(buf, slen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
seed = buf;
}
err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
-
+out:
kzfree(buf);
return err;
}
--
2.13.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-06 17:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 109+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-06 17:47 [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:58 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07 23:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:05 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 1:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 1:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:41 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 2:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 21:58 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 0:41 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-17 3:45 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 14:23 ` Jeffrey Walton
[not found] ` <CAH8yC8nHX2r9cfQ0gNeJAUrgSfAS8V16dVHv35BRnLn-YprZCg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-06-17 18:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Koning
2017-06-17 18:50 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Antw: Re: [kernel-hardening] " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 13:16 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 13:16 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Antw: " Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Antw: Re: [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 8:04 ` Stephan Müller
[not found] ` <2639082.PtrrGWOPPL-jJGQKZiSfeo1haGO/jJMPxvVK+yQ3ZXh@public.gmane.org>
2017-06-26 1:23 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 1:23 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
[not found] ` <1498440189.26123.85.camel-XoQW25Eq2zviZyQQd+hFbcojREIfoBdhmpATvIKMPHk@public.gmane.org>
2017-06-26 17:38 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-26 17:38 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-30 6:02 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
[not found] ` <1678474.GnYBdSlWgs-b2PLbiJbNv8ftSvlWXw0+g@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Antw: " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 12:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-05 12:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:45 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:25 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:47 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 2:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 3:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:01 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 3:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:06 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 3:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 5:04 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 5:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 12:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:05 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-09 1:16 ` [PATCH] bluetooth: ensure RNG is properly seeded before powerup Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:19 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 8:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-15 11:03 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-15 11:59 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 15:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 17:55 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 19:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-18 19:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:43 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-08 8:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 12:33 ` [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 12:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
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