From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 09:38:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170620073845.nteivabsgcdy7gv4@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616185115.18967.79622.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:51:15PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
> Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
> the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
> encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.
>
> The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
> stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
>
> Because of the need to have the routines available to head_64.S, the
> mem_encrypt.c is always built and #ifdefs in mem_encrypt.c will provide
> functionality or stub routines depending on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 +++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 4 +---
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index b99d469..9a78277 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
> */
>
> #include <linux/linkage.h>
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>
> /*
> * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
> @@ -19,3 +22,24 @@
> */
> unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
> +
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
> +{
> +}
Just the minor:
void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
in case you have to respin.
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>,
linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
"Matt Fleming"
<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Alexander Potapenko"
<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"Larry Woodman"
<lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin"
<mst-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Andrey Ryabinin"
<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky"
<boris.ostrovsky-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>,
kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 09:38:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170620073845.nteivabsgcdy7gv4@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616185115.18967.79622.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:51:15PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
> Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
> the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
> encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.
>
> The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
> stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
>
> Because of the need to have the routines available to head_64.S, the
> mem_encrypt.c is always built and #ifdefs in mem_encrypt.c will provide
> functionality or stub routines depending on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 +++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 4 +---
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index b99d469..9a78277 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
> */
>
> #include <linux/linkage.h>
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>
> /*
> * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
> @@ -19,3 +22,24 @@
> */
> unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
> +
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
> +{
> +}
Just the minor:
void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
in case you have to respin.
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp-l3A5Bk7waGM@public.gmane.org>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 09:38:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170620073845.nteivabsgcdy7gv4@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616185115.18967.79622.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:51:15PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
> Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
> the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
> encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.
>
> The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
> stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
>
> Because of the need to have the routines available to head_64.S, the
> mem_encrypt.c is always built and #ifdefs in mem_encrypt.c will provide
> functionality or stub routines depending on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 +++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 4 +---
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index b99d469..9a78277 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
> */
>
> #include <linux/linkage.h>
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>
> /*
> * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
> @@ -19,3 +22,24 @@
> */
> unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
> +
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
> +{
> +}
Just the minor:
void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
in case you have to respin.
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
xen-devel@lists.xen.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 09:38:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170620073845.nteivabsgcdy7gv4@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616185115.18967.79622.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 01:51:15PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
> Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
> the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
> encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.
>
> The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
> stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
>
> Because of the need to have the routines available to head_64.S, the
> mem_encrypt.c is always built and #ifdefs in mem_encrypt.c will provide
> functionality or stub routines depending on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 8 +++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 4 +---
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index b99d469..9a78277 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
> */
>
> #include <linux/linkage.h>
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>
> /*
> * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
> @@ -19,3 +22,24 @@
> */
> unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
> +
> +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
> +{
> +}
Just the minor:
void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
in case you have to respin.
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-20 7:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 384+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-16 18:49 [PATCH v7 00/36] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 01/36] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 02/36] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 7:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 7:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 7:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 7:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 7:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 04/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 05/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 7:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 7:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 7:38 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-06-20 7:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 7:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 7:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 7:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 7:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 09/36] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 7:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 7:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 8:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 8:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 8:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 8:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 8:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 12/36] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 13/36] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 15/36] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:03 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:58 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 11:04 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04 ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 8:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 8:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 8:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 8:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 8:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 22/36] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 9:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 9:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 9:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 9:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 9:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 9:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 9:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 9:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 9:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 9:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 10:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 15:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 9:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 9:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 9:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 9:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 9:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 28/36] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 14:08 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 30/36] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 10:40 ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40 ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40 ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40 ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40 ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-23 9:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 9:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 9:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 9:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 9:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 9:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 9:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 9:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 9:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 9:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 10:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 15:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 16:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 10:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
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