From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>, Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>, "Edgar E. Iglesias" <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>, Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>, Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>, Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>, "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>, Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>, Peter Crosthwaite <crosthwaite.peter@gmail.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Subject: [PATCH v11 18/28] sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 10:50:28 -0600 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180307165038.88640-19-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180307165038.88640-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware. VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using query-sev-launch-measure QMP command. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++++ target/i386/sev.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/sev_i386.h | 2 ++ target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+) diff --git a/target/i386/sev-stub.c b/target/i386/sev-stub.c index c86d8c139237..2f61c32ec975 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev-stub.c +++ b/target/i386/sev-stub.c @@ -39,3 +39,8 @@ uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void) { return 0; } + +char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void) +{ + return NULL; +} diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 6a5f026e8fc6..e01c753be3ec 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -511,6 +511,68 @@ sev_launch_update_data(uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) return ret; } +static void +sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused) +{ + int ret, error; + guchar *data; + SEVState *s = sev_state; + struct kvm_sev_launch_measure *measurement; + + if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_LUPDATE)) { + return; + } + + measurement = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure, 1); + + /* query the measurement blob length */ + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, + measurement, &error); + if (!measurement->len) { + error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(errno)); + goto free_measurement; + } + + data = g_new0(guchar, measurement->len); + measurement->uaddr = (unsigned long)data; + + /* get the measurement blob */ + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, + measurement, &error); + if (ret) { + error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(errno)); + goto free_data; + } + + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_LSECRET); + + /* encode the measurement value and emit the event */ + s->measurement = g_base64_encode(data, measurement->len); + trace_kvm_sev_launch_measurement(s->measurement); + +free_data: + g_free(data); +free_measurement: + g_free(measurement); +} + +char * +sev_get_launch_measurement(void) +{ + if (sev_state && + sev_state->state >= SEV_STATE_LSECRET) { + return g_strdup(sev_state->measurement); + } + + return NULL; +} + +static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { + .notify = sev_launch_get_measure, +}; + void * sev_guest_init(const char *id) { @@ -588,6 +650,7 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) } ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier); + qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify); return s; err: diff --git a/target/i386/sev_i386.h b/target/i386/sev_i386.h index c06be12c8079..c21d1f31d712 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev_i386.h +++ b/target/i386/sev_i386.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void); extern SevInfo *sev_get_info(void); extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void); extern uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void); +extern char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void); typedef struct QSevGuestInfo QSevGuestInfo; typedef struct QSevGuestInfoClass QSevGuestInfoClass; @@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ struct SEVState { uint32_t handle; int sev_fd; SevState state; + gchar *measurement; }; typedef struct SEVState SEVState; diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events index c0cd8e93217f..f7a1a1e6b85c 100644 --- a/target/i386/trace-events +++ b/target/i386/trace-events @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu" kvm_sev_change_state(const char *old, const char *new) "%s -> %s" kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p" kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64 +kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s" -- 2.14.3
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>, Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>, "Daniel P . Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>, "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, "Edgar E. Iglesias" <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>, Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Peter Crosthwaite <crosthwaite.peter@gmail.com>, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>, Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>, Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>, Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 18/28] sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 10:50:28 -0600 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180307165038.88640-19-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180307165038.88640-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware. VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using query-sev-launch-measure QMP command. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++++ target/i386/sev.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/sev_i386.h | 2 ++ target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+) diff --git a/target/i386/sev-stub.c b/target/i386/sev-stub.c index c86d8c139237..2f61c32ec975 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev-stub.c +++ b/target/i386/sev-stub.c @@ -39,3 +39,8 @@ uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void) { return 0; } + +char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void) +{ + return NULL; +} diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 6a5f026e8fc6..e01c753be3ec 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -511,6 +511,68 @@ sev_launch_update_data(uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len) return ret; } +static void +sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused) +{ + int ret, error; + guchar *data; + SEVState *s = sev_state; + struct kvm_sev_launch_measure *measurement; + + if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_LUPDATE)) { + return; + } + + measurement = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure, 1); + + /* query the measurement blob length */ + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, + measurement, &error); + if (!measurement->len) { + error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(errno)); + goto free_measurement; + } + + data = g_new0(guchar, measurement->len); + measurement->uaddr = (unsigned long)data; + + /* get the measurement blob */ + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, + measurement, &error); + if (ret) { + error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(errno)); + goto free_data; + } + + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_LSECRET); + + /* encode the measurement value and emit the event */ + s->measurement = g_base64_encode(data, measurement->len); + trace_kvm_sev_launch_measurement(s->measurement); + +free_data: + g_free(data); +free_measurement: + g_free(measurement); +} + +char * +sev_get_launch_measurement(void) +{ + if (sev_state && + sev_state->state >= SEV_STATE_LSECRET) { + return g_strdup(sev_state->measurement); + } + + return NULL; +} + +static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { + .notify = sev_launch_get_measure, +}; + void * sev_guest_init(const char *id) { @@ -588,6 +650,7 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) } ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier); + qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify); return s; err: diff --git a/target/i386/sev_i386.h b/target/i386/sev_i386.h index c06be12c8079..c21d1f31d712 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev_i386.h +++ b/target/i386/sev_i386.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void); extern SevInfo *sev_get_info(void); extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void); extern uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void); +extern char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void); typedef struct QSevGuestInfo QSevGuestInfo; typedef struct QSevGuestInfoClass QSevGuestInfoClass; @@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ struct SEVState { uint32_t handle; int sev_fd; SevState state; + gchar *measurement; }; typedef struct SEVState SEVState; diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events index c0cd8e93217f..f7a1a1e6b85c 100644 --- a/target/i386/trace-events +++ b/target/i386/trace-events @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu" kvm_sev_change_state(const char *old, const char *new) "%s -> %s" kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p" kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64 +kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s" -- 2.14.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-07 16:50 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-03-07 16:50 [PATCH v11 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 01/28] memattrs: add debug attribute Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 02/28] exec: add ram_debug_ops support Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 03/28] exec: add debug version of physical memory read and write API Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 04/28] monitor/i386: use debug APIs when accessing guest memory Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 05/28] machine: add -memory-encryption property Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 06/28] kvm: update kvm.h to include memory encryption ioctls Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 07/28] docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 08/28] target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 09/28] qmp: add query-sev command Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 10/28] include: add psp-sev.h header file Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 11/28] sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 12/28] sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 13/28] kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 14/28] hmp: add 'info sev' command Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 15/28] sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 16/28] sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 17/28] target/i386: encrypt bios rom Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` Brijesh Singh [this message] 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 18/28] sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 19/28] sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 20/28] hw/i386: set ram_debug_ops when memory encryption is enabled Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 21/28] sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 17:27 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-03-07 17:27 ` [Qemu-devel] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-03-07 17:40 ` Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 17:40 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 18:24 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-03-07 18:24 ` [Qemu-devel] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-03-07 19:38 ` Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 19:38 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 20:11 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-03-07 20:11 ` [Qemu-devel] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 22/28] target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 23/28] qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 24/28] sev/i386: add migration blocker Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 25/28] cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 26/28] qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 27/28] sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities() Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [PATCH v11 28/28] tests/qmp-test: blacklist sev specific qmp commands Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 16:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 17:24 ` [PATCH v11 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) no-reply 2018-03-07 17:24 ` [Qemu-devel] " no-reply 2018-03-07 20:35 ` Brijesh Singh 2018-03-07 20:35 ` [Qemu-devel] " Brijesh Singh 2018-03-08 1:10 ` Fam Zheng 2018-03-08 1:10 ` [Qemu-devel] " Fam Zheng
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