All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 68/95] prctl: Add force disable speculation
Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 23:11:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180521210500.294116876@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180521210447.219380974@linuxfoundation.org>

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 356e4bfff2c5489e016fdb925adbf12a1e3950ee upstream

For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst |   34 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                |   35 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
 fs/proc/array.c                           |    3 ++
 include/linux/sched.h                     |   10 +++++++-
 include/uapi/linux/prctl.h                |    1 
 5 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -25,19 +25,21 @@ PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
 -----------------------
 
 PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
-which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-2 with
+which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-3 with
 the following meaning:
 
-==== ================ ===================================================
-Bit  Define           Description
-==== ================ ===================================================
-0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL    Mitigation can be controlled per task by
-                      PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
-1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE   The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
-                      disabled
-2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE  The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
-                      enabled
-==== ================ ===================================================
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+Bit  Define                Description
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL         Mitigation can be controlled per task by
+                           PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE        The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
+                           disabled
+2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE       The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
+                           enabled
+3    PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A
+                           subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.
+==== ===================== ===================================================
 
 If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
 
@@ -47,9 +49,11 @@ misfeature will fail.
 
 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
 -----------------------
+
 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
 is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
-in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
+in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE or
+PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
 
 Common error codes
 ------------------
@@ -70,10 +74,13 @@ Value   Meaning
 0       Success
 
 ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
-        PR_SPEC_DISABLE
+        PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE
 
 ENXIO   Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.
         See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+
+EPERM   Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller
+        tried to enable it again.
 ======= =================================================================
 
 Speculation misfeature controls
@@ -84,3 +91,4 @@ Speculation misfeature controls
    * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -533,21 +533,37 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation()
 
 static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 {
-	bool rds = !!test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+	bool update;
 
 	if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
-	if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_ENABLE)
-		clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
-	else
-		set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+	switch (ctrl) {
+	case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+		/* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
+		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+			return -EPERM;
+		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
 	 * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
 	 */
-	if (task == current && rds != !!test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS))
+	if (task == current && update)
 		speculative_store_bypass_update();
 
 	return 0;
@@ -559,7 +575,9 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_str
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
 		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
-		if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS))
+		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+		if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
 			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
 	default:
@@ -572,9 +590,6 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_str
 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
 			     unsigned long ctrl)
 {
-	if (ctrl != PR_SPEC_ENABLE && ctrl != PR_SPEC_DISABLE)
-		return -ERANGE;
-
 	switch (which) {
 	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 		return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct s
 	case PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED:
 		seq_printf(m, "not vulnerable");
 		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		seq_printf(m, "thread force mitigated");
+		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
 		seq_printf(m, "thread mitigated");
 		break;
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1363,7 +1363,8 @@ static inline bool is_percpu_thread(void
 #define PFA_NO_NEW_PRIVS		0	/* May not gain new privileges. */
 #define PFA_SPREAD_PAGE			1	/* Spread page cache over cpuset */
 #define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB			2	/* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
-
+#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_DISABLE		3	/* Speculative Store Bypass disabled */
+#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE	4	/* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/
 
 #define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func)					\
 	static inline bool task_##func(struct task_struct *p)		\
@@ -1388,6 +1389,13 @@ TASK_PFA_TEST(SPREAD_SLAB, spread_slab)
 TASK_PFA_SET(SPREAD_SLAB, spread_slab)
 TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPREAD_SLAB, spread_slab)
 
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
+TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
+
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
+
 static inline void
 current_restore_flags(unsigned long orig_flags, unsigned long flags)
 {
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -208,5 +208,6 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL			(1UL << 0)
 # define PR_SPEC_ENABLE			(1UL << 1)
 # define PR_SPEC_DISABLE		(1UL << 2)
+# define PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE		(1UL << 3)
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-21 21:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 103+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.14 00/95] 4.14.43-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/95] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/95] usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/95] usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/95] usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/95] usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/95] ALSA: usb: mixer: volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/95] ALSA: hda: Add Lenovo C50 All in one to the power_save blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/95] ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/95] spi: pxa2xx: Allow 64-bit DMA Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/95] spi: bcm-qspi: Avoid setting MSPI_CDRAM_PCS for spi-nor master Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/95] spi: bcm-qspi: Always read and set BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/95] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS save/restore: protect kvm_read_guest() calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/95] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/95] powerpc: Dont preempt_disable() in show_cpuinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/95] vfio: ccw: fix cleanup if cp_prefetch fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/95] tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/95] tee: shm: fix use-after-free via temporarily dropped reference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/95] netfilter: nf_tables: free set name in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/95] netfilter: nf_tables: cant fail after linking rule into active rule list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/95] netfilter: nf_socket: Fix out of bounds access in nf_sk_lookup_slow_v{4,6} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/95] i2c: designware: fix poll-after-enable regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/95] powerpc/powernv: Fix NVRAM sleep in invalid context when crashing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/95] drm: Match sysfs name in link removal to link creation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/95] lib/test_bitmap.c: fix bitmap optimisation tests to report errors correctly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/95] radix tree: fix multi-order iteration race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/95] mm: dont allow deferred pages with NEED_PER_CPU_KM Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/95] drm/i915/gen9: Add WaClearHIZ_WM_CHICKEN3 for bxt and glk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/95] s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/95] s390/cpum_sf: ensure sample frequency of perf event attributes is non-zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/95] s390/qdio: dont release memory in qdio_setup_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/95] s390: remove indirect branch from do_softirq_own_stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/95] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/95] x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/95] efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32 definition for mixed mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/95] ARM: 8771/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/95] x86/mm: Drop TS_COMPAT on 64-bit exec() syscall Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/95] tick/broadcast: Use for_each_cpu() specially on UP kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/95] ARM: 8769/1: kprobes: Fix to use get_kprobe_ctlblk after irq-disabed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/95] ARM: 8770/1: kprobes: Prohibit probing on optimized_callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/95] ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/95] Btrfs: fix xattr loss after power failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/95] Btrfs: send, fix invalid access to commit roots due to concurrent snapshotting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/95] btrfs: property: Set incompat flag if lzo/zstd compression is set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/95] btrfs: fix crash when trying to resume balance without the resume flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/95] btrfs: Split btrfs_del_delalloc_inode into 2 functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/95] btrfs: Fix delalloc inodes invalidation during transaction abort Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/95] btrfs: fix reading stale metadata blocks after degraded raid1 mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 48/95] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 49/95] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 50/95] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 51/95] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 52/95] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 53/95] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 54/95] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 55/95] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 56/95] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 57/95] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 58/95] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 59/95] x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 60/95] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 61/95] prctl: Add speculation control prctls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 62/95] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 63/95] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 64/95] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 65/95] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 66/95] seccomp: Enable " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 67/95] x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 69/95] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 70/95] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 71/95] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 72/95] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 73/95] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 74/95] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 75/95] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 76/95] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 77/95] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 78/95] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 79/95] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 80/95] KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 81/95] x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 82/95] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 83/95] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 84/95] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 85/95] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 86/95] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 87/95] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 88/95] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 89/95] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 90/95] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 91/95] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 92/95] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 93/95] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 94/95] KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 95/95] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-22  2:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/95] 4.14.43-stable review kernelci.org bot
2018-05-22 11:03 ` Naresh Kamboju
     [not found] ` <CA+res+SgOtr-k80FOBNCczL4adhsqAocFKExoR1-J4-Cq95vQg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-05-22 13:21   ` Jinpu Wang
2018-05-22 14:02     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-22 13:29 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-05-22 20:44 ` Shuah Khan

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180521210500.294116876@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.