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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 85/95] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD
Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 23:12:15 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180521210502.621289723@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180521210447.219380974@linuxfoundation.org>

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 1f50ddb4f4189243c05926b842dc1a0332195f31 upstream

The AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is a per core MSR on Family 17H CPUs. That means when
hyperthreading is enabled the SSBD bit toggle needs to take both cores into
account. Otherwise the following situation can happen:

CPU0		CPU1

disable SSB
		disable SSB
		enable  SSB <- Enables it for the Core, i.e. for CPU0 as well

So after the SSB enable on CPU1 the task on CPU0 runs with SSB enabled
again.

On Intel the SSBD control is per core as well, but the synchronization
logic is implemented behind the per thread SPEC_CTRL MSR. It works like
this:

  CORE_SPEC_CTRL = THREAD0_SPEC_CTRL | THREAD1_SPEC_CTRL

i.e. if one of the threads enables a mitigation then this affects both and
the mitigation is only disabled in the core when both threads disabled it.

Add the necessary synchronization logic for AMD family 17H. Unfortunately
that requires a spinlock to serialize the access to the MSR, but the locks
are only shared between siblings.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h |    6 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c        |  125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c        |    5 +
 3 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg
 	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+extern void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void);
+#else
+static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
+#endif
+
 extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(void);
 
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -280,22 +280,135 @@ static inline void switch_to_bitmap(stru
 	}
 }
 
-static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+
+struct ssb_state {
+	struct ssb_state	*shared_state;
+	raw_spinlock_t		lock;
+	unsigned int		disable_state;
+	unsigned long		local_state;
+};
+
+#define LSTATE_SSB	0
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct ssb_state, ssb_state);
+
+void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void)
+{
+	struct ssb_state *st = this_cpu_ptr(&ssb_state);
+	unsigned int this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	unsigned int cpu;
+
+	st->local_state = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Shared state setup happens once on the first bringup
+	 * of the CPU. It's not destroyed on CPU hotunplug.
+	 */
+	if (st->shared_state)
+		return;
+
+	raw_spin_lock_init(&st->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Go over HT siblings and check whether one of them has set up the
+	 * shared state pointer already.
+	 */
+	for_each_cpu(cpu, topology_sibling_cpumask(this_cpu)) {
+		if (cpu == this_cpu)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!per_cpu(ssb_state, cpu).shared_state)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Link it to the state of the sibling: */
+		st->shared_state = per_cpu(ssb_state, cpu).shared_state;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * First HT sibling to come up on the core.  Link shared state of
+	 * the first HT sibling to itself. The siblings on the same core
+	 * which come up later will see the shared state pointer and link
+	 * themself to the state of this CPU.
+	 */
+	st->shared_state = st;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Logic is: First HT sibling enables SSBD for both siblings in the core
+ * and last sibling to disable it, disables it for the whole core. This how
+ * MSR_SPEC_CTRL works in "hardware":
+ *
+ *  CORE_SPEC_CTRL = THREAD0_SPEC_CTRL | THREAD1_SPEC_CTRL
+ */
+static __always_inline void amd_set_core_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
 {
-	u64 msr;
+	struct ssb_state *st = this_cpu_ptr(&ssb_state);
+	u64 msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) {
-		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN)) {
+		msr |= ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) {
+		/*
+		 * Since this can race with prctl(), block reentry on the
+		 * same CPU.
+		 */
+		if (__test_and_set_bit(LSTATE_SSB, &st->local_state))
+			return;
+
+		msr |= x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+		raw_spin_lock(&st->shared_state->lock);
+		/* First sibling enables SSBD: */
+		if (!st->shared_state->disable_state)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+		st->shared_state->disable_state++;
+		raw_spin_unlock(&st->shared_state->lock);
 	} else {
-		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+		if (!__test_and_clear_bit(LSTATE_SSB, &st->local_state))
+			return;
+
+		raw_spin_lock(&st->shared_state->lock);
+		st->shared_state->disable_state--;
+		if (!st->shared_state->disable_state)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+		raw_spin_unlock(&st->shared_state->lock);
 	}
 }
+#else
+static __always_inline void amd_set_core_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+	u64 msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+}
+#endif
+
+static __always_inline void intel_set_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+	u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+		amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
+	else
+		intel_set_ssb_state(tifn);
+}
 
 void speculative_store_bypass_update(void)
 {
+	preempt_disable();
 	__speculative_store_bypass_update(current_thread_info()->flags);
+	preempt_enable();
 }
 
 void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
 #include <asm/i8259.h>
 #include <asm/realmode.h>
 #include <asm/misc.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 
 /* Number of siblings per CPU package */
 int smp_num_siblings = 1;
@@ -245,6 +246,8 @@ static void notrace start_secondary(void
 	 */
 	check_tsc_sync_target();
 
+	speculative_store_bypass_ht_init();
+
 	/*
 	 * Lock vector_lock and initialize the vectors on this cpu
 	 * before setting the cpu online. We must set it online with
@@ -1349,6 +1352,8 @@ void __init native_smp_prepare_cpus(unsi
 	set_mtrr_aps_delayed_init();
 
 	smp_quirk_init_udelay();
+
+	speculative_store_bypass_ht_init();
 }
 
 void arch_enable_nonboot_cpus_begin(void)

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-21 21:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 103+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.14 00/95] 4.14.43-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/95] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/95] usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/95] usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/95] usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/95] usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/95] ALSA: usb: mixer: volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/95] ALSA: hda: Add Lenovo C50 All in one to the power_save blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/95] ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/95] spi: pxa2xx: Allow 64-bit DMA Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/95] spi: bcm-qspi: Avoid setting MSPI_CDRAM_PCS for spi-nor master Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/95] spi: bcm-qspi: Always read and set BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/95] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS save/restore: protect kvm_read_guest() calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/95] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/95] powerpc: Dont preempt_disable() in show_cpuinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/95] vfio: ccw: fix cleanup if cp_prefetch fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/95] tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/95] tee: shm: fix use-after-free via temporarily dropped reference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/95] netfilter: nf_tables: free set name in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/95] netfilter: nf_tables: cant fail after linking rule into active rule list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/95] netfilter: nf_socket: Fix out of bounds access in nf_sk_lookup_slow_v{4,6} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/95] i2c: designware: fix poll-after-enable regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/95] powerpc/powernv: Fix NVRAM sleep in invalid context when crashing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/95] drm: Match sysfs name in link removal to link creation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/95] lib/test_bitmap.c: fix bitmap optimisation tests to report errors correctly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/95] radix tree: fix multi-order iteration race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/95] mm: dont allow deferred pages with NEED_PER_CPU_KM Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/95] drm/i915/gen9: Add WaClearHIZ_WM_CHICKEN3 for bxt and glk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/95] s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/95] s390/cpum_sf: ensure sample frequency of perf event attributes is non-zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/95] s390/qdio: dont release memory in qdio_setup_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/95] s390: remove indirect branch from do_softirq_own_stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/95] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/95] x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/95] efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32 definition for mixed mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/95] ARM: 8771/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/95] x86/mm: Drop TS_COMPAT on 64-bit exec() syscall Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/95] tick/broadcast: Use for_each_cpu() specially on UP kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/95] ARM: 8769/1: kprobes: Fix to use get_kprobe_ctlblk after irq-disabed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/95] ARM: 8770/1: kprobes: Prohibit probing on optimized_callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/95] ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/95] Btrfs: fix xattr loss after power failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/95] Btrfs: send, fix invalid access to commit roots due to concurrent snapshotting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/95] btrfs: property: Set incompat flag if lzo/zstd compression is set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/95] btrfs: fix crash when trying to resume balance without the resume flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/95] btrfs: Split btrfs_del_delalloc_inode into 2 functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/95] btrfs: Fix delalloc inodes invalidation during transaction abort Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/95] btrfs: fix reading stale metadata blocks after degraded raid1 mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 48/95] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 49/95] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 50/95] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 51/95] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 52/95] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 53/95] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 54/95] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 55/95] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 56/95] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 57/95] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 58/95] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 59/95] x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 60/95] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 61/95] prctl: Add speculation control prctls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 62/95] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 63/95] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 64/95] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 65/95] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 66/95] seccomp: Enable " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 67/95] x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 68/95] prctl: Add force disable speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 69/95] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 70/95] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 71/95] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 72/95] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 73/95] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 74/95] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 75/95] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 76/95] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 77/95] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 78/95] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 79/95] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 80/95] KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 81/95] x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 82/95] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 83/95] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 84/95] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 86/95] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 87/95] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 88/95] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 89/95] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 90/95] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 91/95] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 92/95] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 93/95] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 94/95] KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 95/95] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-22  2:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/95] 4.14.43-stable review kernelci.org bot
2018-05-22 11:03 ` Naresh Kamboju
     [not found] ` <CA+res+SgOtr-k80FOBNCczL4adhsqAocFKExoR1-J4-Cq95vQg@mail.gmail.com>
2018-05-22 13:21   ` Jinpu Wang
2018-05-22 14:02     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-22 13:29 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-05-22 20:44 ` Shuah Khan

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