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From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, mark.rutland@arm.com,
	mlangsdo@redhat.com,
	"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	julien.thierry@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, steven.price@arm.com,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	ykaukab@suse.de, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	shankerd@codeaurora.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] sysfs/cpu: Add "Unknown" vulnerability state
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 16:37:40 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190103163740.GC3529@e103592.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190103004921.1928921-2-jeremy.linton@arm.com>

On Wed, Jan 02, 2019 at 06:49:15PM -0600, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> There is a lot of variation in the Arm ecosystem. Because of this,
> there exist possible cases where the kernel cannot authoritatively
> determine if a machine is vulnerable.
> 
> Rather than guess the vulnerability status in cases where
> the mitigation is disabled or the firmware isn't responding
> correctly, we need to display an "Unknown" state.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> ---
>  Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 +
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
> index 9605dbd4b5b5..876103fddfa4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
> @@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
>  		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
>  		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
>  		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
> +		"Unknown"    	  The kernel is unable to make a determination

Do some of the "Unknown" cases arise from the vulnerability detection
code being compiled out of the kernel?

I wonder whether at least the detection support should be mandatory.
sysfs is not very useful as a standard vulnerability reporting interface
unless we make best efforts to always populate it with real information.


Also, does "Unknown" convey anything beyond what is indicated by the
sysfs entry being omitted altogether?

Cheers
---Dave

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, julien.thierry@arm.com,
	mlangsdo@redhat.com,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
	will.deacon@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	steven.price@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	ykaukab@suse.de, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] sysfs/cpu: Add "Unknown" vulnerability state
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 16:37:40 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190103163740.GC3529@e103592.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190103004921.1928921-2-jeremy.linton@arm.com>

On Wed, Jan 02, 2019 at 06:49:15PM -0600, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> There is a lot of variation in the Arm ecosystem. Because of this,
> there exist possible cases where the kernel cannot authoritatively
> determine if a machine is vulnerable.
> 
> Rather than guess the vulnerability status in cases where
> the mitigation is disabled or the firmware isn't responding
> correctly, we need to display an "Unknown" state.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> ---
>  Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 +
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
> index 9605dbd4b5b5..876103fddfa4 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
> @@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
>  		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
>  		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
>  		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
> +		"Unknown"    	  The kernel is unable to make a determination

Do some of the "Unknown" cases arise from the vulnerability detection
code being compiled out of the kernel?

I wonder whether at least the detection support should be mandatory.
sysfs is not very useful as a standard vulnerability reporting interface
unless we make best efforts to always populate it with real information.


Also, does "Unknown" convey anything beyond what is indicated by the
sysfs entry being omitted altogether?

Cheers
---Dave

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-01-03 16:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-03  0:49 [PATCH v2 0/7] add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] sysfs/cpu: Add "Unknown" vulnerability state Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  9:38   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-01-03  9:38     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-01-03 16:38     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03 16:38       ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03 16:48       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-01-03 16:48         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-01-04 14:08         ` Dave Martin
2019-01-04 14:08           ` Dave Martin
2019-01-04 14:18           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-01-04 14:18             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-01-04 14:55             ` Will Deacon
2019-01-04 14:55               ` Will Deacon
2019-01-03 16:37   ` Dave Martin [this message]
2019-01-03 16:37     ` Dave Martin
2019-01-03 16:46     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03 16:46       ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03 19:30       ` Stefan Wahren
2019-01-03 19:30         ` Stefan Wahren
2019-01-03 20:32         ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03 20:32           ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-04 10:13           ` Will Deacon
2019-01-04 10:13             ` Will Deacon
2019-01-03  0:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] arm64: kpti: move check for non-vulnerable CPUs to a function Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-01-03  0:49   ` Jeremy Linton

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