From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Cc: jmorris@namei.org, Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:43:40 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190621064340.GB4528@localhost.localdomain> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190326182742.16950-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> On 03/26/19 at 11:27am, Matthew Garrett wrote: > From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> > > When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through > kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down. > > [Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch > and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with > other lockdowns. Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA > integration, which will be replaced by integrating with the IMA > architecture policy patches.] > > Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> > cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org > --- > kernel/kexec_file.c | 6 ++++++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > index 67f3a866eabe..a1cc37c8b43b 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > @@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, > } > > ret = 0; > + > + if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY)) { > + ret = -EPERM; > + goto out; > + } > + Checking here is late, it would be good to move the check to earlier code around below code: /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) return -EPERM; > break; > > /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable > -- > 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog > > > _______________________________________________ > kexec mailing list > kexec@lists.infradead.org > http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec Thanks Dave
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, jmorris@namei.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:43:40 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190621064340.GB4528@localhost.localdomain> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190326182742.16950-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> On 03/26/19 at 11:27am, Matthew Garrett wrote: > From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> > > When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through > kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down. > > [Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch > and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with > other lockdowns. Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA > integration, which will be replaced by integrating with the IMA > architecture policy patches.] > > Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> > cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org > --- > kernel/kexec_file.c | 6 ++++++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > index 67f3a866eabe..a1cc37c8b43b 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > @@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, > } > > ret = 0; > + > + if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY)) { > + ret = -EPERM; > + goto out; > + } > + Checking here is late, it would be good to move the check to earlier code around below code: /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) return -EPERM; > break; > > /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable > -- > 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog > > > _______________________________________________ > kexec mailing list > kexec@lists.infradead.org > http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec Thanks Dave _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-21 6:43 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-03-26 18:27 [PATCH V31 00/25] Add support for kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 01/25] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 02/25] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 03/25] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 04/25] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 05/25] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 06/25] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-21 6:34 ` Dave Young 2019-06-21 6:34 ` Dave Young 2019-06-21 6:34 ` Dave Young 2019-06-21 20:13 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-21 20:13 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-21 20:14 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-21 20:14 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-21 20:14 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 07/25] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-21 6:43 ` Dave Young [this message] 2019-06-21 6:43 ` Dave Young 2019-06-21 20:18 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-21 20:18 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-21 20:18 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-24 1:52 ` Dave Young 2019-06-24 1:52 ` Dave Young 2019-06-24 21:06 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-24 21:06 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-24 21:27 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-06-24 21:27 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-06-25 0:02 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-25 0:02 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-06-25 1:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-06-25 1:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2019-06-25 2:51 ` Dave Young 2019-06-25 2:51 ` Dave Young 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 08/25] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 09/25] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 10/25] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 20:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-26 21:19 ` Alex Williamson 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 11/25] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 20:56 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 12/25] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 13/25] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 14/25] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 15/25] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 16/25] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 17/25] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 18/25] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 19/25] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett 2019-03-27 15:57 ` Steven Rostedt 2019-03-27 16:55 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 20/25] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 21/25] Lock down kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 22/25] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 19:21 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 23/25] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 24/25] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 18:27 ` [PATCH V31 25/25] debugfs: Disable open() when kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett 2019-03-26 19:20 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-26 19:21 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-27 0:30 ` Greg KH 2019-03-27 4:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-27 5:06 ` Greg KH 2019-03-27 5:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-27 5:33 ` Greg KH 2019-03-27 16:53 ` James Morris 2019-03-27 17:39 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-27 17:42 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-27 18:29 ` Greg KH 2019-03-27 18:31 ` Greg KH 2019-03-27 0:31 ` Greg KH 2019-03-27 2:06 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-03-27 2:35 ` Greg KH
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