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From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>,
	Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 13/20] fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2019 20:39:37 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190813003937.GK28705@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190805162521.90882-14-ebiggers@kernel.org>

On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 09:25:14AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2".  It has the following changes
> from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):
> 
> - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as
>   input to HKDF-SHA512.  This is more flexible and less error-prone, and
>   it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF.
>   Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:
> 
>     - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.
> 
>     - Per-mode keys.  These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY
>       flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly.
>       These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when
>       support for it is added.
> 
>     - Key identifiers (see below).
> 
> - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier,
>   which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512.  This prevents
>   users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or
>   directory.  This was easily possible with v1 policies, which
>   identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.
> 
> - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a
>   process-subscribed keyring.
> 
> The following UAPI additions are made:
> 
> - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a
>   fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy.  It's disambiguated
>   from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.
> 
> - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added.  It allows
>   getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or
>   directory.  The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not
>   be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which
>   policy structure is expected.  The new ioctl includes a size field, so
>   it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.
> 
> - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
>   and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2
>   encryption policies.  Such keys are kept logically separate from keys
>   for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather
>   than by 'descriptor'.  The 'identifier' need not be provided when
>   adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.
> 
> This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the
> same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
> capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  However, the next patch will carefully take
> advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow
> non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full
> replacement for v1 policies.
> 
> (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
>     fscrypt_context::format is 1.  But I believe it makes the most sense
>     to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the
>     numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Looks good, feel free to add:

Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 13/20] fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 00:39:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190813003937.GK28705@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190805162521.90882-14-ebiggers@kernel.org>

On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 09:25:14AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2".  It has the following changes
> from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):
> 
> - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as
>   input to HKDF-SHA512.  This is more flexible and less error-prone, and
>   it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF.
>   Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:
> 
>     - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.
> 
>     - Per-mode keys.  These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY
>       flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly.
>       These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when
>       support for it is added.
> 
>     - Key identifiers (see below).
> 
> - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier,
>   which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512.  This prevents
>   users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or
>   directory.  This was easily possible with v1 policies, which
>   identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.
> 
> - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a
>   process-subscribed keyring.
> 
> The following UAPI additions are made:
> 
> - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a
>   fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy.  It's disambiguated
>   from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.
> 
> - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added.  It allows
>   getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or
>   directory.  The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not
>   be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which
>   policy structure is expected.  The new ioctl includes a size field, so
>   it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.
> 
> - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
>   and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2
>   encryption policies.  Such keys are kept logically separate from keys
>   for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather
>   than by 'descriptor'.  The 'identifier' need not be provided when
>   adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.
> 
> This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the
> same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
> capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  However, the next patch will carefully take
> advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow
> non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full
> replacement for v1 policies.
> 
> (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
>     fscrypt_context::format is 1.  But I believe it makes the most sense
>     to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the
>     numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Looks good, feel free to add:

Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 13/20] fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2019 20:39:37 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190813003937.GK28705@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190805162521.90882-14-ebiggers@kernel.org>

On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 09:25:14AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2".  It has the following changes
> from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):
> 
> - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as
>   input to HKDF-SHA512.  This is more flexible and less error-prone, and
>   it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF.
>   Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:
> 
>     - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.
> 
>     - Per-mode keys.  These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY
>       flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly.
>       These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when
>       support for it is added.
> 
>     - Key identifiers (see below).
> 
> - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier,
>   which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512.  This prevents
>   users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or
>   directory.  This was easily possible with v1 policies, which
>   identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.
> 
> - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a
>   process-subscribed keyring.
> 
> The following UAPI additions are made:
> 
> - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a
>   fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy.  It's disambiguated
>   from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.
> 
> - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added.  It allows
>   getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or
>   directory.  The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not
>   be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which
>   policy structure is expected.  The new ioctl includes a size field, so
>   it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.
> 
> - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
>   and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2
>   encryption policies.  Such keys are kept logically separate from keys
>   for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather
>   than by 'descriptor'.  The 'identifier' need not be provided when
>   adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.
> 
> This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the
> same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
> capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  However, the next patch will carefully take
> advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow
> non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full
> replacement for v1 policies.
> 
> (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
>     fscrypt_context::format is 1.  But I believe it makes the most sense
>     to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the
>     numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Looks good, feel free to add:

Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v8 13/20] fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2019 20:39:37 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190813003937.GK28705@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190805162521.90882-14-ebiggers@kernel.org>

On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 09:25:14AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2".  It has the following changes
> from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):
> 
> - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as
>   input to HKDF-SHA512.  This is more flexible and less error-prone, and
>   it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF.
>   Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:
> 
>     - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.
> 
>     - Per-mode keys.  These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY
>       flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly.
>       These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when
>       support for it is added.
> 
>     - Key identifiers (see below).
> 
> - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier,
>   which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512.  This prevents
>   users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or
>   directory.  This was easily possible with v1 policies, which
>   identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.
> 
> - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a
>   process-subscribed keyring.
> 
> The following UAPI additions are made:
> 
> - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a
>   fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy.  It's disambiguated
>   from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.
> 
> - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added.  It allows
>   getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or
>   directory.  The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not
>   be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which
>   policy structure is expected.  The new ioctl includes a size field, so
>   it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.
> 
> - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
>   and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2
>   encryption policies.  Such keys are kept logically separate from keys
>   for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather
>   than by 'descriptor'.  The 'identifier' need not be provided when
>   adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.
> 
> This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the
> same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
> capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  However, the next patch will carefully take
> advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow
> non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full
> replacement for v1 policies.
> 
> (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
>     fscrypt_context::format is 1.  But I believe it makes the most sense
>     to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the
>     numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Looks good, feel free to add:

Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>


_______________________________________________
Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list
Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 13/20] fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2019 20:39:37 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190813003937.GK28705@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190805162521.90882-14-ebiggers@kernel.org>

On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 09:25:14AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2".  It has the following changes
> from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):
> 
> - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as
>   input to HKDF-SHA512.  This is more flexible and less error-prone, and
>   it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF.
>   Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:
> 
>     - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.
> 
>     - Per-mode keys.  These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY
>       flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly.
>       These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when
>       support for it is added.
> 
>     - Key identifiers (see below).
> 
> - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier,
>   which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512.  This prevents
>   users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or
>   directory.  This was easily possible with v1 policies, which
>   identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.
> 
> - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a
>   process-subscribed keyring.
> 
> The following UAPI additions are made:
> 
> - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a
>   fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy.  It's disambiguated
>   from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.
> 
> - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added.  It allows
>   getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or
>   directory.  The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not
>   be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which
>   policy structure is expected.  The new ioctl includes a size field, so
>   it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.
> 
> - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
>   and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2
>   encryption policies.  Such keys are kept logically separate from keys
>   for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather
>   than by 'descriptor'.  The 'identifier' need not be provided when
>   adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.
> 
> This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the
> same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
> capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  However, the next patch will carefully take
> advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow
> non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full
> replacement for v1 policies.
> 
> (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
>     fscrypt_context::format is 1.  But I believe it makes the most sense
>     to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the
>     numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Looks good, feel free to add:

Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-08-13  0:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 162+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-05 16:25 [PATCH v8 00/20] fscrypt: key management improvements Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 01/20] fs, fscrypt: move uapi definitions to new header <linux/fscrypt.h> Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 02/20] fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 03/20] fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_* definitions, not FS_* Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 04/20] fscrypt: add ->ci_inode to fscrypt_info Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 05/20] fscrypt: rename fscrypt_master_key to fscrypt_direct_key Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-12 22:20   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:20     ` [f2fs-dev] " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:20     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:20     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 06/20] fscrypt: refactor key setup code in preparation for v2 policies Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-12 22:38   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:38     ` [f2fs-dev] " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:38     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:38     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 07/20] fscrypt: move v1 policy key setup to keysetup_v1.c Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-12 22:53   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:53     ` [f2fs-dev] " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:53     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:53     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 08/20] fscrypt: rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.c Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-12 22:53   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:53     ` [f2fs-dev] " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:53     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-12 22:53     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 09/20] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 10/20] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-13  0:06   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:06     ` [f2fs-dev] " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:06     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:06     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-14 22:35     ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-14 22:35       ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-14 22:35       ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-14 22:35       ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 11/20] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 12/20] fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-06 20:43   ` Paul Crowley
2019-08-06 20:43     ` Paul Crowley
2019-08-06 20:43     ` [f2fs-dev] " Paul Crowley via Linux-f2fs-devel
2019-08-06 20:43     ` Paul Crowley via Linux-f2fs-devel
2019-08-06 20:43     ` Paul Crowley
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 13/20] fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-06 20:44   ` Paul Crowley
2019-08-06 20:44     ` Paul Crowley
2019-08-06 20:44     ` [f2fs-dev] " Paul Crowley via Linux-f2fs-devel
2019-08-06 20:44     ` Paul Crowley via Linux-f2fs-devel
2019-08-06 20:44     ` Paul Crowley
2019-08-13  0:39   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o [this message]
2019-08-13  0:39     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:39     ` [f2fs-dev] " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:39     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:39     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 14/20] fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-13  0:14   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:14     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:14     ` [f2fs-dev] " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:14     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:14     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 15/20] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-13  0:15   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:15     ` [f2fs-dev] " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:15     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:15     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 16/20] fscrypt: require that key be added when setting a v2 encryption policy Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 17/20] ext4: wire up new fscrypt ioctls Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 18/20] f2fs: " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 19/20] ubifs: " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25 ` [PATCH v8 20/20] fscrypt: document the new ioctls and policy version Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-05 16:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-13  0:49   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:49     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:49     ` [f2fs-dev] " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:49     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-13  0:49     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-08-14 22:37 ` [PATCH v8 00/20] fscrypt: key management improvements Eric Biggers
2019-08-14 22:37   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2019-08-14 22:37   ` Eric Biggers
2019-08-14 22:37   ` Eric Biggers

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