From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 8/9] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 06:31:41 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20191218063142.23033-9-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauthõ72d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" after: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle000001" Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index fc9c13802c06..c117bf598230 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint16_t keytype; uint32_t keyhandle; unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t blobauth_len; unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint32_t pcrinfo_len; unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 668cbdc675b8..af269f4774de 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -785,12 +785,26 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_blobauth: - if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (res < 0) + /* + * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes + * passed in as hex strings. TPM 2.0 + * authorizations are simple passwords + * (although it can take a hash as well) + */ + opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); + if (opt->blobauth_len = 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; + } else if (tpm2 && + opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { + memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + opt->blobauth_len); + } else { return -EINVAL; + } break; case Opt_migratable: if (*args[0].from = '0') -- 2.16.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 8/9] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:31:41 +0900 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20191218063142.23033-9-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20191218063142.23033-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" after: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index fc9c13802c06..c117bf598230 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint16_t keytype; uint32_t keyhandle; unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t blobauth_len; unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint32_t pcrinfo_len; unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 668cbdc675b8..af269f4774de 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -785,12 +785,26 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_blobauth: - if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (res < 0) + /* + * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes + * passed in as hex strings. TPM 2.0 + * authorizations are simple passwords + * (although it can take a hash as well) + */ + opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); + if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; + } else if (tpm2 && + opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { + memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + opt->blobauth_len); + } else { return -EINVAL; + } break; case Opt_migratable: if (*args[0].from == '0') -- 2.16.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-18 6:31 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-12-18 6:31 [PATCH v3 0/9] TPM 2.0 trusted keys with attached policy James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] lib: add asn.1 encoder James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 tpm2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley [this message] 2019-12-18 6:31 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] security: keys: trusted: add password based authorizations to policy keys James Bottomley 2019-12-18 6:31 ` James Bottomley
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