From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>s
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 10:51:54 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200117105153.GB6144@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ce3086d8-9fce-84d6-8b4e-948996c2e0fc@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:30:29PM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes.
> For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
> for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
> monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> index 4e4984a55cd1..5dff81bc3324 100644
> --- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> +++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)
> if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
> reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT);
>
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable())
> reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT);
>
> return reg;
> @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> + if (!perfmon_capable() &&
> (reg & (BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT) |
> BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT) |
> BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT))))
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Worth noting that this allows profiling of *physical* addresses used by
memory access instructions and so probably has some security implications
beyond the usual "but perf is buggy" line of reasoning.
Will
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 10:51:54 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200117105153.GB6144@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ce3086d8-9fce-84d6-8b4e-948996c2e0fc@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:30:29PM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes.
> For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
> for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
> monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> index 4e4984a55cd1..5dff81bc3324 100644
> --- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> +++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)
> if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
> reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT);
>
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable())
> reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT);
>
> return reg;
> @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> + if (!perfmon_capable() &&
> (reg & (BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT) |
> BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT) |
> BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT))))
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Worth noting that this allows profiling of *physical* addresses used by
memory access instructions and so probably has some security implications
beyond the usual "but perf is buggy" line of reasoning.
Will
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 10:51:54 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200117105153.GB6144@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ce3086d8-9fce-84d6-8b4e-948996c2e0fc@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:30:29PM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes.
> For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
> for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
> monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> index 4e4984a55cd1..5dff81bc3324 100644
> --- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> +++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)
> if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
> reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT);
>
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable())
> reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT);
>
> return reg;
> @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> + if (!perfmon_capable() &&
> (reg & (BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT) |
> BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT) |
> BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT))))
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Worth noting that this allows profiling of *physical* addresses used by
memory access instructions and so probably has some security implications
beyond the usual "but perf is buggy" line of reasoning.
Will
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 10:51:54 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200117105153.GB6144@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ce3086d8-9fce-84d6-8b4e-948996c2e0fc@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:30:29PM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Open access to monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes.
> For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
> for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure
> monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> index 4e4984a55cd1..5dff81bc3324 100644
> --- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> +++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
> @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)
> if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
> reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT);
>
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable())
> reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT);
>
> return reg;
> @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> + if (!perfmon_capable() &&
> (reg & (BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT) |
> BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT) |
> BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT))))
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Worth noting that this allows profiling of *physical* addresses used by
memory access instructions and so probably has some security implications
beyond the usual "but perf is buggy" line of reasoning.
Will
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-17 10:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 148+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-18 9:16 [PATCH v4 0/7] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:16 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:16 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:16 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:16 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:24 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:24 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:24 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:24 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:24 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 19:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:56 ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-28 3:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2019-12-28 3:53 ` [Intel-gfx] " Serge E. Hallyn
2019-12-28 3:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2019-12-28 3:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-01-13 20:25 ` Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:25 ` [Intel-gfx] " Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:25 ` Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:25 ` Song Liu
2019-12-18 9:25 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:25 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:25 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:25 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:25 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-08 16:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-08 16:07 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-08 16:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-08 16:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-08 16:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-09 11:36 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-09 11:36 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-09 11:36 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-09 11:36 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-09 11:36 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 14:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-10 14:02 ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-10 14:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-10 14:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-10 15:52 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 15:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 15:52 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 15:52 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 16:45 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-01-10 16:45 ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-01-10 16:45 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-01-10 16:45 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-01-10 23:47 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 23:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 23:47 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 23:47 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-11 0:23 ` Song Liu
2020-01-11 0:23 ` [Intel-gfx] " Song Liu
2020-01-11 0:23 ` Song Liu
2020-01-11 0:23 ` Song Liu
2020-01-11 0:35 ` arnaldo.melo
2020-01-11 0:35 ` [Intel-gfx] " arnaldo.melo
2020-01-11 9:57 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-13 20:39 ` Song Liu
2020-01-14 3:25 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-14 5:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-14 9:47 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-14 18:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-14 18:50 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-15 1:52 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-15 5:15 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-01 20:50 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 13:55 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 13:56 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-15 9:45 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-15 12:11 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-14 12:04 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-12 1:44 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-12 1:44 ` [Intel-gfx] " Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-12 1:44 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 16:41 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 16:41 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 16:41 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 16:41 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 17:34 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 17:34 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 17:34 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 17:34 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-01 20:49 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 14:28 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:26 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:26 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:26 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:26 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:26 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:27 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:27 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:27 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:27 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:27 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-19 9:10 ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-19 9:10 ` [Intel-gfx] " Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-19 9:10 ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-19 9:10 ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-19 9:10 ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-18 9:28 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:28 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:28 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:28 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:28 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-13 20:47 ` Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:47 ` [Intel-gfx] " Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:47 ` Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:47 ` Song Liu
2019-12-18 9:28 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:28 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:28 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:28 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:28 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:29 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:29 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:29 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:29 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:29 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-27 8:52 ` Helge Deller
2020-01-27 8:52 ` [Intel-gfx] " Helge Deller
2020-01-27 8:52 ` Helge Deller
2020-01-27 8:52 ` Helge Deller
2020-01-27 8:52 ` Helge Deller
2019-12-18 9:30 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:30 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:30 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:30 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:30 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-17 10:51 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2020-01-17 10:51 ` [Intel-gfx] " Will Deacon
2020-01-17 10:51 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-17 10:51 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-17 21:33 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-17 21:33 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-17 21:33 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-17 21:33 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-18 18:48 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-18 18:48 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:31 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] drivers/oprofile: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:31 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:31 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:31 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:31 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 10:11 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev3) Patchwork
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200117105153.GB6144@willie-the-truck \
--to=will@kernel.org \
--cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
--cc=alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com \
--cc=alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \
--cc=eranian@google.com \
--cc=ilubashe@akamai.com \
--cc=james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=jolsa@redhat.com \
--cc=joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
--cc=oprofile-list@lists.sf.net \
--cc=paulus@samba.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rric@kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=songliubraving@fb.com \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.