From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: broonie@kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
mark.rutland@arm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
tytso@mit.edu, will@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] arm64: add credited/trusted RNG support
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 13:00:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200210130015.17664-4-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200210130015.17664-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
Currently arm64 doesn't initialize the primary CRNG in a (potentially)
trusted manner as we only detect the presence of the RNG once secondary
CPUs are up.
Now that the core RNG code distinguishes the early initialization of the
primary CRNG, we can implement arch_get_random_seed_long_early() to
support this.
This patch does so.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
index 3fe02da70004..fc1594a0710e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -66,6 +68,18 @@ static inline bool __init __early_cpu_has_rndr(void)
return (ftr >> ID_AA64ISAR0_RNDR_SHIFT) & 0xf;
}
+static inline bool __init __must_check
+arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v)
+{
+ WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
+
+ if (!__early_cpu_has_rndr())
+ return false;
+
+ return __arm64_rndr(v);
+}
+#define arch_get_random_seed_long_early arch_get_random_seed_long_early
+
#else
static inline bool __arm64_rndr(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
--
2.11.0
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, tytso@mit.edu, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
richard.henderson@linaro.org, broonie@kernel.org,
will@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] arm64: add credited/trusted RNG support
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 13:00:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200210130015.17664-4-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200210130015.17664-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
Currently arm64 doesn't initialize the primary CRNG in a (potentially)
trusted manner as we only detect the presence of the RNG once secondary
CPUs are up.
Now that the core RNG code distinguishes the early initialization of the
primary CRNG, we can implement arch_get_random_seed_long_early() to
support this.
This patch does so.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
index 3fe02da70004..fc1594a0710e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -66,6 +68,18 @@ static inline bool __init __early_cpu_has_rndr(void)
return (ftr >> ID_AA64ISAR0_RNDR_SHIFT) & 0xf;
}
+static inline bool __init __must_check
+arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v)
+{
+ WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
+
+ if (!__early_cpu_has_rndr())
+ return false;
+
+ return __arm64_rndr(v);
+}
+#define arch_get_random_seed_long_early arch_get_random_seed_long_early
+
#else
static inline bool __arm64_rndr(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
--
2.11.0
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-10 13:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-10 13:00 [PATCH 0/4] random/arm64: enable RANDOM_TRUST_CPU for arm64 Mark Rutland
2020-02-10 13:00 ` Mark Rutland
2020-02-10 13:00 ` [PATCH 1/4] random: split primary/secondary crng init paths Mark Rutland
2020-02-10 13:00 ` Mark Rutland
2020-02-10 13:00 ` [PATCH 2/4] random: add arch_get_random_*long_early() Mark Rutland
2020-02-10 13:00 ` Mark Rutland
2020-02-10 13:00 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2020-02-10 13:00 ` [PATCH 3/4] arm64: add credited/trusted RNG support Mark Rutland
2020-02-10 13:00 ` [PATCH 4/4] random: Make RANDOM_TRUST_CPU depend on ARCH_RANDOM Mark Rutland
2020-02-10 13:00 ` Mark Rutland
2020-02-26 10:24 ` [PATCH 0/4] random/arm64: enable RANDOM_TRUST_CPU for arm64 Mark Rutland
2020-02-26 10:24 ` Mark Rutland
2020-02-28 4:22 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-02-28 4:22 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
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