From: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
To: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
dyoung@redhat.com, bhe@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
keescook@chromium.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, cai@lca.pw,
rdunlap@infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kernel: add panic_on_taint
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 14:53:15 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200507185315.GH205881@optiplex-lnx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200507185046.GY11244@42.do-not-panic.com>
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:50:46PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> > case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
>
> If used for this purpose then we must add a new TAINT flag for
> proc_taint() was used, otherwise we can cheat to show a taint
> *did* happen, where in fact it never happened, some punk just
> echo'd a value into the kernel's /proc/sys/kernel/tainted.
>
To accomplish that, the punk would need to be root, though, in which
case everything else is doomed, already.
> Forunately proc_taint() only allows to *increment* the taint, not
> reduce.
>
> Luis
>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
To: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: rdunlap@infradead.org, keescook@chromium.org, bhe@redhat.com,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
cai@lca.pw, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, dyoung@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kernel: add panic_on_taint
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 14:53:15 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200507185315.GH205881@optiplex-lnx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200507185046.GY11244@42.do-not-panic.com>
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:50:46PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> > case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
>
> If used for this purpose then we must add a new TAINT flag for
> proc_taint() was used, otherwise we can cheat to show a taint
> *did* happen, where in fact it never happened, some punk just
> echo'd a value into the kernel's /proc/sys/kernel/tainted.
>
To accomplish that, the punk would need to be root, though, in which
case everything else is doomed, already.
> Forunately proc_taint() only allows to *increment* the taint, not
> reduce.
>
> Luis
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-07 18:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-07 18:06 [PATCH v2] kernel: add panic_on_taint Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 18:06 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 18:22 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-07 18:22 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-07 18:43 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 18:43 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 18:47 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 18:47 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 20:33 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-07 20:33 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-07 22:06 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 22:06 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 22:25 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-07 22:25 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-08 12:47 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-08 12:47 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-09 3:48 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-09 3:48 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-09 14:56 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-09 14:56 ` Rafael Aquini
2020-05-07 18:50 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-07 18:50 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-05-07 18:53 ` Rafael Aquini [this message]
2020-05-07 18:53 ` Rafael Aquini
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