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From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: glider@google.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, cl@linux.com, rientjes@google.com,
	iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, penberg@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, paulmck@kernel.org, andreyknvl@google.com,
	aryabinin@virtuozzo.com, luto@kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, dvyukov@google.com,
	edumazet@google.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, jannh@google.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	keescook@chromium.org, peterz@infradead.org, cai@lca.pw,
	tglx@linutronix.de, will@kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 17:31:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200908153102.GB61807@elver.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e399d8d5-03c2-3c13-2a43-3bb8e842c55a@intel.com>

On Tue, Sep 08, 2020 at 07:52AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 9/7/20 6:40 AM, Marco Elver wrote:
> > KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
> > zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
> > for precision. 
> 
> Could you talk a little bit about where you expect folks to continue to
> use KASAN?  How would a developer or a tester choose which one to use?

We mention some of this in Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst:

	In the kernel, several tools exist to debug memory access errors, and in
	particular KASAN can detect all bug classes that KFENCE can detect. While KASAN
	is more precise, relying on compiler instrumentation, this comes at a
	performance cost. We want to highlight that KASAN and KFENCE are complementary,
	with different target environments. For instance, KASAN is the better
	debugging-aid, where a simple reproducer exists: due to the lower chance to
	detect the error, it would require more effort using KFENCE to debug.
	Deployments at scale, however, would benefit from using KFENCE to discover bugs
	due to code paths not exercised by test cases or fuzzers.

If you can afford to use KASAN, continue using KASAN. Usually this only
applies to test environments. If you have kernels for production use,
and cannot enable KASAN for the obvious cost reasons, you could consider
KFENCE.

I'll try to make this clearer, maybe summarizing what I said here in
Documentation as well.

> > KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or
> > right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object
> > page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
> > state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page
> > faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault
> > gracefully by reporting a memory access error.
> 
> How much memory overhead does this end up having?  I know it depends on
> the object size and so forth.  But, could you give some real-world
> examples of memory consumption?  Also, what's the worst case?  Say I
> have a ton of worst-case-sized (32b) slab objects.  Will I notice?

KFENCE objects are limited (default 255). If we exhaust KFENCE's memory
pool, no more KFENCE allocations will occur.
Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst gives a formula to calculate the
KFENCE pool size:

	The total memory dedicated to the KFENCE memory pool can be computed as::

	    ( #objects + 1 ) * 2 * PAGE_SIZE

	Using the default config, and assuming a page size of 4 KiB, results in
	dedicating 2 MiB to the KFENCE memory pool.

Does that clarify this point? Or anything else that could help clarify
this?

Thanks,
-- Marco

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	edumazet@google.com, glider@google.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	cl@linux.com, will@kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, x86@kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, mingo@redhat.com,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, rientjes@google.com,
	aryabinin@virtuozzo.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	paulmck@kernel.org, jannh@google.com, andreyknvl@google.com,
	bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, dvyukov@google.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	penberg@kernel.org, cai@lca.pw, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 17:31:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200908153102.GB61807@elver.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e399d8d5-03c2-3c13-2a43-3bb8e842c55a@intel.com>

On Tue, Sep 08, 2020 at 07:52AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 9/7/20 6:40 AM, Marco Elver wrote:
> > KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
> > zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
> > for precision. 
> 
> Could you talk a little bit about where you expect folks to continue to
> use KASAN?  How would a developer or a tester choose which one to use?

We mention some of this in Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst:

	In the kernel, several tools exist to debug memory access errors, and in
	particular KASAN can detect all bug classes that KFENCE can detect. While KASAN
	is more precise, relying on compiler instrumentation, this comes at a
	performance cost. We want to highlight that KASAN and KFENCE are complementary,
	with different target environments. For instance, KASAN is the better
	debugging-aid, where a simple reproducer exists: due to the lower chance to
	detect the error, it would require more effort using KFENCE to debug.
	Deployments at scale, however, would benefit from using KFENCE to discover bugs
	due to code paths not exercised by test cases or fuzzers.

If you can afford to use KASAN, continue using KASAN. Usually this only
applies to test environments. If you have kernels for production use,
and cannot enable KASAN for the obvious cost reasons, you could consider
KFENCE.

I'll try to make this clearer, maybe summarizing what I said here in
Documentation as well.

> > KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or
> > right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object
> > page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
> > state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page
> > faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault
> > gracefully by reporting a memory access error.
> 
> How much memory overhead does this end up having?  I know it depends on
> the object size and so forth.  But, could you give some real-world
> examples of memory consumption?  Also, what's the worst case?  Say I
> have a ton of worst-case-sized (32b) slab objects.  Will I notice?

KFENCE objects are limited (default 255). If we exhaust KFENCE's memory
pool, no more KFENCE allocations will occur.
Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst gives a formula to calculate the
KFENCE pool size:

	The total memory dedicated to the KFENCE memory pool can be computed as::

	    ( #objects + 1 ) * 2 * PAGE_SIZE

	Using the default config, and assuming a page size of 4 KiB, results in
	dedicating 2 MiB to the KFENCE memory pool.

Does that clarify this point? Or anything else that could help clarify
this?

Thanks,
-- Marco

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2020-09-08 19:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 152+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-07 13:40 [PATCH RFC 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 01/10] mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 15:41   ` Jonathan Cameron
2020-09-07 15:41     ` Jonathan Cameron
2020-09-07 16:38     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 16:38       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 16:38       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 14:57   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 14:57     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 14:57     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 15:06     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 15:06       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 15:06       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 15:48       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 15:48         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 15:48         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 16:22         ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 16:22           ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 16:22           ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 15:42   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 15:42     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 15:42     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 16:19     ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-10 16:19       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-10 16:19       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-10 17:11       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 17:11         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 17:11         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-10 17:41         ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 17:41           ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 17:41           ` Marco Elver
2020-09-10 20:25         ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-09-10 20:25           ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-09-15 13:57   ` SeongJae Park
2020-09-15 13:57     ` SeongJae Park
2020-09-15 14:14     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 14:14       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 14:26       ` SeongJae Park
2020-09-15 14:26         ` SeongJae Park
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 02/10] x86, kfence: enable KFENCE for x86 Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 17:31   ` kernel test robot
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 03/10] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64 Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-09 15:13   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-09 15:13     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-09 15:13     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 04/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11  7:17   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11  7:17     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11  7:17     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 12:24     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 12:24       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 12:24       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 13:03       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 13:03         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 13:03         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 05/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLUB Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 06/10] kfence, kasan: make KFENCE compatible with KASAN Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 16:11   ` kernel test robot
2020-09-11  7:04   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11  7:04     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11  7:04     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 13:00     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 13:00       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 13:00       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 07/10] kfence, kmemleak: make KFENCE compatible with KMEMLEAK Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 11:53   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-08 11:53     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-08 12:29     ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-08 12:29       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-08 12:29       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 08/10] kfence, lockdep: make KFENCE compatible with lockdep Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 09/10] kfence, Documentation: add KFENCE documentation Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 15:33   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-07 15:33     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-07 15:33     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-07 16:33     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 16:33       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 16:33       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 17:55       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-07 17:55         ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-07 17:55         ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-07 18:16         ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 18:16           ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 18:16           ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 15:54   ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-08 15:54     ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-08 16:14     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 16:14       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11  7:14   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11  7:14     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11  7:14     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11  7:46     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11  7:46       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11  7:46       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40 ` [PATCH RFC 10/10] kfence: add test suite Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 13:40   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-07 18:37   ` kernel test robot
2020-09-08 11:48 ` [PATCH RFC 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector Vlastimil Babka
2020-09-08 11:48   ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-09-08 12:16   ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-08 12:16     ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-08 12:16     ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-08 14:40     ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-09-08 14:40       ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-09-08 15:21       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 15:21         ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 14:52 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-08 14:52   ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-08 15:31   ` Marco Elver [this message]
2020-09-08 15:31     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 15:36     ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-09-08 15:36       ` Vlastimil Babka
2020-09-08 15:56       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 15:56         ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11  7:35         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11  7:35           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11  7:35           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 12:03           ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 12:03             ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 12:03             ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 13:09             ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 13:09               ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 13:09               ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-11 13:33               ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 13:33                 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 13:33                 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 16:33                 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 16:33                   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-11 16:33                   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-08 15:37     ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-08 15:37       ` Dave Hansen

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