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From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	lin ux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 16:06:41 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200929130641.GG2142832@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8435eff6-7fa9-d923-45e5-d8850e4c6d73@redhat.com>

On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 11:00:30AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 25.09.20 09:41, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 04:29:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> >> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> >>
> >> Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is
> >> allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of
> >> the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages
> >> as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.
> >>
> >> Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with
> >> PMD-size pages.
> > 
> > What's the actual efficacy of this? Since the pmd is per inode, all I
> > need is a lot of inodes and we're in business to destroy the directmap,
> > no?
> > 
> > Afaict there's no privs needed to use this, all a process needs is to
> > stay below the mlock limit, so a 'fork-bomb' that maps a single secret
> > page will utterly destroy the direct map.
> > 
> > I really don't like this, at all.
> 
> As I expressed earlier, I would prefer allowing allocation of secretmem
> only from a previously defined CMA area. This would physically locally
> limit the pain.

The prevois version contained a patch that allowed reserving a memory
pool for the secretmem at boot time to avpoid splitting pages from the
direct map

> But my suggestion was not well received :)

The disagreemet was only whether to use CMA or simple boot time
reservation :-P

> -- 
> Thanks,
> 
> David / dhildenb
> 

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 16:06:41 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200929130641.GG2142832@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8435eff6-7fa9-d923-45e5-d8850e4c6d73@redhat.com>

On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 11:00:30AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 25.09.20 09:41, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 04:29:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> >> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> >>
> >> Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is
> >> allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of
> >> the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages
> >> as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.
> >>
> >> Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with
> >> PMD-size pages.
> > 
> > What's the actual efficacy of this? Since the pmd is per inode, all I
> > need is a lot of inodes and we're in business to destroy the directmap,
> > no?
> > 
> > Afaict there's no privs needed to use this, all a process needs is to
> > stay below the mlock limit, so a 'fork-bomb' that maps a single secret
> > page will utterly destroy the direct map.
> > 
> > I really don't like this, at all.
> 
> As I expressed earlier, I would prefer allowing allocation of secretmem
> only from a previously defined CMA area. This would physically locally
> limit the pain.

The prevois version contained a patch that allowed reserving a memory
pool for the secretmem at boot time to avpoid splitting pages from the
direct map

> But my suggestion was not well received :)

The disagreemet was only whether to use CMA or simple boot time
reservation :-P

> -- 
> Thanks,
> 
> David / dhildenb
> 

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 16:06:41 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200929130641.GG2142832@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8435eff6-7fa9-d923-45e5-d8850e4c6d73@redhat.com>

On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 11:00:30AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 25.09.20 09:41, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 04:29:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> >> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> >>
> >> Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is
> >> allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of
> >> the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages
> >> as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.
> >>
> >> Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with
> >> PMD-size pages.
> > 
> > What's the actual efficacy of this? Since the pmd is per inode, all I
> > need is a lot of inodes and we're in business to destroy the directmap,
> > no?
> > 
> > Afaict there's no privs needed to use this, all a process needs is to
> > stay below the mlock limit, so a 'fork-bomb' that maps a single secret
> > page will utterly destroy the direct map.
> > 
> > I really don't like this, at all.
> 
> As I expressed earlier, I would prefer allowing allocation of secretmem
> only from a previously defined CMA area. This would physically locally
> limit the pain.

The prevois version contained a patch that allowed reserving a memory
pool for the secretmem at boot time to avpoid splitting pages from the
direct map

> But my suggestion was not well received :)

The disagreemet was only whether to use CMA or simple boot time
reservation :-P

> -- 
> Thanks,
> 
> David / dhildenb
> 

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 16:06:41 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200929130641.GG2142832@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8435eff6-7fa9-d923-45e5-d8850e4c6d73@redhat.com>

On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 11:00:30AM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 25.09.20 09:41, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 04:29:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> >> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> >>
> >> Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is
> >> allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of
> >> the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages
> >> as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.
> >>
> >> Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with
> >> PMD-size pages.
> > 
> > What's the actual efficacy of this? Since the pmd is per inode, all I
> > need is a lot of inodes and we're in business to destroy the directmap,
> > no?
> > 
> > Afaict there's no privs needed to use this, all a process needs is to
> > stay below the mlock limit, so a 'fork-bomb' that maps a single secret
> > page will utterly destroy the direct map.
> > 
> > I really don't like this, at all.
> 
> As I expressed earlier, I would prefer allowing allocation of secretmem
> only from a previously defined CMA area. This would physically locally
> limit the pain.

The prevois version contained a patch that allowed reserving a memory
pool for the secretmem at boot time to avpoid splitting pages from the
direct map

> But my suggestion was not well received :)

The disagreemet was only whether to use CMA or simple boot time
reservation :-P

> -- 
> Thanks,
> 
> David / dhildenb
> 

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-09-29 13:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 236+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-24 13:28 [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:28   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29  4:58   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29  4:58     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29  4:58     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29  4:58     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29  4:58     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 13:06     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 20:06       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-29 20:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 10:35         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:35           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 20:11           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-09-30 20:11             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-10-11  9:42             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11  9:42               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11  9:42               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11  9:42               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-11  9:42               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  7:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  7:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  7:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  7:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  9:00     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25  9:00       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25  9:00       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25  9:00       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-25  9:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  9:50         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  9:50         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25  9:50         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-25 10:31         ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 10:31           ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 10:31           ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 10:31           ` Mark Rutland
2020-09-25 14:57           ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-25 14:57             ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-25 14:57             ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-25 14:57             ` Tycho Andersen
2020-09-29 14:04           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:04             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:04             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:04             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:07           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06       ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2020-09-29 13:06         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:06         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 13:05       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:12       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:12         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:12         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:12         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 14:31         ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:31           ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:31           ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:31           ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 14:58         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:58           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:58           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 14:58           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 15:15           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 15:15             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 15:15             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-29 15:15             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:27             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:27               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:27               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:27               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 14:39               ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:39                 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:39                 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:39                 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 14:45                 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 14:45                   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 14:45                   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 14:45                   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:17                   ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:17                     ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:17                     ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:17                     ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 15:25                     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:25                       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:25                       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:25                       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-30 15:09               ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-30 15:09                 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-30 15:09                 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-30 15:09                 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-01  8:14                 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-01  8:14                   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-01  8:14                   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-01  8:14                   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-29 15:03         ` James Bottomley
2020-09-29 15:03           ` James Bottomley
2020-09-29 15:03           ` James Bottomley
2020-09-29 15:03           ` James Bottomley
2020-09-30 10:20         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:20           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:20           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:20           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-30 10:43           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:43             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:43             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-30 10:43             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-24 13:29 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:29   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35 ` [PATCH] man2: new page describing memfd_secret() system call Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 13:35   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-24 14:55   ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-09-24 14:55     ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-09-24 14:55     ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-09-24 14:55     ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03  9:32     ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03  9:32       ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03  9:32       ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-03  9:32       ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-10-05  7:32       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-05  7:32         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-05  7:32         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-10-05  7:32         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-16 21:01         ` [PATCH v2] memfd_secret.2: New " Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-16 21:01           ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-16 21:01           ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-16 21:01           ` Alejandro Colomar
2020-11-17  6:26           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-17  6:26             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-17  6:26             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-17  6:26             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-21 21:46             ` Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
2020-11-22  7:03               ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  2:34 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Andrew Morton
2020-09-25  2:34   ` Andrew Morton
2020-09-25  2:34   ` Andrew Morton
2020-09-25  2:34   ` Andrew Morton
2020-09-25  6:42   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  6:42     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  6:42     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-25  6:42     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-01 11:09 ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-01 11:09   ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-01 11:09   ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-01 11:09   ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-02 15:40   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 15:40     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 15:40     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 15:40     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 13:52     ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 13:52       ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 13:52       ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 13:52       ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-03 16:30       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 16:30         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 16:30         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 16:30         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 11:39         ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 11:39           ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 11:39           ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 11:39           ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-04 17:02           ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 17:02             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 17:02             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-04 17:02             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-09 10:41             ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-09 10:41               ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-09 10:41               ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-09 10:41               ` Hagen Paul Pfeifer
2020-11-02  9:11 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:11   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:11   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:11   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:31   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:31     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:31     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02  9:31     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:43   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:43     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:43     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:43     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-02 17:51     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:51       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:51       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-02 17:51       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03  9:52       ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03  9:52         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03  9:52         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03  9:52         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-03 10:11         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 10:11           ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 10:11           ` David Hildenbrand
2020-11-03 10:11           ` David Hildenbrand

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