From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: "DRI Development" <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org, linux-media@vger.kernel.org,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
"Daniel Vetter" <daniel.vetter@intel.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Dan Williams" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"John Hubbard" <jhubbard@nvidia.com>,
"Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/13] mm: add unsafe_follow_pfn
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 14:36:47 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201007173647.GW5177@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201007164426.1812530-12-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 06:44:24PM +0200, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> Way back it was a reasonable assumptions that iomem mappings never
> change the pfn range they point at. But this has changed:
>
> - gpu drivers dynamically manage their memory nowadays, invalidating
> ptes with unmap_mapping_range when buffers get moved
>
> - contiguous dma allocations have moved from dedicated carvetouts to
> cma regions. This means if we miss the unmap the pfn might contain
> pagecache or anon memory (well anything allocated with GFP_MOVEABLE)
>
> - even /dev/mem now invalidates mappings when the kernel requests that
> iomem region when CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM is set, see 3234ac664a87
> ("/dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the region")
>
> Accessing pfns obtained from ptes without holding all the locks is
> therefore no longer a good idea.
>
> Unfortunately there's some users where this is not fixable (like v4l
> userptr of iomem mappings) or involves a pile of work (vfio type1
> iommu). For now annotate these as unsafe and splat appropriately.
>
> This patch adds an unsafe_follow_pfn, which later patches will then
> roll out to all appropriate places.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
> Cc: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++
> mm/memory.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> mm/nommu.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Makes sense to me.
I wonder if we could change the original follow_pfn to require the
ptep and then lockdep_assert_held() it against the page table lock?
> +int unsafe_follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> + unsigned long *pfn)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN
> + pr_info("unsafe follow_pfn usage rejected, see
> CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN\n");
Wonder if we can print something useful here, like the current
PID/process name?
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 7561f6f99f1d..48945402e103 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -230,6 +230,19 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
> If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
> specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
>
> +config STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN
> + bool "Disable unsafe use of follow_pfn"
> + depends on MMU
I would probably invert this CONFIG_ALLOW_UNSAFE_FOLLOW_PFN
default n
Jason
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org,
"Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "John Hubbard" <jhubbard@nvidia.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"DRI Development" <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>,
"Daniel Vetter" <daniel.vetter@intel.com>,
"Dan Williams" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/13] mm: add unsafe_follow_pfn
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 14:36:47 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201007173647.GW5177@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201007164426.1812530-12-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 06:44:24PM +0200, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> Way back it was a reasonable assumptions that iomem mappings never
> change the pfn range they point at. But this has changed:
>
> - gpu drivers dynamically manage their memory nowadays, invalidating
> ptes with unmap_mapping_range when buffers get moved
>
> - contiguous dma allocations have moved from dedicated carvetouts to
> cma regions. This means if we miss the unmap the pfn might contain
> pagecache or anon memory (well anything allocated with GFP_MOVEABLE)
>
> - even /dev/mem now invalidates mappings when the kernel requests that
> iomem region when CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM is set, see 3234ac664a87
> ("/dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the region")
>
> Accessing pfns obtained from ptes without holding all the locks is
> therefore no longer a good idea.
>
> Unfortunately there's some users where this is not fixable (like v4l
> userptr of iomem mappings) or involves a pile of work (vfio type1
> iommu). For now annotate these as unsafe and splat appropriately.
>
> This patch adds an unsafe_follow_pfn, which later patches will then
> roll out to all appropriate places.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
> Cc: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++
> mm/memory.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> mm/nommu.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Makes sense to me.
I wonder if we could change the original follow_pfn to require the
ptep and then lockdep_assert_held() it against the page table lock?
> +int unsafe_follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> + unsigned long *pfn)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN
> + pr_info("unsafe follow_pfn usage rejected, see
> CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN\n");
Wonder if we can print something useful here, like the current
PID/process name?
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 7561f6f99f1d..48945402e103 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -230,6 +230,19 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
> If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
> specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
>
> +config STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN
> + bool "Disable unsafe use of follow_pfn"
> + depends on MMU
I would probably invert this CONFIG_ALLOW_UNSAFE_FOLLOW_PFN
default n
Jason
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org,
"Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "John Hubbard" <jhubbard@nvidia.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"DRI Development" <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com>,
"Daniel Vetter" <daniel.vetter@intel.com>,
"Dan Williams" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/13] mm: add unsafe_follow_pfn
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 14:36:47 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201007173647.GW5177@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201007164426.1812530-12-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 06:44:24PM +0200, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> Way back it was a reasonable assumptions that iomem mappings never
> change the pfn range they point at. But this has changed:
>
> - gpu drivers dynamically manage their memory nowadays, invalidating
> ptes with unmap_mapping_range when buffers get moved
>
> - contiguous dma allocations have moved from dedicated carvetouts to
> cma regions. This means if we miss the unmap the pfn might contain
> pagecache or anon memory (well anything allocated with GFP_MOVEABLE)
>
> - even /dev/mem now invalidates mappings when the kernel requests that
> iomem region when CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM is set, see 3234ac664a87
> ("/dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the region")
>
> Accessing pfns obtained from ptes without holding all the locks is
> therefore no longer a good idea.
>
> Unfortunately there's some users where this is not fixable (like v4l
> userptr of iomem mappings) or involves a pile of work (vfio type1
> iommu). For now annotate these as unsafe and splat appropriately.
>
> This patch adds an unsafe_follow_pfn, which later patches will then
> roll out to all appropriate places.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
> Cc: linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++
> mm/memory.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> mm/nommu.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Makes sense to me.
I wonder if we could change the original follow_pfn to require the
ptep and then lockdep_assert_held() it against the page table lock?
> +int unsafe_follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> + unsigned long *pfn)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN
> + pr_info("unsafe follow_pfn usage rejected, see
> CONFIG_STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN\n");
Wonder if we can print something useful here, like the current
PID/process name?
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 7561f6f99f1d..48945402e103 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -230,6 +230,19 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
> If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
> specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
>
> +config STRICT_FOLLOW_PFN
> + bool "Disable unsafe use of follow_pfn"
> + depends on MMU
I would probably invert this CONFIG_ALLOW_UNSAFE_FOLLOW_PFN
default n
Jason
_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-07 17:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 166+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-07 16:44 [PATCH 00/13] follow_pfn and other iomap races Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 01/13] drm/exynos: Stop using frame_vector helpers Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 20:32 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 20:32 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 20:32 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 21:32 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 21:32 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 21:32 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 21:36 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 21:36 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 21:36 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 21:50 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 21:50 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 21:50 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 02/13] drm/exynos: Use FOLL_LONGTERM for g2d cmdlists Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 20:43 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 20:43 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 20:43 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 03/13] misc/habana: Stop using frame_vector helpers Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 20:38 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 20:38 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 20:38 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 04/13] misc/habana: Use FOLL_LONGTERM for userptr Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 20:46 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 20:46 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 20:46 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 05/13] mm/frame-vector: Use FOLL_LONGTERM Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 16:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 16:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 17:12 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 17:12 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 17:12 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 17:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 17:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 17:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 21:13 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 21:13 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 21:13 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 21:30 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 21:30 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 21:30 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 06/13] media: videobuf2: Move frame_vector into media subsystem Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 22:18 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 22:18 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 22:18 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 07/13] mm: close race in generic_access_phys Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 17:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 17:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 17:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 18:01 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 18:01 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 18:01 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 23:21 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 23:21 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 23:21 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-08 0:44 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-08 0:44 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-08 0:44 ` John Hubbard
2020-10-08 7:23 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 7:23 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 7:23 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 08/13] s390/pci: Remove races against pte updates Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 16:44 ` Gerald Schaefer
2020-10-08 16:44 ` Gerald Schaefer
2020-10-08 16:44 ` Gerald Schaefer
2020-10-08 17:16 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 17:16 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 17:16 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 09/13] PCI: obey iomem restrictions for procfs mmap Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 18:46 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-10-07 18:46 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-10-07 18:46 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-10-07 18:46 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 10/13] PCI: revoke mappings like devmem Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 18:41 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-10-07 18:41 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-10-07 18:41 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-10-07 19:24 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 19:24 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 19:24 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 19:33 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-07 19:33 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-07 19:33 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-07 19:47 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 19:47 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 19:47 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 22:23 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-07 22:23 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-07 22:23 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-07 22:29 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-07 22:29 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-07 22:29 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-08 8:09 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 8:09 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 8:09 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 23:24 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 23:24 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 23:24 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-08 7:31 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 7:31 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 7:31 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 7:49 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-08 7:49 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-08 7:49 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-08 8:13 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 8:13 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 8:13 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-08 8:35 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-08 8:35 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-08 8:35 ` Dan Williams
2020-10-08 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-08 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-08 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 11/13] mm: add unsafe_follow_pfn Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 17:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2020-10-07 17:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 17:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 18:10 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 18:10 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 18:10 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 19:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 19:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 19:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 19:38 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 19:38 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 19:38 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 12/13] media/videbuf1|2: Mark follow_pfn usage as unsafe Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 13/13] vfio/type1: Mark follow_pfn " Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 16:44 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 17:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 17:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 17:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 18:14 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 18:14 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 18:14 ` Daniel Vetter
2020-10-07 18:47 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 18:47 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2020-10-07 18:47 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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