From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v6 5/8] IMA: extend policy to add data sources as a critical data measurement constraint Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:26:08 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201119232611.30114-6-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201119232611.30114-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data to the given kernel subsystems. Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_sources:=" to the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the subsystems listed in "data_sources:=". Limit the measurement to the subsystems that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_sources:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 4 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 6ec7daa87cba..ee60442a41cd 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value + data_sources:= list of kernel subsystems that contain + kernel in-memory data critical to the integrity of the kernel. + Only valid when action is "measure" and func is + CRITICAL_DATA. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 583be7674f3e..c9e52dab0638 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, - Opt_err + Opt_data_sources, Opt_err }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, + {Opt_data_sources, "data_sources=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -1350,6 +1351,24 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS; break; + case Opt_data_sources: + ima_log_string(ab, "data_sources", + args[0].from); + + if (entry->data_sources) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + entry->data_sources = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args); + if (IS_ERR(entry->data_sources)) { + result = PTR_ERR(entry->data_sources); + entry->data_sources = NULL; + break; + } + + entry->flags |= IMA_DATA_SOURCES; + break; case Opt_fsuuid: ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from); @@ -1730,6 +1749,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } + if (entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCES) { + seq_puts(m, "data_sources="); + ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->data_sources); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) { snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr); seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf); -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: sashal@kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v6 5/8] IMA: extend policy to add data sources as a critical data measurement constraint Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:26:08 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201119232611.30114-6-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201119232611.30114-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data to the given kernel subsystems. Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_sources:=" to the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the subsystems listed in "data_sources:=". Limit the measurement to the subsystems that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_sources:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 4 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 6ec7daa87cba..ee60442a41cd 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value + data_sources:= list of kernel subsystems that contain + kernel in-memory data critical to the integrity of the kernel. + Only valid when action is "measure" and func is + CRITICAL_DATA. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 583be7674f3e..c9e52dab0638 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, - Opt_err + Opt_data_sources, Opt_err }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, + {Opt_data_sources, "data_sources=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -1350,6 +1351,24 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS; break; + case Opt_data_sources: + ima_log_string(ab, "data_sources", + args[0].from); + + if (entry->data_sources) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + entry->data_sources = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args); + if (IS_ERR(entry->data_sources)) { + result = PTR_ERR(entry->data_sources); + entry->data_sources = NULL; + break; + } + + entry->flags |= IMA_DATA_SOURCES; + break; case Opt_fsuuid: ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from); @@ -1730,6 +1749,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } + if (entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCES) { + seq_puts(m, "data_sources="); + ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->data_sources); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) { snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr); seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf); -- 2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-19 23:26 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-11-19 23:26 [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` Tushar Sugandhi [this message] 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v6 5/8] IMA: extend policy to add data sources as a critical data measurement constraint Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 6/8] IMA: add support to critical data hook to limit data sources for measurement Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 7/8] IMA: add a built-in policy rule for critical data measurement Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-20 14:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 14:30 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 23:33 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-20 23:33 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-20 15:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 15:49 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 23:40 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-20 23:40 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-21 2:05 ` James Morris 2020-11-21 2:05 ` [dm-devel] " James Morris 2020-11-23 19:37 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-23 19:37 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-20 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Pavel Machek 2020-11-20 12:46 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek 2020-11-22 20:53 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-22 20:53 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-22 21:00 ` Pavel Machek 2020-11-22 21:00 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek 2020-11-23 13:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-23 13:41 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-23 17:18 ` Pavel Machek 2020-11-23 17:18 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek 2020-11-23 19:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-23 19:49 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
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