From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Linux API <li nux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
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LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> >
> > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
>
> I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
> the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
> for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
> general.
Ok, let's move forward without UC.
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> >
> > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
>
> I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
> the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
> for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
> general.
Ok, let's move forward without UC.
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> >
> > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
>
> I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
> the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
> for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
> general.
Ok, let's move forward without UC.
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> >
> > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
>
> I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
> the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
> for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
> general.
Ok, let's move forward without UC.
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXr-9ABs7rzXcCrh1VXn-15AfpwjA6bQA7aU9Ta7DR+bw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> >
> > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
>
> I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
> the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
> for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
> general.
Ok, let's move forward without UC.
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-24 9:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-23 9:54 [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 1/9] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 2/9] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 3/9] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 4/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 5/9] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 6/9] secretmem: add memcg accounting Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 7/9] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 8/9] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-23 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-23 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-23 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-23 9:54 ` [PATCH v10 9/9] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 9:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-23 15:28 ` [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-23 15:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-23 15:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-23 15:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-23 15:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-11-24 9:29 ` Mike Rapoport
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