From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>, Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, smbarber@chromium.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Mrunal Patel <mpatel@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>, Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>, OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>, Geoffrey Thomas <geofft@ldpreload.com>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>, Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>, Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Subject: [PATCH v4 21/40] open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate() Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 00:57:17 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201203235736.3528991-22-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201203235736.3528991-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> When truncating files the vfs will verify that the caller is privileged over the inode. Extend it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it is mapped according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the permissions checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> --- /* v2 */ unchanged /* v3 */ unchanged /* v4 */ - Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>: - Use "mnt_userns" to refer to a vfsmount's userns everywhere to make terminology consistent. --- fs/coredump.c | 14 ++++++++++---- fs/inode.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/namei.c | 6 +++--- fs/open.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- include/linux/fs.h | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c index 0cd9056d79cc..478add03c554 100644 --- a/fs/coredump.c +++ b/fs/coredump.c @@ -703,6 +703,7 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) goto close_fail; } } else { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; struct inode *inode; int open_flags = O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE | O_EXCL; @@ -780,13 +781,14 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) * a process dumps core while its cwd is e.g. on a vfat * filesystem. */ - if (!uid_eq(inode->i_uid, current_fsuid())) + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(cprm.file->f_path.mnt); + if (!uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), current_fsuid())) goto close_fail; if ((inode->i_mode & 0677) != 0600) goto close_fail; if (!(cprm.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_WRITE)) goto close_fail; - if (do_truncate(cprm.file->f_path.dentry, 0, 0, cprm.file)) + if (do_truncate(mnt_userns, cprm.file->f_path.dentry, 0, 0, cprm.file)) goto close_fail; } @@ -931,8 +933,12 @@ void dump_truncate(struct coredump_params *cprm) if (file->f_op->llseek && file->f_op->llseek != no_llseek) { offset = file->f_op->llseek(file, 0, SEEK_CUR); - if (i_size_read(file->f_mapping->host) < offset) - do_truncate(file->f_path.dentry, offset, 0, file); + if (i_size_read(file->f_mapping->host) < offset) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; + + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt); + do_truncate(mnt_userns, file->f_path.dentry, offset, 0, file); + } } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_truncate); diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index 159b55538347..d7a6842cf2ad 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -1904,7 +1904,8 @@ int dentry_needs_remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry) return mask; } -static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill) +static int __remove_privs(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, + int kill) { struct iattr newattrs; @@ -1913,7 +1914,7 @@ static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill) * Note we call this on write, so notify_change will not * encounter any conflicting delegations: */ - return notify_change(&init_user_ns, dentry, &newattrs, NULL); + return notify_change(mnt_userns, dentry, &newattrs, NULL); } /* @@ -1939,8 +1940,12 @@ int file_remove_privs(struct file *file) kill = dentry_needs_remove_privs(dentry); if (kill < 0) return kill; - if (kill) - error = __remove_privs(dentry, kill); + if (kill) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; + + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt); + error = __remove_privs(mnt_userns, dentry, kill); + } if (!error) inode_has_no_xattr(inode); diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 6cc655310bd9..a2c4ecd26966 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -3005,9 +3005,9 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct file *filp) if (!error) error = security_path_truncate(path); if (!error) { - error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0, - ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN, - filp); + error = do_truncate(mnt_user_ns(filp->f_path.mnt), + path->dentry, 0, + ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_OPEN, filp); } put_write_access(inode); return error; diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 2dc94689a7dc..648477aa7e0b 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ #include "internal.h" -int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs, - struct file *filp) +int do_truncate(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, + loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp) { int ret; struct iattr newattrs; @@ -61,13 +61,14 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs, inode_lock(dentry->d_inode); /* Note any delegations or leases have already been broken: */ - ret = notify_change(&init_user_ns, dentry, &newattrs, NULL); + ret = notify_change(mnt_userns, dentry, &newattrs, NULL); inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode); return ret; } long vfs_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; struct inode *inode; long error; @@ -83,7 +84,8 @@ long vfs_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length) if (error) goto out; - error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, MAY_WRITE); + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt); + error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_WRITE); if (error) goto mnt_drop_write_and_out; @@ -107,7 +109,7 @@ long vfs_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length) if (!error) error = security_path_truncate(path); if (!error) - error = do_truncate(path->dentry, length, 0, NULL); + error = do_truncate(mnt_userns, path->dentry, length, 0, NULL); put_write_and_out: put_write_access(inode); @@ -186,13 +188,16 @@ long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small) /* Check IS_APPEND on real upper inode */ if (IS_APPEND(file_inode(f.file))) goto out_putf; - sb_start_write(inode->i_sb); error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, f.file, length); if (!error) error = security_path_truncate(&f.file->f_path); - if (!error) - error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, f.file); + if (!error) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; + + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(f.file->f_path.mnt); + error = do_truncate(mnt_userns, dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_CTIME, f.file); + } sb_end_write(inode->i_sb); out_putf: fdput(f); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index c88dafc4152f..616aeee07d69 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2586,8 +2586,8 @@ struct filename { static_assert(offsetof(struct filename, iname) % sizeof(long) == 0); extern long vfs_truncate(const struct path *, loff_t); -extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, unsigned int time_attrs, - struct file *filp); +extern int do_truncate(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *, loff_t start, + unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp); extern int vfs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len); extern long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, -- 2.29.2 _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: "John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>, "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, "Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>, "Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>, "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Andreas Dilger" <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>, "OGAWA Hirofumi" <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>, "Geoffrey Thomas" <geofft@ldpreload.com>, "Mrunal Patel" <mpatel@redhat.com>, "Josh Triplett" <josh@joshtriplett.org>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>, "Theodore Tso" <tytso@mit.edu>, "Alban Crequy" <alban@kinvolk.io>, "Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.ws>, "David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>, "James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>, "Seth Forshee" <seth.forshee@canonical.com>, "Stéphane Graber" <stgraber@ubuntu.com>, "Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>, "Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, smbarber@chromium.org, "Phil Estes" <estesp@gmail.com>, "Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "Todd Kjos" <tkjos@google.com>, "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, "Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>, "Christoph Hellwig" <hch@lst.de> Subject: [PATCH v4 21/40] open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate() Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 00:57:17 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201203235736.3528991-22-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201203235736.3528991-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> When truncating files the vfs will verify that the caller is privileged over the inode. Extend it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it is mapped according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the permissions checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> --- /* v2 */ unchanged /* v3 */ unchanged /* v4 */ - Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>: - Use "mnt_userns" to refer to a vfsmount's userns everywhere to make terminology consistent. --- fs/coredump.c | 14 ++++++++++---- fs/inode.c | 13 +++++++++---- fs/namei.c | 6 +++--- fs/open.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- include/linux/fs.h | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c index 0cd9056d79cc..478add03c554 100644 --- a/fs/coredump.c +++ b/fs/coredump.c @@ -703,6 +703,7 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) goto close_fail; } } else { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; struct inode *inode; int open_flags = O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_NOFOLLOW | O_LARGEFILE | O_EXCL; @@ -780,13 +781,14 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) * a process dumps core while its cwd is e.g. on a vfat * filesystem. */ - if (!uid_eq(inode->i_uid, current_fsuid())) + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(cprm.file->f_path.mnt); + if (!uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), current_fsuid())) goto close_fail; if ((inode->i_mode & 0677) != 0600) goto close_fail; if (!(cprm.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_WRITE)) goto close_fail; - if (do_truncate(cprm.file->f_path.dentry, 0, 0, cprm.file)) + if (do_truncate(mnt_userns, cprm.file->f_path.dentry, 0, 0, cprm.file)) goto close_fail; } @@ -931,8 +933,12 @@ void dump_truncate(struct coredump_params *cprm) if (file->f_op->llseek && file->f_op->llseek != no_llseek) { offset = file->f_op->llseek(file, 0, SEEK_CUR); - if (i_size_read(file->f_mapping->host) < offset) - do_truncate(file->f_path.dentry, offset, 0, file); + if (i_size_read(file->f_mapping->host) < offset) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; + + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt); + do_truncate(mnt_userns, file->f_path.dentry, offset, 0, file); + } } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_truncate); diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index 159b55538347..d7a6842cf2ad 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -1904,7 +1904,8 @@ int dentry_needs_remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry) return mask; } -static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill) +static int __remove_privs(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, + int kill) { struct iattr newattrs; @@ -1913,7 +1914,7 @@ static int __remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry, int kill) * Note we call this on write, so notify_change will not * encounter any conflicting delegations: */ - return notify_change(&init_user_ns, dentry, &newattrs, NULL); + return notify_change(mnt_userns, dentry, &newattrs, NULL); } /* @@ -1939,8 +1940,12 @@ int file_remove_privs(struct file *file) kill = dentry_needs_remove_privs(dentry); if (kill < 0) return kill; - if (kill) - error = __remove_privs(dentry, kill); + if (kill) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; + + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt); + error = __remove_privs(mnt_userns, dentry, kill); + } if (!error) inode_has_no_xattr(inode); diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 6cc655310bd9..a2c4ecd26966 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -3005,9 +3005,9 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct file *filp) if (!error) error = security_path_truncate(path); if (!error) { - error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0, - ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN, - filp); + error = do_truncate(mnt_user_ns(filp->f_path.mnt), + path->dentry, 0, + ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_OPEN, filp); } put_write_access(inode); return error; diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 2dc94689a7dc..648477aa7e0b 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ #include "internal.h" -int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs, - struct file *filp) +int do_truncate(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, + loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp) { int ret; struct iattr newattrs; @@ -61,13 +61,14 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, unsigned int time_attrs, inode_lock(dentry->d_inode); /* Note any delegations or leases have already been broken: */ - ret = notify_change(&init_user_ns, dentry, &newattrs, NULL); + ret = notify_change(mnt_userns, dentry, &newattrs, NULL); inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode); return ret; } long vfs_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; struct inode *inode; long error; @@ -83,7 +84,8 @@ long vfs_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length) if (error) goto out; - error = inode_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, MAY_WRITE); + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt); + error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_WRITE); if (error) goto mnt_drop_write_and_out; @@ -107,7 +109,7 @@ long vfs_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length) if (!error) error = security_path_truncate(path); if (!error) - error = do_truncate(path->dentry, length, 0, NULL); + error = do_truncate(mnt_userns, path->dentry, length, 0, NULL); put_write_and_out: put_write_access(inode); @@ -186,13 +188,16 @@ long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small) /* Check IS_APPEND on real upper inode */ if (IS_APPEND(file_inode(f.file))) goto out_putf; - sb_start_write(inode->i_sb); error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, f.file, length); if (!error) error = security_path_truncate(&f.file->f_path); - if (!error) - error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, f.file); + if (!error) { + struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; + + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(f.file->f_path.mnt); + error = do_truncate(mnt_userns, dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_CTIME, f.file); + } sb_end_write(inode->i_sb); out_putf: fdput(f); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index c88dafc4152f..616aeee07d69 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2586,8 +2586,8 @@ struct filename { static_assert(offsetof(struct filename, iname) % sizeof(long) == 0); extern long vfs_truncate(const struct path *, loff_t); -extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, unsigned int time_attrs, - struct file *filp); +extern int do_truncate(struct user_namespace *, struct dentry *, loff_t start, + unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp); extern int vfs_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len); extern long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, -- 2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-04 0:07 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 98+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-12-03 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/40] idmapped mounts Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:56 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 01/40] namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:56 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/40] mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:56 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/40] namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:56 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 04/40] fs: split out functions to hold writers Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-07 17:08 ` Christoph Hellwig 2020-12-07 17:08 ` Christoph Hellwig 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 05/40] fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-07 17:10 ` Christoph Hellwig 2020-12-07 17:10 ` Christoph Hellwig 2020-12-08 10:07 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-08 10:07 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 06/40] fs: add mount_setattr() Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-07 17:14 ` Christoph Hellwig 2020-12-07 17:14 ` Christoph Hellwig 2020-12-08 10:37 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-08 10:37 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-08 15:05 ` Christoph Hellwig 2020-12-08 15:05 ` Christoph Hellwig 2020-12-08 15:22 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-08 15:22 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-08 15:26 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-08 15:26 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 07/40] tests: add mount_setattr() selftests Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 08/40] fs: add id translation helpers Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 09/40] mount: attach mappings to mounts Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 10/40] capability: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 11/40] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 12/40] inode: make init and " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 13/40] attr: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 14/40] acl: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 15/40] xattr: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 16/40] commoncap: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 17/40] stat: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 18/40] namei: handle idmapped mounts in may_*() helpers Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 19/40] namei: introduce struct renamedata Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 20/40] namei: prepare for idmapped mounts Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner [this message] 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 21/40] open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate() Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 22/40] open: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 23/40] af_unix: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 24/40] utimes: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 25/40] fcntl: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 26/40] notify: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 27/40] init: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 28/40] ioctl: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 29/40] would_dump: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 30/40] exec: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 31/40] fs: make helpers idmap mount aware Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 32/40] apparmor: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 33/40] ima: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 34/40] fat: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 35/40] ext4: support " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 36/40] ecryptfs: do not mount on top of " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 37/40] overlayfs: " Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 38/40] fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 39/40] tests: extend mount_setattr tests Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` [PATCH v4 40/40] generic/618: add fstests for idmapped mounts Christian Brauner 2020-12-03 23:57 ` Christian Brauner
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