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From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
	gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, sashal@kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2020 17:15:05 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201210231505.GJ489768@sequoia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201209194212.5131-6-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>

On 2020-12-09 11:42:09, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems
> they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy
> condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy
> condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on
> a label for the given subsystems.
> 
> Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func
> CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This
> policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the
> measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=".
> 
> Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA
> policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not
> provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the
> supported kernel subsystems is measured.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>

This patch will look good once all the IMA_DATA_SOURCE stuff is moved
over from patch #4.

Tyler

> ---
>  Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  2 ++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 6ec7daa87cba..0f4ee9e0a455 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Description:
>  			template:= name of a defined IMA template type
>  			(eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
>  			pcr:= decimal value
> +			data_source:= [label]
> +			label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data.
>  
>  		  default policy:
>  			# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 9a8ee80a3128..7486d09a3f60 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ enum {
>  	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
>  	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag,
>  	Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
> -	Opt_err
> +	Opt_data_source, Opt_err
>  };
>  
>  static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> @@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
>  	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
>  	{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
>  	{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
> +	{Opt_data_source, "data_source=%s"},
>  	{Opt_err, NULL}
>  };
>  
> @@ -1350,6 +1351,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  
>  			entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS;
>  			break;
> +		case Opt_data_source:
> +			ima_log_string(ab, "data_source", args[0].from);
> +
> +			if (entry->data_source) {
> +				result = -EINVAL;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +
> +			entry->data_source = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args);
> +			if (IS_ERR(entry->data_source)) {
> +				result = PTR_ERR(entry->data_source);
> +				entry->data_source = NULL;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +
> +			entry->flags |= IMA_DATA_SOURCE;
> +			break;
>  		case Opt_fsuuid:
>  			ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
>  
> @@ -1730,6 +1748,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>  		seq_puts(m, " ");
>  	}
>  
> +	if (entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) {
> +		seq_puts(m, "data_source=");
> +		ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->data_source);
> +		seq_puts(m, " ");
> +	}
> +
>  	if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
>  		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
>  		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: sashal@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	gmazyland@gmail.com, agk@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v7 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2020 17:15:05 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201210231505.GJ489768@sequoia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201209194212.5131-6-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>

On 2020-12-09 11:42:09, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems
> they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy
> condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy
> condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on
> a label for the given subsystems.
> 
> Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func
> CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This
> policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the
> measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=".
> 
> Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA
> policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not
> provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the
> supported kernel subsystems is measured.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>

This patch will look good once all the IMA_DATA_SOURCE stuff is moved
over from patch #4.

Tyler

> ---
>  Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  2 ++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 6ec7daa87cba..0f4ee9e0a455 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Description:
>  			template:= name of a defined IMA template type
>  			(eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
>  			pcr:= decimal value
> +			data_source:= [label]
> +			label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data.
>  
>  		  default policy:
>  			# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 9a8ee80a3128..7486d09a3f60 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ enum {
>  	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
>  	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag,
>  	Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
> -	Opt_err
> +	Opt_data_source, Opt_err
>  };
>  
>  static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> @@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
>  	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
>  	{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
>  	{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
> +	{Opt_data_source, "data_source=%s"},
>  	{Opt_err, NULL}
>  };
>  
> @@ -1350,6 +1351,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  
>  			entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS;
>  			break;
> +		case Opt_data_source:
> +			ima_log_string(ab, "data_source", args[0].from);
> +
> +			if (entry->data_source) {
> +				result = -EINVAL;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +
> +			entry->data_source = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args);
> +			if (IS_ERR(entry->data_source)) {
> +				result = PTR_ERR(entry->data_source);
> +				entry->data_source = NULL;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +
> +			entry->flags |= IMA_DATA_SOURCE;
> +			break;
>  		case Opt_fsuuid:
>  			ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
>  
> @@ -1730,6 +1748,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>  		seq_puts(m, " ");
>  	}
>  
> +	if (entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) {
> +		seq_puts(m, "data_source=");
> +		ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->data_source);
> +		seq_puts(m, " ");
> +	}
> +
>  	if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
>  		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
>  		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

--
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https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel


  reply	other threads:[~2020-12-10 23:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-09 19:42 [PATCH v7 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-10 22:14   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-10 22:14     ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11  1:14     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11  1:14       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-10 22:38   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-10 22:38     ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11  1:21     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11  1:21       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11  2:08       ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11  2:08         ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks
2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-10 23:02   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-10 23:02     ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11  3:26     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11  3:26       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11 17:28     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11 17:28       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-10 23:10   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-10 23:10     ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11  3:28     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11  3:28       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-10 23:15   ` Tyler Hicks [this message]
2020-12-10 23:15     ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11  3:28     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11  3:28       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 6/8] IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-10 23:19   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-10 23:19     ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11  1:29     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11  1:29       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-10 23:22   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-10 23:22     ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11  1:30     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11  1:30       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42 ` [PATCH v7 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-09 19:42   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11 15:36   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11 15:36     ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11 15:41     ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11 15:41       ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11 16:27       ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-12-11 16:27         ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian

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