From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v9 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2020 10:02:50 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201212180251.9943-8-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201212180251.9943-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy is loaded. Add critical data to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line contains "ima_policy=critical_data". Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document the new critical data builtin policy. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 526d65d8573a..6034d75c3ca0 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ ima_policy= [IMA] The builtin policies to load during IMA setup. Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot | - fail_securely" + fail_securely | critical_data" The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read @@ -1765,6 +1765,9 @@ filesystems with the SB_I_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE flag. + The "critical_data" policy measures kernel integrity + critical data. + ima_tcb [IMA] Deprecated. Use ima_policy= instead. Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index fea996a9e26c..376b625acc72 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { + {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +}; + /* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; @@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; +static bool ima_use_critical_data __initdata; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) { @@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) + ima_use_critical_data = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else @@ -872,6 +879,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + if (ima_use_critical_data) + add_rules(critical_data_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + ima_update_policy_flag(); } -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: sashal@kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v9 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2020 10:02:50 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201212180251.9943-8-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201212180251.9943-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy is loaded. Add critical data to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line contains "ima_policy=critical_data". Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document the new critical data builtin policy. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 526d65d8573a..6034d75c3ca0 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ ima_policy= [IMA] The builtin policies to load during IMA setup. Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot | - fail_securely" + fail_securely | critical_data" The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read @@ -1765,6 +1765,9 @@ filesystems with the SB_I_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE flag. + The "critical_data" policy measures kernel integrity + critical data. + ima_tcb [IMA] Deprecated. Use ima_policy= instead. Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index fea996a9e26c..376b625acc72 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { + {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +}; + /* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; @@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; +static bool ima_use_critical_data __initdata; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) { @@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) + ima_use_critical_data = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else @@ -872,6 +879,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + if (ima_use_critical_data) + add_rules(critical_data_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + ima_update_policy_flag(); } -- 2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-12 18:06 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-12-12 18:02 [PATCH v9 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 13:06 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 13:06 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 18:48 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 18:48 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 0:03 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 0:03 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 18:53 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 18:53 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-06 5:00 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-06 5:00 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 13:04 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 13:04 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:01 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:01 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:16 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:16 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:19 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:19 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 19:20 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 19:20 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-13 1:21 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-13 1:21 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 13:48 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 13:48 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:12 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:12 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 19:20 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 19:20 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-13 1:21 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-13 1:21 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 14:29 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 14:29 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:28 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:28 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` Tushar Sugandhi [this message] 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v9 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-24 14:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-24 14:41 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2021-01-05 20:30 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2021-01-05 20:30 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 18:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-23 21:10 ` Paul Moore 2020-12-23 21:10 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore 2021-01-04 23:30 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2021-01-04 23:30 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2021-01-05 2:13 ` Paul Moore 2021-01-05 2:13 ` [dm-devel] " Paul Moore 2021-01-05 5:24 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2021-01-05 5:24 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
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