From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: andi.kleen@intel.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Marcelo Tosatti" <mtosatti@redhat.com>, "David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>, "Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>, frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, "Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, "Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, "Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>, david@redhat.com, "Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>, mst@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v6 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:44:57 +1100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210112044508.427338-3-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and Intel's MKTME can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and new memory protection features, instead of encryption. To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague, but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes, and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security). The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect itself from hypervisor eavesdropping. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> --- backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 30 +++++++++++++++ backends/meson.build | 1 + include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++ include/qemu/typedefs.h | 1 + target/i386/sev.c | 3 +- 5 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 backends/confidential-guest-support.c create mode 100644 include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h diff --git a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2c7793c74f --- /dev/null +++ b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* + * QEMU Confidential Guest support + * + * Copyright: David Gibson, Red Hat Inc. 2020 + * + * Authors: + * David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> + * + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or + * later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory. + * + */ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" + +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h" + +static const TypeInfo confidential_guest_support_info = { + .parent = TYPE_OBJECT, + .name = TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT, + .class_size = sizeof(ConfidentialGuestSupportClass), + .instance_size = sizeof(ConfidentialGuestSupport), +}; + +static void confidential_guest_support_register_types(void) +{ + type_register_static(&confidential_guest_support_info); +} + +type_init(confidential_guest_support_register_types) diff --git a/backends/meson.build b/backends/meson.build index 484456ece7..d4221831fc 100644 --- a/backends/meson.build +++ b/backends/meson.build @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ softmmu_ss.add([files( 'rng-builtin.c', 'rng-egd.c', 'rng.c', + 'confidential-guest-support.c', ), numa]) softmmu_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_POSIX', if_true: files('rng-random.c')) diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9cf170802 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * QEMU Confidential Guest support + * This interface describes the common pieces between various + * schemes for protecting guest memory or other state against a + * compromised hypervisor. This includes memory encryption (AMD's + * SEV and Intel's MKTME) or special protection modes (PEF on POWER, + * or PV on s390x). + * + * Copyright: David Gibson, Red Hat Inc. 2020 + * + * Authors: + * David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> + * + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or + * later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory. + * + */ +#ifndef QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H +#define QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H + +#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY + +#include "qom/object.h" + +#define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support" +#define CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT(obj) \ + OBJECT_CHECK(ConfidentialGuestSupport, (obj), \ + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) +#define CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(klass) \ + OBJECT_CLASS_CHECK(ConfidentialGuestSupportClass, (klass), \ + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) +#define CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(obj) \ + OBJECT_GET_CLASS(ConfidentialGuestSupportClass, (obj), \ + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) + +struct ConfidentialGuestSupport { + Object parent; +}; + +typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass { + ObjectClass parent; +} ConfidentialGuestSupportClass; + +#endif /* !CONFIG_USER_ONLY */ + +#endif /* QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H */ diff --git a/include/qemu/typedefs.h b/include/qemu/typedefs.h index 976b529dfb..33685c79ed 100644 --- a/include/qemu/typedefs.h +++ b/include/qemu/typedefs.h @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ typedef struct BusState BusState; typedef struct Chardev Chardev; typedef struct CompatProperty CompatProperty; typedef struct CoMutex CoMutex; +typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupport ConfidentialGuestSupport; typedef struct CPUAddressSpace CPUAddressSpace; typedef struct CPUState CPUState; typedef struct DeviceListener DeviceListener; diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 1546606811..6b49925f51 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include "qom/object.h" #include "exec/address-spaces.h" #include "monitor/monitor.h" +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h" #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest" OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST) @@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ sev_guest_instance_init(Object *obj) /* sev guest info */ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = { - .parent = TYPE_OBJECT, + .parent = TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT, .name = TYPE_SEV_GUEST, .instance_size = sizeof(SevGuestState), .instance_finalize = sev_guest_finalize, -- 2.29.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: thuth@redhat.com, "Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, frankja@linux.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, mst@redhat.com, "Marcelo Tosatti" <mtosatti@redhat.com>, richard.henderson@linaro.org, "Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>, "Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, "Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Subject: [PATCH v6 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 15:44:57 +1100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210112044508.427338-3-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and Intel's MKTME can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and new memory protection features, instead of encryption. To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague, but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes, and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security). The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect itself from hypervisor eavesdropping. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> --- backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 30 +++++++++++++++ backends/meson.build | 1 + include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++ include/qemu/typedefs.h | 1 + target/i386/sev.c | 3 +- 5 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 backends/confidential-guest-support.c create mode 100644 include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h diff --git a/backends/confidential-guest-support.c b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2c7793c74f --- /dev/null +++ b/backends/confidential-guest-support.c @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* + * QEMU Confidential Guest support + * + * Copyright: David Gibson, Red Hat Inc. 2020 + * + * Authors: + * David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> + * + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or + * later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory. + * + */ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" + +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h" + +static const TypeInfo confidential_guest_support_info = { + .parent = TYPE_OBJECT, + .name = TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT, + .class_size = sizeof(ConfidentialGuestSupportClass), + .instance_size = sizeof(ConfidentialGuestSupport), +}; + +static void confidential_guest_support_register_types(void) +{ + type_register_static(&confidential_guest_support_info); +} + +type_init(confidential_guest_support_register_types) diff --git a/backends/meson.build b/backends/meson.build index 484456ece7..d4221831fc 100644 --- a/backends/meson.build +++ b/backends/meson.build @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ softmmu_ss.add([files( 'rng-builtin.c', 'rng-egd.c', 'rng.c', + 'confidential-guest-support.c', ), numa]) softmmu_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_POSIX', if_true: files('rng-random.c')) diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9cf170802 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * QEMU Confidential Guest support + * This interface describes the common pieces between various + * schemes for protecting guest memory or other state against a + * compromised hypervisor. This includes memory encryption (AMD's + * SEV and Intel's MKTME) or special protection modes (PEF on POWER, + * or PV on s390x). + * + * Copyright: David Gibson, Red Hat Inc. 2020 + * + * Authors: + * David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> + * + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or + * later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory. + * + */ +#ifndef QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H +#define QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H + +#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY + +#include "qom/object.h" + +#define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support" +#define CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT(obj) \ + OBJECT_CHECK(ConfidentialGuestSupport, (obj), \ + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) +#define CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(klass) \ + OBJECT_CLASS_CHECK(ConfidentialGuestSupportClass, (klass), \ + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) +#define CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(obj) \ + OBJECT_GET_CLASS(ConfidentialGuestSupportClass, (obj), \ + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) + +struct ConfidentialGuestSupport { + Object parent; +}; + +typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass { + ObjectClass parent; +} ConfidentialGuestSupportClass; + +#endif /* !CONFIG_USER_ONLY */ + +#endif /* QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H */ diff --git a/include/qemu/typedefs.h b/include/qemu/typedefs.h index 976b529dfb..33685c79ed 100644 --- a/include/qemu/typedefs.h +++ b/include/qemu/typedefs.h @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ typedef struct BusState BusState; typedef struct Chardev Chardev; typedef struct CompatProperty CompatProperty; typedef struct CoMutex CoMutex; +typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupport ConfidentialGuestSupport; typedef struct CPUAddressSpace CPUAddressSpace; typedef struct CPUState CPUState; typedef struct DeviceListener DeviceListener; diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 1546606811..6b49925f51 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include "qom/object.h" #include "exec/address-spaces.h" #include "monitor/monitor.h" +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h" #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest" OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST) @@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ sev_guest_instance_init(Object *obj) /* sev guest info */ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = { - .parent = TYPE_OBJECT, + .parent = TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT, .name = TYPE_SEV_GUEST, .instance_size = sizeof(SevGuestState), .instance_finalize = sev_guest_finalize, -- 2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-12 4:45 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-01-12 4:44 [PATCH v6 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson [this message] 2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson 2021-01-12 9:46 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:46 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-13 2:09 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 2:09 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:44 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 10:39 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 10:59 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-13 0:50 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 0:50 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 12:03 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-01-13 12:03 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 7:56 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 7:56 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 8:36 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 8:36 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 9:52 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:52 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:56 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:56 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-13 0:52 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 0:52 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 11:27 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-13 0:56 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 0:56 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 11:37 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 11:38 ` Greg Kurz 2021-01-12 4:45 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson 2021-01-12 4:45 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 8:15 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 8:15 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 11:36 ` Cornelia Huck 2021-01-12 11:36 ` Cornelia Huck 2021-01-12 11:48 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 11:48 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-12 11:49 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 11:49 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-13 0:57 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 0:57 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 6:57 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-13 6:57 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-01-13 23:56 ` David Gibson 2021-01-13 23:56 ` David Gibson 2021-01-12 9:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé 2021-01-12 9:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
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