From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com Cc: pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>, richard.henderson@linaro.org, berrange@redhat.com, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, pbonzini@redhat.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, thuth@redhat.com, mst@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Subject: [PATCH v8 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:13:06 +1100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210202041315.196530-5-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210202041315.196530-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> When the "memory-encryption" property is set, we also disable KSM merging for the guest, since it won't accomplish anything. We want that, but doing it in the property set function itself is thereoretically incorrect, in the unlikely event of some configuration environment that set the property then cleared it again before constructing the guest. More importantly, it makes some other cleanups we want more difficult. So, instead move this logic to machine_run_board_init() conditional on the final value of the property. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> --- hw/core/machine.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c index de3b8f1b31..8909117d80 100644 --- a/hw/core/machine.c +++ b/hw/core/machine.c @@ -437,14 +437,6 @@ static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value, g_free(ms->memory_encryption); ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value); - - /* - * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real contents of RAM, - * so there's no point in it trying to merge areas. - */ - if (value) { - machine_set_mem_merge(obj, false, errp); - } } static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp) @@ -1166,6 +1158,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) cc->deprecation_note); } + if (machine->memory_encryption) { + /* + * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real + * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge + * areas. + */ + machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort); + } + machine_class->init(machine); phase_advance(PHASE_MACHINE_INITIALIZED); } -- 2.29.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com Cc: thuth@redhat.com, Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>, berrange@redhat.com, mst@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>, jun.nakajima@intel.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, andi.kleen@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Subject: [PATCH v8 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:13:06 +1100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210202041315.196530-5-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210202041315.196530-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> When the "memory-encryption" property is set, we also disable KSM merging for the guest, since it won't accomplish anything. We want that, but doing it in the property set function itself is thereoretically incorrect, in the unlikely event of some configuration environment that set the property then cleared it again before constructing the guest. More importantly, it makes some other cleanups we want more difficult. So, instead move this logic to machine_run_board_init() conditional on the final value of the property. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> --- hw/core/machine.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c index de3b8f1b31..8909117d80 100644 --- a/hw/core/machine.c +++ b/hw/core/machine.c @@ -437,14 +437,6 @@ static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value, g_free(ms->memory_encryption); ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value); - - /* - * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real contents of RAM, - * so there's no point in it trying to merge areas. - */ - if (value) { - machine_set_mem_merge(obj, false, errp); - } } static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp) @@ -1166,6 +1158,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) cc->deprecation_note); } + if (machine->memory_encryption) { + /* + * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real + * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge + * areas. + */ + machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort); + } + machine_class->init(machine); phase_advance(PHASE_MACHINE_INITIALIZED); } -- 2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-02 4:14 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-02-02 4:13 [PATCH v8 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson [this message] 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 10:42 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-02-03 10:42 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2021-02-03 16:15 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-03 16:15 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-04 2:45 ` David Gibson 2021-02-04 2:45 ` David Gibson 2021-02-10 16:25 ` Venu Busireddy 2021-02-10 16:25 ` Venu Busireddy 2021-02-11 23:48 ` David Gibson 2021-02-11 23:48 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 16:19 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-03 16:19 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 17:50 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-03 17:50 ` Greg Kurz 2021-02-04 2:47 ` David Gibson 2021-02-04 2:47 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 23:06 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-02-02 23:06 ` Michael S. Tsirkin 2021-02-03 4:53 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 4:53 ` David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` [PATCH v8 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson 2021-02-02 4:13 ` David Gibson 2021-02-03 9:05 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-02-03 9:05 ` Christian Borntraeger
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