From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, peter.maydell@linaro.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com Cc: richard.henderson@linaro.org, ehabkost@redhat.com, cohuck@redhat.com, david@redhat.com, berrange@redhat.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, mst@redhat.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>, jun.nakajima@intel.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>, andi.kleen@intel.com, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org Subject: [PULL v9 00/13] Cgs patches Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 17:07:22 +1100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210208060735.39838-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) The following changes since commit 5b19cb63d9dfda41b412373b8c9fe14641bcab60: Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/rth-gitlab/tags/pull-tcg-20210205' in= to staging (2021-02-05 22:59:12 +0000) are available in the Git repository at: https://gitlab.com/dgibson/qemu.git tags/cgs-pull-request for you to fetch changes up to 651615d92d244a6dfd7c81ab97bd3369fbe41d06: s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option (2021-02-08 16:57:38 +110= 0) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Generalize memory encryption models A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be very helpful. Changes since v8: * Rebase * Fixed some cosmetic typos Changes since v7: * Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag * Polished the interface to the PEF internals * Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be) Changes since v6: * Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros * Assorted minor fixes Changes since v5: * Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest support" * Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption * Added a bunch of documentation * Fixed some compile errors on POWER Changes since v4: * Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory", which I think is marginally more descriptive * Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at kvm_init didn't work for s390 * Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing (gitlab CI) only Changes since v3: * Rebased * Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization Changes since RFCv2: * Rebased * Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged) * Changed name to "host trust limitation" * Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version) Changes since RFCv1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert ---------------------------------------------------------------- David Gibson (12): confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code confidential guest support: Update documentation spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support spapr: PEF: prevent migration confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option Greg Kurz (1): qom: Allow optional sugar props accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 38 ------ accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 10 +- accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 10 -- backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 33 +++++ backends/meson.build | 1 + docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 2 +- docs/confidential-guest-support.txt | 49 ++++++++ docs/papr-pef.txt | 30 +++++ docs/system/s390x/protvirt.rst | 19 ++- hw/core/machine.c | 63 ++++++++-- hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 17 +-- hw/ppc/meson.build | 1 + hw/ppc/pef.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/ppc/spapr.c | 8 +- hw/s390x/pv.c | 62 ++++++++++ hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 3 + include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 62 ++++++++++ include/hw/boards.h | 2 +- include/hw/ppc/pef.h | 17 +++ include/hw/s390x/pv.h | 17 +++ include/qemu/typedefs.h | 1 + include/qom/object.h | 3 +- include/sysemu/kvm.h | 16 --- include/sysemu/sev.h | 4 +- qom/object.c | 4 +- softmmu/rtc.c | 3 +- softmmu/vl.c | 27 ++++- target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++ target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 + target/i386/sev.c | 95 ++++++--------- target/ppc/kvm.c | 18 --- target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h | 6 - 32 files changed, 595 insertions(+), 191 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backends/confidential-guest-support.c create mode 100644 docs/confidential-guest-support.txt create mode 100644 docs/papr-pef.txt create mode 100644 hw/ppc/pef.c create mode 100644 include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h create mode 100644 include/hw/ppc/pef.h --=20 2.29.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, peter.maydell@linaro.org, dgilbert@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com Cc: qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>, cohuck@redhat.com, berrange@redhat.com, ehabkost@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, mst@redhat.com, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Subject: [PULL v9 00/13] Cgs patches Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 17:07:22 +1100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210208060735.39838-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) The following changes since commit 5b19cb63d9dfda41b412373b8c9fe14641bcab60: Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/rth-gitlab/tags/pull-tcg-20210205' in= to staging (2021-02-05 22:59:12 +0000) are available in the Git repository at: https://gitlab.com/dgibson/qemu.git tags/cgs-pull-request for you to fetch changes up to 651615d92d244a6dfd7c81ab97bd3369fbe41d06: s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option (2021-02-08 16:57:38 +110= 0) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Generalize memory encryption models A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be very helpful. Changes since v8: * Rebase * Fixed some cosmetic typos Changes since v7: * Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag * Polished the interface to the PEF internals * Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be) Changes since v6: * Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros * Assorted minor fixes Changes since v5: * Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest support" * Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption * Added a bunch of documentation * Fixed some compile errors on POWER Changes since v4: * Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory", which I think is marginally more descriptive * Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at kvm_init didn't work for s390 * Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing (gitlab CI) only Changes since v3: * Rebased * Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization Changes since RFCv2: * Rebased * Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged) * Changed name to "host trust limitation" * Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version) Changes since RFCv1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert ---------------------------------------------------------------- David Gibson (12): confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code confidential guest support: Update documentation spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support spapr: PEF: prevent migration confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option Greg Kurz (1): qom: Allow optional sugar props accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 38 ------ accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 10 +- accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 10 -- backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 33 +++++ backends/meson.build | 1 + docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 2 +- docs/confidential-guest-support.txt | 49 ++++++++ docs/papr-pef.txt | 30 +++++ docs/system/s390x/protvirt.rst | 19 ++- hw/core/machine.c | 63 ++++++++-- hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 17 +-- hw/ppc/meson.build | 1 + hw/ppc/pef.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++ hw/ppc/spapr.c | 8 +- hw/s390x/pv.c | 62 ++++++++++ hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 3 + include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 62 ++++++++++ include/hw/boards.h | 2 +- include/hw/ppc/pef.h | 17 +++ include/hw/s390x/pv.h | 17 +++ include/qemu/typedefs.h | 1 + include/qom/object.h | 3 +- include/sysemu/kvm.h | 16 --- include/sysemu/sev.h | 4 +- qom/object.c | 4 +- softmmu/rtc.c | 3 +- softmmu/vl.c | 27 ++++- target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++ target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 + target/i386/sev.c | 95 ++++++--------- target/ppc/kvm.c | 18 --- target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h | 6 - 32 files changed, 595 insertions(+), 191 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backends/confidential-guest-support.c create mode 100644 docs/confidential-guest-support.txt create mode 100644 docs/papr-pef.txt create mode 100644 hw/ppc/pef.c create mode 100644 include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h create mode 100644 include/hw/ppc/pef.h --=20 2.29.2
next reply other threads:[~2021-02-08 6:08 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-02-08 6:07 David Gibson [this message] 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 00/13] Cgs patches David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` [PULL v9 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:07 ` David Gibson -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2021-02-08 6:05 [PULL v9 00/13] Cgs patches David Gibson 2021-02-08 6:05 ` David Gibson 2021-02-08 13:00 ` Peter Maydell 2021-02-08 13:00 ` Peter Maydell 2021-05-17 10:58 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2021-05-17 10:58 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
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