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From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	kernel-team@android.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing HYP data
Date: Mon,  2 Aug 2021 13:38:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210802123830.2195174-1-maz@kernel.org> (raw)

This is a rework of the patch previously posted at [1].

The gist of the problem is that kmemleak can legitimately access data
that has been removed from the kernel view, for two reasons:

(1) .hyp.rodata is lumped together with the BSS
(2) there is no separation of the HYP BSS from the kernel BSS

(1) can easily be addressed by moving the .hyp.rodata section into the
    kernel's RO zone, which avoids any kmemleak into that section.
(2) must be addressed by telling kmemleak about the address range.

Tested on a SC2A11 system, in protected and non-protected modes with
kmemleak active. Both patches are stable candidates.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729135016.3037277-1-maz@kernel.org

Marc Zyngier (2):
  arm64: Move .hyp.rodata outside of the _sdata.._edata range
  KVM: arm64: Unregister HYP sections from kmemleak in protected mode

 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 4 ++--
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c            | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

-- 
2.30.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing HYP data
Date: Mon,  2 Aug 2021 13:38:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210802123830.2195174-1-maz@kernel.org> (raw)

This is a rework of the patch previously posted at [1].

The gist of the problem is that kmemleak can legitimately access data
that has been removed from the kernel view, for two reasons:

(1) .hyp.rodata is lumped together with the BSS
(2) there is no separation of the HYP BSS from the kernel BSS

(1) can easily be addressed by moving the .hyp.rodata section into the
    kernel's RO zone, which avoids any kmemleak into that section.
(2) must be addressed by telling kmemleak about the address range.

Tested on a SC2A11 system, in protected and non-protected modes with
kmemleak active. Both patches are stable candidates.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729135016.3037277-1-maz@kernel.org

Marc Zyngier (2):
  arm64: Move .hyp.rodata outside of the _sdata.._edata range
  KVM: arm64: Unregister HYP sections from kmemleak in protected mode

 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 4 ++--
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c            | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

-- 
2.30.2

_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	kernel-team@android.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing HYP data
Date: Mon,  2 Aug 2021 13:38:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210802123830.2195174-1-maz@kernel.org> (raw)

This is a rework of the patch previously posted at [1].

The gist of the problem is that kmemleak can legitimately access data
that has been removed from the kernel view, for two reasons:

(1) .hyp.rodata is lumped together with the BSS
(2) there is no separation of the HYP BSS from the kernel BSS

(1) can easily be addressed by moving the .hyp.rodata section into the
    kernel's RO zone, which avoids any kmemleak into that section.
(2) must be addressed by telling kmemleak about the address range.

Tested on a SC2A11 system, in protected and non-protected modes with
kmemleak active. Both patches are stable candidates.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729135016.3037277-1-maz@kernel.org

Marc Zyngier (2):
  arm64: Move .hyp.rodata outside of the _sdata.._edata range
  KVM: arm64: Unregister HYP sections from kmemleak in protected mode

 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 4 ++--
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c            | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

-- 
2.30.2


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

             reply	other threads:[~2021-08-02 12:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-02 12:38 Marc Zyngier [this message]
2021-08-02 12:38 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing HYP data Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 12:38 ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 12:38 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Move .hyp.rodata outside of the _sdata.._edata range Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 12:38   ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 12:38   ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 13:11   ` Quentin Perret
2021-08-02 13:11     ` Quentin Perret
2021-08-02 13:11     ` Quentin Perret
2021-08-02 13:20     ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 13:20       ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 13:20       ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 13:47       ` Quentin Perret
2021-08-02 13:47         ` Quentin Perret
2021-08-02 13:47         ` Quentin Perret
2021-08-02 16:52   ` Catalin Marinas
2021-08-02 16:52     ` Catalin Marinas
2021-08-02 16:52     ` Catalin Marinas
2021-08-02 12:38 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: arm64: Unregister HYP sections from kmemleak in protected mode Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 12:38   ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 12:38   ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-02 16:52   ` Catalin Marinas
2021-08-02 16:52     ` Catalin Marinas
2021-08-02 16:52     ` Catalin Marinas
2021-08-04 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing HYP data Marc Zyngier
2021-08-04 12:26   ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-04 12:26   ` Marc Zyngier

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