From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v31 01/28] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2021 15:40:07 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20211213234034.111891-2-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20211213234034.111891-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces. These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit interfaces. The new fuctions are put in security.c because they use security module registered hooks that we don't want exported. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> --- include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 -------------------------- security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index bbf44a466832..71eac35bfa21 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1917,6 +1917,32 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule); + +#else + +static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ } + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ + #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */ -/* LSM based policy rules require audit */ -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES - -#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init -#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free -#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match - -#else - -static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} - -static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) -{ -} - -static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY #define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR) #else diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index c88167a414b4..063c9cbbcea6 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2563,6 +2563,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) } #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES +/* + * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as + * the audit subsystem. + */ +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +{ + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); +} + +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ + call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); +} + +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) +{ + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ + #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) { -- 2.31.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH v31 01/28] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2021 15:40:07 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20211213234034.111891-2-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20211213234034.111891-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces. These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit interfaces. The new fuctions are put in security.c because they use security module registered hooks that we don't want exported. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> --- include/linux/security.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 -------------------------- security/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index bbf44a466832..71eac35bfa21 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1917,6 +1917,32 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule); + +#else + +static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ } + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ + #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */ -/* LSM based policy rules require audit */ -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES - -#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init -#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free -#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match - -#else - -static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} - -static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) -{ -} - -static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY #define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR) #else diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index c88167a414b4..063c9cbbcea6 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2563,6 +2563,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) } #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES +/* + * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as + * the audit subsystem. + */ +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +{ + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); +} + +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ + call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); +} + +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) +{ + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ + #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) { -- 2.31.1 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-13 23:41 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top [not found] <20211213234034.111891-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com> 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 00/28] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 01/28] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Casey Schaufler 2021-12-14 13:33 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-14 13:33 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-14 13:33 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 02/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 03/28] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 04/28] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 05/28] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 06/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 07/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 08/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 09/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 10/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 11/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 12/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-15 9:14 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-15 9:14 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-15 9:14 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 14/28] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-14 18:38 ` Christian Göttsche 2021-12-14 18:38 ` Christian Göttsche 2021-12-14 18:49 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-14 18:49 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 15/28] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 16/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 17/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 18/28] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 19/28] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 20/28] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 21/28] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 22/28] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 23/28] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 25/28] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-14 13:12 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-14 13:12 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-14 13:12 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-14 13:22 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-14 13:22 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-14 13:22 ` kernel test robot 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 27/28] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` [PATCH v31 28/28] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler 2021-12-13 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler
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