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From: "Petr Tesařík" <petr@tesarici.cz>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
	<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Ze Gao <zegao2021@gmail.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Tina Zhang <tina.zhang@intel.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
	Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@huawei-partners.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 19:22:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240214192214.78734652@meshulam.tesarici.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c424618c-d6c6-430a-8975-8851a617204e@intel.com>

On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 06:52:53 -0800
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:

> On 2/14/24 03:35, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> > This patch series implements x86_64 arch hooks for the generic SandBox
> > Mode infrastructure.  
> 
> I think I'm missing a bit of context here.  What does one _do_ with
> SandBox Mode?  Why is it useful?

I see, I split the patch series into the base infrastructure and the
x86_64 implementation, but I forgot to merge the two recipient lists.
:-(

Anyway, in the long term I would like to work on gradual decomposition
of the kernel into a core part and many self-contained components.
Sandbox mode is a useful tool to enforce isolation.

In its current form, sandbox mode is too limited for that, but I'm
trying to find some balance between "publish early" and reaching a
feature level where some concrete examples can be shown. I'd rather
fail fast than maintain hundreds of patches in an out-of-tree branch
before submitting (and failing anyway).

Petr T

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-14 18:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-14 11:35 [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 1/8] sbm: x86: page table " Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 2/8] sbm: x86: execute target function on sandbox mode stack Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 3/8] sbm: x86: map system data structures into the sandbox Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 4/8] sbm: x86: allocate and map an exception stack Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 5/8] sbm: x86: handle sandbox mode faults Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 6/8] sbm: x86: switch to sandbox mode pages in arch_sbm_exec() Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 7/8] sbm: documentation of the x86-64 SandBox Mode implementation Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 18:37   ` Xin Li
2024-02-14 19:16     ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 8/8] sbm: x86: lazy TLB flushing Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 14:52 ` [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks Dave Hansen
2024-02-14 15:28   ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-14 16:41     ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 17:29       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-14 19:14         ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 18:14       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-14 18:32         ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 19:19           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-14 19:35             ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 18:22   ` Petr Tesařík [this message]
2024-02-14 18:42     ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-14 19:33       ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 20:16         ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-16 15:24           ` [RFC 0/8] PGP key parser using SandBox Mode Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 1/8] mpi: Introduce mpi_key_length() Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 2/8] rsa: add parser of raw format Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 3/8] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 4/8] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 5/8] PGPLIB: Signature parser Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 6/8] KEYS: PGP data parser Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 16:44               ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-16 16:53                 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 17:08                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-16 17:13                     ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-20 10:55                     ` Petr Tesarik
2024-02-21 14:02                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-22  7:53                         ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-16 18:44                   ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-16 19:54                     ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-28 17:58                       ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 7/8] KEYS: Run PGP key parser in a sandbox Petr Tesarik
2024-02-18  6:07               ` kernel test robot
2024-02-18  8:02               ` kernel test robot
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 8/8] KEYS: Add intentional fault injection Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:38             ` [RFC 0/8] PGP key parser using SandBox Mode Dave Hansen
2024-02-16 16:08               ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-16 17:21                 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-02-16 18:24                   ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-22 13:12           ` [RFC 0/5] PoC: convert AppArmor parser to " Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 1/5] sbm: x86: fix SBM error entry path Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 2/5] sbm: enhance buffer mapping API Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 3/5] sbm: x86: infrastructure to fix up sandbox faults Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 4/5] sbm: fix up calls to dynamic memory allocators Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 15:51               ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 17:57                 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-22 18:03                   ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 5/5] apparmor: parse profiles in sandbox mode Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 18:52     ` [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks Xin Li
2024-02-15  6:59       ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-15  8:16         ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-15  9:30           ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-15  9:37             ` Roberto Sassu

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