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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: "Petr Tesařík" <petr@tesarici.cz>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
	<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Xin Li" <xin3.li@intel.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	"Pengfei Xu" <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	"Ze Gao" <zegao2021@gmail.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"Kai Huang" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	"David Woodhouse" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	"Brian Gerst" <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	"Jason Gunthorpe" <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <jroedel@suse.de>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"Tina Zhang" <tina.zhang@intel.com>,
	"Jacob Pan" <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Petr Tesarik" <petr.tesarik1@huawei-partners.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 4/5] sbm: fix up calls to dynamic memory allocators
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 07:51:00 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f6135f2c-bc8f-41c3-9c6a-8346d685e4dc@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240222131230.635-5-petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>

On 2/22/24 05:12, Petr Tesarik wrote:
>  static const struct sbm_fixup fixups[] =
>  {
> +	/* kmalloc() and friends */
> +	{ kmalloc_trace, proxy_alloc3 },
> +	{ __kmalloc, proxy_alloc1 },
> +	{ __kmalloc_node, proxy_alloc1 },
> +	{ __kmalloc_node_track_caller, proxy_alloc1 },
> +	{ kmalloc_large, proxy_alloc1 },
> +	{ kmalloc_large_node, proxy_alloc1 },
> +	{ krealloc, proxy_alloc2 },
> +	{ kfree, proxy_free },
> +
> +	/* vmalloc() and friends */
> +	{ vmalloc, proxy_alloc1 },
> +	{ __vmalloc, proxy_alloc1 },
> +	{ __vmalloc_node, proxy_alloc1 },
> +	{ vzalloc, proxy_alloc1 },
> +	{ vfree, proxy_free },
> +
>  	{ }
>  };

Petr, thanks for sending this.  This _is_ a pretty concise example of
what it means to convert kernel code to run in your sandbox mode.  But,
from me, it's still "no thanks".

Establishing and maintaining this proxy list will be painful.  Folks
will change the code to call something new and break this *constantly*.

That goes for infrastructure like the allocators and for individual
sandbox instances like apparmor.

It's also telling that sandboxing a bit of apparmor took four fixups.
That tells me we're probably still only looking at the tip of the icebeg
if we were to convert a bunch more sites.

That's on top of everything I was concerned about before.

  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-22 15:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-14 11:35 [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 1/8] sbm: x86: page table " Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 2/8] sbm: x86: execute target function on sandbox mode stack Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 3/8] sbm: x86: map system data structures into the sandbox Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 4/8] sbm: x86: allocate and map an exception stack Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 5/8] sbm: x86: handle sandbox mode faults Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 6/8] sbm: x86: switch to sandbox mode pages in arch_sbm_exec() Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 7/8] sbm: documentation of the x86-64 SandBox Mode implementation Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 18:37   ` Xin Li
2024-02-14 19:16     ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 8/8] sbm: x86: lazy TLB flushing Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 14:52 ` [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks Dave Hansen
2024-02-14 15:28   ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-14 16:41     ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 17:29       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-14 19:14         ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 18:14       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-14 18:32         ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 19:19           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-14 19:35             ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 18:22   ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 18:42     ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-14 19:33       ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 20:16         ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-16 15:24           ` [RFC 0/8] PGP key parser using SandBox Mode Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 1/8] mpi: Introduce mpi_key_length() Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 2/8] rsa: add parser of raw format Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 3/8] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 4/8] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 5/8] PGPLIB: Signature parser Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 6/8] KEYS: PGP data parser Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 16:44               ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-16 16:53                 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 17:08                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-16 17:13                     ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-20 10:55                     ` Petr Tesarik
2024-02-21 14:02                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-22  7:53                         ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-16 18:44                   ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-16 19:54                     ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-28 17:58                       ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 7/8] KEYS: Run PGP key parser in a sandbox Petr Tesarik
2024-02-18  6:07               ` kernel test robot
2024-02-18  8:02               ` kernel test robot
2024-02-16 15:24             ` [RFC 8/8] KEYS: Add intentional fault injection Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:38             ` [RFC 0/8] PGP key parser using SandBox Mode Dave Hansen
2024-02-16 16:08               ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-16 17:21                 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-02-16 18:24                   ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-22 13:12           ` [RFC 0/5] PoC: convert AppArmor parser to " Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 1/5] sbm: x86: fix SBM error entry path Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 2/5] sbm: enhance buffer mapping API Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 3/5] sbm: x86: infrastructure to fix up sandbox faults Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 4/5] sbm: fix up calls to dynamic memory allocators Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 15:51               ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2024-02-22 17:57                 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-22 18:03                   ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 13:12             ` [RFC 5/5] apparmor: parse profiles in sandbox mode Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 18:52     ` [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks Xin Li
2024-02-15  6:59       ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-15  8:16         ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-15  9:30           ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-15  9:37             ` Roberto Sassu

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