From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v22 12/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2020 16:20:43 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <31027d8e-50bc-70be-b4f2-a96a84de2bae@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201105092245.GB3439341@kroah.com> On 11/5/2020 1:22 AM, Greg KH wrote: > On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 03:41:03PM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: >> Create a new entry "display" in the procfs attr directory for >> controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a >> process. A process can only read or write its own display value. >> >> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for >> human readable data may be written to "display" to set the >> value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from >> "display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable >> of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is >> provided to get the display slot for a task_struct. >> >> Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using >> setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is >> responsible for defining its policy. >> >> AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> >> SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >> >> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> >> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> >> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> >> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org >> --- >> fs/proc/base.c | 1 + >> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 17 +++ >> security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- >> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 +++++ >> security/security.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- >> security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++ >> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- >> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++ >> 8 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c >> index 0f707003dda5..7432f24f0132 100644 >> --- a/fs/proc/base.c >> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c >> @@ -2806,6 +2806,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { >> ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666), >> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), >> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), >> + ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666), > That's a vague name, any chance it can be more descriptive? Sure. How about lsm_display, or display_lsm? I wouldn't say that any of the files in /proc/*/attr have especially descriptive names, but that's hardly an excuse. > And where is the Documentation/ABI/ entries for all of this, how does > userspace know what these things are, and how to use them? I'll add ABI descriptions and move some of the lsm.rst up from where it is later in the patchset. > > thanks, > > greg k-h
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, casey.schaufler@intel.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: [PATCH v22 12/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2020 16:20:43 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <31027d8e-50bc-70be-b4f2-a96a84de2bae@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201105092245.GB3439341@kroah.com> On 11/5/2020 1:22 AM, Greg KH wrote: > On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 03:41:03PM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: >> Create a new entry "display" in the procfs attr directory for >> controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a >> process. A process can only read or write its own display value. >> >> The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for >> human readable data may be written to "display" to set the >> value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from >> "display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable >> of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is >> provided to get the display slot for a task_struct. >> >> Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using >> setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is >> responsible for defining its policy. >> >> AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> >> SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >> >> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> >> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> >> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> >> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> >> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org >> --- >> fs/proc/base.c | 1 + >> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 17 +++ >> security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- >> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 +++++ >> security/security.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- >> security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++ >> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- >> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++ >> 8 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c >> index 0f707003dda5..7432f24f0132 100644 >> --- a/fs/proc/base.c >> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c >> @@ -2806,6 +2806,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { >> ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", 0666), >> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), >> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), >> + ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666), > That's a vague name, any chance it can be more descriptive? Sure. How about lsm_display, or display_lsm? I wouldn't say that any of the files in /proc/*/attr have especially descriptive names, but that's hardly an excuse. > And where is the Documentation/ABI/ entries for all of this, how does > userspace know what these things are, and how to use them? I'll add ABI descriptions and move some of the lsm.rst up from where it is later in the patchset. > > thanks, > > greg k-h -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-07 0:20 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top [not found] <20201104234114.11346-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com> 2020-11-04 23:40 ` [PATCH v22 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` [PATCH v22 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` [PATCH v22 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` [PATCH v22 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` [PATCH v22 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` [PATCH v22 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` [PATCH v22 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` [PATCH v22 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` [PATCH v22 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` [PATCH v22 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` [PATCH v22 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` [PATCH v22 11/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` [PATCH v22 12/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-05 9:22 ` Greg KH 2020-11-05 9:22 ` Greg KH 2020-11-07 0:20 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2020-11-07 0:20 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-07 9:15 ` Greg KH 2020-11-07 9:15 ` Greg KH 2020-11-07 22:05 ` John Johansen 2020-11-07 22:05 ` John Johansen 2020-11-09 22:28 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-09 22:28 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-09 22:47 ` John Johansen 2020-11-09 22:47 ` John Johansen 2020-11-04 23:41 ` [PATCH v22 13/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` [PATCH v22 14/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2020-11-04 23:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-05 0:49 [PATCH v22 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2020-11-05 0:49 ` [PATCH v22 12/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler 2020-11-05 0:49 ` Casey Schaufler
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