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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, miklos@szeredi.hu
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, SELinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 10:44:35 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5582D953.2030209@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150618133254.12722.33339.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On 06/18/2015 09:32 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling.  The xattr copy up stub
> discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that
> the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
>  security/selinux/hooks.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index ffa5a642629a..c5d893e2ff23 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3200,6 +3200,20 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
>  	*secid = isec->sid;
>  }
>  
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst,
> +				       const char *name, void *value,
> +				       size_t *size)
> +{
> +	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
> +		return 1; /* Discard */
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +

(expanded cc list)

I'm not sure we never want to copy up the SELinux attribute.  See my
other email about ecryptfs and supporting per-file labeling and
consistent access control over the upper and lower inodes.

>  /* file security operations */
>  
>  static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> @@ -5917,6 +5931,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
>  	.inode_setsecurity =		selinux_inode_setsecurity,
>  	.inode_listsecurity =		selinux_inode_listsecurity,
>  	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
> +	.inode_copy_up =		selinux_inode_copy_up,
> +	.inode_copy_up_xattr =		selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr,
>  
>  	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
>  	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
> 
> 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, miklos@szeredi.hu
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	SELinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 10:44:35 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5582D953.2030209@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150618133254.12722.33339.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On 06/18/2015 09:32 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling.  The xattr copy up stub
> discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that
> the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
>  security/selinux/hooks.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index ffa5a642629a..c5d893e2ff23 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3200,6 +3200,20 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
>  	*secid = isec->sid;
>  }
>  
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst,
> +				       const char *name, void *value,
> +				       size_t *size)
> +{
> +	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
> +		return 1; /* Discard */
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +

(expanded cc list)

I'm not sure we never want to copy up the SELinux attribute.  See my
other email about ecryptfs and supporting per-file labeling and
consistent access control over the upper and lower inodes.

>  /* file security operations */
>  
>  static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> @@ -5917,6 +5931,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
>  	.inode_setsecurity =		selinux_inode_setsecurity,
>  	.inode_listsecurity =		selinux_inode_listsecurity,
>  	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
> +	.inode_copy_up =		selinux_inode_copy_up,
> +	.inode_copy_up_xattr =		selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr,
>  
>  	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
>  	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
> 
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2015-06-18 14:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-06-18 13:32 [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 1/8] overlay: Call ovl_drop_write() earlier in ovl_dentry_open() David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 2/8] overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay David Howells
2015-07-20 12:42   ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-07-21 13:28     ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 3/8] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 4/8] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells
2015-06-18 13:32 ` [PATCH 5/8] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling David Howells
2015-06-18 14:44   ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2015-06-18 14:44     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:34   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-06-18 16:51   ` David Howells
2015-06-18 16:51     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 6/8] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells
2015-06-18 14:54   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 14:54     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:04   ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:04     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 7/8] SELinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label David Howells
2015-06-18 14:56   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 14:56     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:13   ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:13     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:20     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:20       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:32     ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:32       ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:47       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:47         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:47       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:47         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 13:33 ` [PATCH 8/8] SELinux: Check against union label for file operations David Howells
2015-06-19  7:20 ` [PATCH 0/8] Security: Provide unioned file support Al Viro
2015-06-19  7:52   ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19  7:59     ` Al Viro
2015-06-19  8:11       ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19  8:29         ` Al Viro
2015-06-19  8:36           ` Miklos Szeredi
2015-06-19 14:04   ` David Howells
2015-06-19 14:04     ` David Howells

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