From: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
To: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at"
<clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at>,
"moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at" <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>,
Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>,
Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
"anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de" <anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 10:23:50 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <55fa194e-69bd-fe39-f915-6f77673aea36@iaik.tugraz.at> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJcbSZHcAi37FfFBKF4MsC3WM-RY5ar_e1pgMScb=S3+_-wqVQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 04.05.2017 17:28, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Please read the documentation on submitting patches [1] and coding style [2].
I will have a closer look at that.
> - How this approach prevent the hardware attacks you mentioned? You
> still have to keep a part of _text in the pagetable and an attacker
> could discover it no? (and deduce the kernel base address).
These parts are moved to a different section (.user_mapped) which is at
a possibly predictable location - the location of the randomized parts
of the kernel is independent of the location of .user_mapped.
The code/data footprint for .user_mapped is quite small, helping to
reduce or eliminate the attack surface...
> You also need to make it clear that btb attacks are still possible.
By just increasing the KASLR randomization range, btb attacks can be
mitigated (for free).
> - What is the perf impact?
It will vary for different machines. We have promising results (<1%) for
an i7-6700K with representative benchmarks. However, for older systems
or for workloads with a lot of pressure on some TLB levels, the
performance may be much worse.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-05 8:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-04 10:02 [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode Daniel Gruss
2017-05-04 10:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Gruss
2017-05-04 12:26 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-04 12:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Gruss
2017-05-04 15:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Garnier
2017-05-04 15:28 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 8:23 ` Daniel Gruss [this message]
2017-05-05 8:23 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-05 15:47 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-05 15:47 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-06 4:02 ` David Gens
2017-05-06 8:38 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-06 8:38 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 10:21 ` Mark Rutland
2017-05-08 10:51 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 10:51 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 13:22 ` Mark Rutland
2017-05-08 13:43 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 13:43 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 13:53 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 13:53 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 14:09 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-05-08 14:19 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 14:19 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 13:23 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-08 13:23 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-04 15:47 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-04 15:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-05-05 7:40 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-05 7:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Gruss
2017-05-07 20:20 ` Richard Weinberger
2017-05-07 20:20 ` Richard Weinberger
2017-05-07 21:45 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-07 21:45 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-07 22:02 ` Richard Weinberger
2017-05-07 22:02 ` Richard Weinberger
2017-05-07 22:18 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-07 22:18 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-09 14:44 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not mapkernel " Fogh, Anders
2017-05-09 14:44 ` Fogh, Anders
2017-05-09 14:57 ` Richard Weinberger
2017-05-09 14:57 ` Richard Weinberger
2017-05-09 15:30 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-09 15:30 ` Rik van Riel
2017-10-31 23:28 ` Dave Hansen
2017-10-31 23:28 ` Dave Hansen
2017-05-05 15:49 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel " Jann Horn
2017-05-05 15:49 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-05 15:53 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-05 15:53 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-06 8:28 ` Daniel Gruss
2017-05-06 8:28 ` Daniel Gruss
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