From: "PaX Team" <pageexec@freemail.hu>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
"AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
park jinbum <jinb.park7@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, spender@grsecurity.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initialization
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2017 19:54:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <587E686E.29386.DA7FA27@pageexec.freemail.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170117174831.GB367@leverpostej>
On 17 Jan 2017 at 17:48, Mark Rutland wrote:
> That being the case, (and given the relevant bug has now been fixed),
> it's not clear to me what the value of this is today. i.e. given the
> general case, is this preventing many leaks?
no idea, i stopped looking at the instrumentation log long ago, but everyone
can enable the debug output (has a very specific comment on it ;) and look at
the results. i keep this plugin around because it costs nothing to maintain
it and the alternative (better) solution doesn't exist yet.
> > i never went into that direction because i think the security goal can
> > be achieved without the performance impact of forced initialization.
>
> Was there a particular technique you had in mind?
sure, i mentioned it in my SSTIC'12 keynote (page 36):
https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/PaXTeam-SSTIC12-keynote-20-years-of-PaX.pdf
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "PaX Team" <pageexec@freemail.hu>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
"AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
park jinbum <jinb.park7@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, spender@grsecurity.net
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initialization
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2017 19:54:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <587E686E.29386.DA7FA27@pageexec.freemail.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170117174831.GB367@leverpostej>
On 17 Jan 2017 at 17:48, Mark Rutland wrote:
> That being the case, (and given the relevant bug has now been fixed),
> it's not clear to me what the value of this is today. i.e. given the
> general case, is this preventing many leaks?
no idea, i stopped looking at the instrumentation log long ago, but everyone
can enable the debug output (has a very specific comment on it ;) and look at
the results. i keep this plugin around because it costs nothing to maintain
it and the alternative (better) solution doesn't exist yet.
> > i never went into that direction because i think the security goal can
> > be achieved without the performance impact of forced initialization.
>
> Was there a particular technique you had in mind?
sure, i mentioned it in my SSTIC'12 keynote (page 36):
https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/PaXTeam-SSTIC12-keynote-20-years-of-PaX.pdf
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-17 19:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-01-13 22:02 [PATCH] gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initialization Kees Cook
2017-01-13 22:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-01-14 10:03 ` PaX Team
2017-01-14 10:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2017-01-16 15:24 ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-16 15:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-01-16 19:08 ` Daniel Micay
2017-01-16 19:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-01-16 19:30 ` PaX Team
2017-01-16 19:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2017-01-17 17:48 ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-17 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-01-17 18:54 ` PaX Team [this message]
2017-01-17 18:54 ` PaX Team
2017-01-18 10:48 ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-18 10:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-01-17 17:48 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-17 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-01-16 11:54 ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-16 11:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-01-16 12:26 ` Mark Rutland
2017-01-16 19:22 ` PaX Team
2017-01-16 19:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2017-01-17 10:42 ` Dave P Martin
2017-01-17 10:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave P Martin
2017-01-17 17:09 ` PaX Team
2017-01-17 18:07 ` Dave P Martin
2017-01-17 18:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave P Martin
2017-01-17 19:25 ` PaX Team
2017-01-17 19:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2017-01-17 22:04 ` Dave P Martin
2017-01-17 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave P Martin
2017-01-17 17:56 ` Kees Cook
2017-01-17 17:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
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