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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 15/32] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 13:53:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6ec969dbe40e32a004d4ef6da623bab4881411f7.1468270393.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1468270393.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1468270393.git.luto@kernel.org>

If we get a page fault indicating kernel stack overflow, invoke
handle_stack_overflow().  To prevent us from overflowing the stack
again while handling the overflow (because we are likely to have
very little stack space left), call handle_stack_overflow() on the
double-fault stack

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c      |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c          | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index c3496619740a..01fd0a7f48cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ extern void ist_exit(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void ist_begin_non_atomic(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void ist_end_non_atomic(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs,
+				      unsigned long fault_address);
+#endif
+
 /* Interrupts/Exceptions */
 enum {
 	X86_TRAP_DE = 0,	/*  0, Divide-by-zero */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index f0345284c30b..33d4e7629a42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -293,9 +293,9 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS,     SIGBUS,  "stack segment",		stack_segment)
 DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_AC,     SIGBUS,  "alignment check",		alignment_check)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
-static void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
-					     struct pt_regs *regs,
-					     unsigned long fault_address)
+__visible void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
+						struct pt_regs *regs,
+						unsigned long fault_address)
 {
 	printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n",
 		 (void *)fault_address, current->stack,
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index ca44e2e7fd00..76c58fdcfb29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -753,6 +753,40 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 		return;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+	/*
+	 * Stack overflow?  During boot, we can fault near the initial
+	 * stack in the direct map, but that's not an overflow -- check
+	 * that we're in vmalloc space to avoid this.
+	 */
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr((void *)address) &&
+	    (((unsigned long)tsk->stack - 1 - address < PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	     address - ((unsigned long)tsk->stack + THREAD_SIZE) < PAGE_SIZE)) {
+		register void *__sp asm("rsp");
+		unsigned long stack =
+			this_cpu_read(orig_ist.ist[DOUBLEFAULT_STACK]) -
+			sizeof(void *);
+		/*
+		 * We're likely to be running with very little stack space
+		 * left.  It's plausible that we'd hit this condition but
+		 * double-fault even before we get this far, in which case
+		 * we're fine: the double-fault handler will deal with it.
+		 *
+		 * We don't want to make it all the way into the oops code
+		 * and then double-fault, though, because we're likely to
+		 * break the console driver and lose most of the stack dump.
+		 */
+		asm volatile ("movq %[stack], %%rsp\n\t"
+			      "call handle_stack_overflow\n\t"
+			      "1: jmp 1b"
+			      : "+r" (__sp)
+			      : "D" ("kernel stack overflow (page fault)"),
+				"S" (regs), "d" (address),
+				[stack] "rm" (stack));
+		unreachable();
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * 32-bit:
 	 *
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 15/32] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 13:53:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6ec969dbe40e32a004d4ef6da623bab4881411f7.1468270393.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1468270393.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1468270393.git.luto@kernel.org>

If we get a page fault indicating kernel stack overflow, invoke
handle_stack_overflow().  To prevent us from overflowing the stack
again while handling the overflow (because we are likely to have
very little stack space left), call handle_stack_overflow() on the
double-fault stack

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c      |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c          | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index c3496619740a..01fd0a7f48cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ extern void ist_exit(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void ist_begin_non_atomic(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void ist_end_non_atomic(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs,
+				      unsigned long fault_address);
+#endif
+
 /* Interrupts/Exceptions */
 enum {
 	X86_TRAP_DE = 0,	/*  0, Divide-by-zero */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index f0345284c30b..33d4e7629a42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -293,9 +293,9 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS,     SIGBUS,  "stack segment",		stack_segment)
 DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_AC,     SIGBUS,  "alignment check",		alignment_check)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
-static void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
-					     struct pt_regs *regs,
-					     unsigned long fault_address)
+__visible void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
+						struct pt_regs *regs,
+						unsigned long fault_address)
 {
 	printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n",
 		 (void *)fault_address, current->stack,
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index ca44e2e7fd00..76c58fdcfb29 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -753,6 +753,40 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 		return;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+	/*
+	 * Stack overflow?  During boot, we can fault near the initial
+	 * stack in the direct map, but that's not an overflow -- check
+	 * that we're in vmalloc space to avoid this.
+	 */
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr((void *)address) &&
+	    (((unsigned long)tsk->stack - 1 - address < PAGE_SIZE) ||
+	     address - ((unsigned long)tsk->stack + THREAD_SIZE) < PAGE_SIZE)) {
+		register void *__sp asm("rsp");
+		unsigned long stack =
+			this_cpu_read(orig_ist.ist[DOUBLEFAULT_STACK]) -
+			sizeof(void *);
+		/*
+		 * We're likely to be running with very little stack space
+		 * left.  It's plausible that we'd hit this condition but
+		 * double-fault even before we get this far, in which case
+		 * we're fine: the double-fault handler will deal with it.
+		 *
+		 * We don't want to make it all the way into the oops code
+		 * and then double-fault, though, because we're likely to
+		 * break the console driver and lose most of the stack dump.
+		 */
+		asm volatile ("movq %[stack], %%rsp\n\t"
+			      "call handle_stack_overflow\n\t"
+			      "1: jmp 1b"
+			      : "+r" (__sp)
+			      : "D" ("kernel stack overflow (page fault)"),
+				"S" (regs), "d" (address),
+				[stack] "rm" (stack));
+		unreachable();
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * 32-bit:
 	 *
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-07-11 20:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 176+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-11 20:53 [PATCH v5 00/32] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one() Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-14 19:10   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-14 19:10     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-14 19:10     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-14 20:30     ` Marcel Holtmann
2016-07-14 20:30       ` [kernel-hardening] " Marcel Holtmann
2016-07-14 20:30       ` Marcel Holtmann
2016-07-14 20:41     ` David Miller
2016-07-14 20:41       ` [kernel-hardening] " David Miller
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-22  4:43   ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-22  4:43     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-22  5:34     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-22  5:34       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-22  5:34       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-22 10:18       ` Mike Krinkin
2016-07-22 10:21       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-22 18:21         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-22 18:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-22 18:31           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-22 18:31             ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-22 20:11           ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-22 20:11             ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-22 20:11             ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-23  5:21       ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-23  5:21         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-23 14:58         ` [kernel-hardening] " Nicolai Stange
2016-07-28  9:26           ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-28  9:26             ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables() Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 06/32] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 07/32] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 08/32] dma-api: Teach the "DMA-from-stack" check about vmapped stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit() Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/dumpstack: Honor supplied @regs arg Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/mm/64: In vmalloc_fault(), use CR3 instead of current->active_mm Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-12 17:51   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2016-07-12 18:03     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-12 18:03       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 14/32] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13  7:53   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-13  7:53     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-13  7:53     ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-13 18:42     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 18:42       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 18:42       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-14  8:34       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-14  8:34         ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-14  8:34         ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-14 16:51         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-14 16:51           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-14 16:51           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-14 18:45           ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-14 18:45             ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-07-14 18:45             ` Ingo Molnar
2016-07-11 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 15/32] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 16/32] x86: Move uaccess_err and sig_on_uaccess_err to thread_struct Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 17/32] x86: Move addr_limit " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 18/32] signal: Consolidate {TS,TLF}_RESTORE_SIGMASK code Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-12 11:57   ` Brian Gerst
2016-07-12 11:57     ` Brian Gerst
2016-07-12 11:57     ` [kernel-hardening] " Brian Gerst
2016-07-12 11:57     ` [PATCH v5 18/32] signal: Consolidate {TS, TLF}_RESTORE_SIGMASK code Brian Gerst
2016-07-12 11:57     ` [PATCH v5 18/32] signal: Consolidate {TS,TLF}_RESTORE_SIGMASK code Brian Gerst
2016-07-12 11:57     ` Brian Gerst
2016-07-12 11:57     ` Brian Gerst
2016-07-12 23:01     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-12 23:01       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-12 23:01       ` [PATCH v5 18/32] signal: Consolidate {TS, TLF}_RESTORE_SIGMASK code Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-12 23:01       ` [PATCH v5 18/32] signal: Consolidate {TS,TLF}_RESTORE_SIGMASK code Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-12 23:01       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-12 23:01       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/smp: Remove stack_smp_processor_id() Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/smp: Remove unnecessary initialization of thread_info::cpu Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 21/32] x86/asm: Move 'status' from struct thread_info to struct thread_struct Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 22/32] kdb: Use task_cpu() instead of task_thread_info()->cpu Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 23/32] printk: When dumping regs, show the stack, not thread_info Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 24/32] x86/entry: Get rid of pt_regs_to_thread_info() Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 25/32] um: Stop conflating task_struct::stack with thread_info Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v5 26/32] sched: Allow putting thread_info into task_struct Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v5 27/32] x86: Move " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v5 28/32] sched: Add try_get_task_stack() and put_task_stack() Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v5 29/32] kthread: to_live_kthread() needs try_get_task_stack() Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/dumpstack: Pin the target stack in save_stack_trace_tsk() Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v5 31/32] sched: Free the stack early if CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v5 32/32] fork: Cache two thread stacks per cpu if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 20:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-12  8:56 ` [PATCH v5 00/32] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup Herbert Xu
2016-07-12  8:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Herbert Xu
2016-07-12  8:56   ` Herbert Xu
2016-07-12  8:56   ` Herbert Xu
2016-07-13  8:54 ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-13  8:54   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-13  8:54   ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-13 18:36   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 18:36     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 18:36     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 18:53     ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-13 18:53       ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-13 18:53       ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger

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