From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/7] security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 14:51:00 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <871sdzy0nv.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1805260139030.11624@namei.org> (James Morris's message of "Sat, 26 May 2018 01:41:52 +1000 (AEST)")
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> writes:
> On Thu, 24 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
>> Below is where I suggest you start on sorting out these security hooks.
>> - Adding a security_kernel_arg to catch when you want to allow/deny the
>> use of an argument to a syscall. What security_kernel_file_read and
>> security_kernel_file_post_read have been abused for.
>
> NAK. This abstraction is too semantically weak.
>
> LSM hooks need to map to stronger semantics so we can reason about what
> the hook and the policy is supposed to be mediating.
I will take that as an extremely weak nack as all I did was expose the
existing code and what the code is currently doing. I don't see how you
can NAK what is already being merged and used.
I will be happy to see a better proposal.
The best I can see is to take each and every syscall that my patch
is calling syscall_kernel_arg and make it it's own hook without an
enumeration. I did not see any real duplication between the cases in my
enumeration so I don't think that will be a problem. Maybe a bit of a
challenge for loadpin but otherwise not.
Thank you in this for understanding why I am having problems with the
current hook.
Eric
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/7] security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 14:51:00 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <871sdzy0nv.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1805260139030.11624@namei.org> (James Morris's message of "Sat, 26 May 2018 01:41:52 +1000 (AEST)")
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> writes:
> On Thu, 24 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
>> Below is where I suggest you start on sorting out these security hooks.
>> - Adding a security_kernel_arg to catch when you want to allow/deny the
>> use of an argument to a syscall. What security_kernel_file_read and
>> security_kernel_file_post_read have been abused for.
>
> NAK. This abstraction is too semantically weak.
>
> LSM hooks need to map to stronger semantics so we can reason about what
> the hook and the policy is supposed to be mediating.
I will take that as an extremely weak nack as all I did was expose the
existing code and what the code is currently doing. I don't see how you
can NAK what is already being merged and used.
I will be happy to see a better proposal.
The best I can see is to take each and every syscall that my patch
is calling syscall_kernel_arg and make it it's own hook without an
enumeration. I did not see any real duplication between the cases in my
enumeration so I don't think that will be a problem. Maybe a bit of a
challenge for loadpin but otherwise not.
Thank you in this for understanding why I am having problems with the
current hook.
Eric
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/7] security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 14:51:00 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <871sdzy0nv.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1805260139030.11624@namei.org> (James Morris's message of "Sat, 26 May 2018 01:41:52 +1000 (AEST)")
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> writes:
> On Thu, 24 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>
>> Below is where I suggest you start on sorting out these security hooks.
>> - Adding a security_kernel_arg to catch when you want to allow/deny the
>> use of an argument to a syscall. What security_kernel_file_read and
>> security_kernel_file_post_read have been abused for.
>
> NAK. This abstraction is too semantically weak.
>
> LSM hooks need to map to stronger semantics so we can reason about what
> the hook and the policy is supposed to be mediating.
I will take that as an extremely weak nack as all I did was expose the
existing code and what the code is currently doing. I don't see how you
can NAK what is already being merged and used.
I will be happy to see a better proposal.
The best I can see is to take each and every syscall that my patch
is calling syscall_kernel_arg and make it it's own hook without an
enumeration. I did not see any real duplication between the cases in my
enumeration so I don't think that will be a problem. Maybe a bit of a
challenge for loadpin but otherwise not.
Thank you in this for understanding why I am having problems with the
current hook.
Eric
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-25 19:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-24 11:09 [PATCH v3 0/7] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 20:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 20:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 20:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 23:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 23:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 23:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 23:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-25 12:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-25 12:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-25 12:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-25 12:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-25 15:41 ` James Morris
2018-05-25 15:41 ` James Morris
2018-05-25 15:41 ` James Morris
2018-05-25 19:51 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2018-05-25 19:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-25 19:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-29 20:32 ` James Morris
2018-05-29 20:32 ` James Morris
2018-05-29 20:32 ` James Morris
2018-05-29 21:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-29 21:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-29 21:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 20:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 20:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 20:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] ima: add build time policy Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 7/7] ima: based on policy prevent loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` Mimi Zohar
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