From: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 14:28:19 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8736t6p1v0.fsf@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181016101645.GA24870@embeddedor.com>
Hi Greg,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com> writes:
> num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn:
> potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index
> fsg_opts->common->luns
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Can you still take this as an urgent fix?
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@intel.com>
--
balbi
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 14:28:19 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8736t6p1v0.fsf@linux.intel.com> (raw)
Hi Greg,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com> writes:
> num can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_mass_storage.c:3177 fsg_lun_make() warn:
> potential spectre issue 'fsg_opts->common->luns' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing num before using it to index
> fsg_opts->common->luns
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Can you still take this as an urgent fix?
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@intel.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-16 11:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-16 10:16 [PATCH] usb: gadget: storage: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-10-16 10:16 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-10-16 11:28 ` Felipe Balbi [this message]
2018-10-16 11:28 ` Felipe Balbi
2018-10-16 11:34 ` [PATCH] " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-10-16 11:34 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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