From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 09:50:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87lfa369tv.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210330205750.428816-5-keescook@chromium.org>
On Tue, Mar 30 2021 at 13:57, Kees Cook wrote:
> Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly
> 5-6 bits of entropy, depending on compiler and word size. Since the
> method of offsetting uses macros, this cannot live in the common entry
> code (the stack offset needs to be retained for the life of the syscall,
> which means it needs to happen at the actual entry point).
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 09:50:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87lfa369tv.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210330205750.428816-5-keescook@chromium.org>
On Tue, Mar 30 2021 at 13:57, Kees Cook wrote:
> Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly
> 5-6 bits of entropy, depending on compiler and word size. Since the
> method of offsetting uses macros, this cannot live in the common entry
> code (the stack offset needs to be retained for the life of the syscall,
> which means it needs to happen at the actual entry point).
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-03-31 7:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-30 20:57 [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` [PATCH v8 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` [PATCH v8 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-31 7:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-03-31 7:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-03-31 21:54 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-31 21:54 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-31 22:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-03-31 22:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-04-01 6:31 ` Kees Cook
2021-04-01 6:31 ` Kees Cook
2021-04-01 8:30 ` Will Deacon
2021-04-01 8:30 ` Will Deacon
2021-04-01 11:15 ` David Laight
2021-04-01 11:15 ` David Laight
2021-04-01 11:15 ` David Laight
2021-04-01 22:42 ` Kees Cook
2021-04-01 22:42 ` Kees Cook
2021-04-01 22:42 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-31 7:50 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2021-03-31 7:50 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-03-30 20:57 ` [PATCH v8 5/6] arm64: entry: " Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` [PATCH v8 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets Kees Cook
2021-03-30 20:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-04-01 19:17 ` [PATCH] Where we are for this patch? Roy Yang
2021-04-01 19:17 ` Roy Yang
2021-04-01 19:17 ` Roy Yang
2021-04-01 19:48 ` Al Viro
2021-04-01 19:48 ` Al Viro
2021-04-01 20:13 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-04-01 20:13 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-04-01 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook
2021-04-01 21:46 ` Kees Cook
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