All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "Kenneth R . Crudup" <kenny@panix.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
	Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] x86/split_lock: Refactor and export handle_user_split_lock() for KVM
Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 21:06:15 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87mu7tn1w8.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200402171946.GH13879@linux.intel.com>

Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> writes:
> On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 07:01:56PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> >  static inline void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
>> >  static inline void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn) {}
>> > -static inline bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
>> > +static inline bool handle_user_split_lock(unsigned long ip)
>> 
>> This is necessary because VMX can be compiled without CPU_SUP_INTEL?
>
> Ya, it came about when cleaning up the IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR handling
> to consolidate duplicate code.
>
> config KVM_INTEL
>         tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support"
>         depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL
>
> config IA32_FEAT_CTL
>         def_bool y
>         depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL || CPU_SUP_CENTAUR || CPU_SUP_ZHAOXIN

Ah, indeed. So something like the below would make sense. Hmm?

Of course that can be mangled into Xiaoyao's patches, I'm not worried
about my patch count :)

Aside of that I really wish Intel HW folks had indicated the source of
the #AC via the error code. It can only be 0 or 1 for the regular #AC so
there would have been 31 bits to chose from.

Thanks,

        tglx

8<----------------
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu.h
@@ -43,14 +43,14 @@ unsigned int x86_stepping(unsigned int s
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
 extern void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn);
-extern bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+extern int handle_ac_split_lock(unsigned long ip);
 extern void split_lock_validate_module_text(struct module *me, void *text, void *text_end);
 #else
 static inline void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
 static inline void switch_to_sld(unsigned long tifn) {}
-static inline bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+static int handle_ac_split_lock(unsigned long ip)
 {
-	return false;
+	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 static inline void split_lock_validate_module_text(struct module *me, void *text, void *text_end) {}
 #endif

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -1102,13 +1102,20 @@ static void split_lock_init(void)
 	split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off);
 }
 
-bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+int handle_ac_split_lock(unsigned long ip)
 {
-	if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC) || sld_state == sld_fatal)
-		return false;
+	switch (sld_state) {
+	case sld_warn:
+		break;
+	case sld_off:
+		pr_warn_once("#AC: Spurious trap at address: 0x%lx\n", ip);
+		return -ENOSYS;
+	case sld_fatal:
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
 
 	pr_warn_ratelimited("#AC: %s/%d took a split_lock trap at address: 0x%lx\n",
-			    current->comm, current->pid, regs->ip);
+			    current->comm, current->pid, ip);
 
 	/*
 	 * Disable the split lock detection for this task so it can make
@@ -1117,8 +1124,9 @@ bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_re
 	 */
 	sld_update_msr(false);
 	set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SLD);
-	return true;
+	return 0;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(handle_ac_split_lock);
 
 /*
  * This function is called only when switching between tasks with
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_alignment_check(st
 
 	local_irq_enable();
 
-	if (handle_user_split_lock(regs, error_code))
+	if (!(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC) && !handle_ac_split_lock(regs->ip))
 		return;
 
 	do_trap(X86_TRAP_AC, SIGBUS, "alignment check", regs,
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_INFO(sld_safe, "Y");
 
 #ifdef MODULE
 static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = {
@@ -4623,6 +4624,22 @@ static int handle_machine_check(struct k
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static bool guest_handles_ac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If guest has alignment checking enabled in CR0 and activated in
+	 * eflags, then the #AC originated from CPL3 and the guest is able
+	 * to handle it. It does not matter whether this is a regular or
+	 * a split lock operation induced #AC.
+	 */
+	if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3 && kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_AM) &&
+	    kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC)
+		return true;
+
+	/* Add guest SLD handling checks here once it's supported */
+	return false;
+}
+
 static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -4630,6 +4647,7 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct k
 	u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
 	unsigned long cr2, rip, dr6;
 	u32 vect_info;
+	int err;
 
 	vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
 	intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
@@ -4688,9 +4706,6 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct k
 		return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
 
 	switch (ex_no) {
-	case AC_VECTOR:
-		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
-		return 1;
 	case DB_VECTOR:
 		dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
 		if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
@@ -4719,6 +4734,29 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct k
 		kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip;
 		kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
 		break;
+	case AC_VECTOR:
+		if (guest_handles_ac(vcpu)) {
+			kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Handle #AC caused by split lock detection. If the host
+		 * mode is sld_warn, then it warns, marks current with
+		 * TIF_SLD and disables split lock detection. So the guest
+		 * can just continue.
+		 *
+		 * If the host mode is fatal, the handling code warned. Let
+		 * qemu kill itself.
+		 *
+		 * If the host mode is off, then this #AC is bonkers and
+		 * something is badly wrong. Let it fail as well.
+		 */
+		err = handle_ac_split_lock(kvm_rip_read(vcpu));
+		if (!err)
+			return 1;
+		/* Propagate the error type to user space */
+		error_code = err == -EFAULT ? 0x100 : 0x200;
+		fallthrough;
 	default:
 		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
 		kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;

  reply	other threads:[~2020-04-02 19:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-02 12:32 [patch 0/2] x86: Prevent Split-Lock-Detection wreckage on VMX hypervisors Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 12:32 ` [patch 1/2] x86,module: Detect VMX modules and disable Split-Lock-Detect Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 15:23   ` [patch v2 " Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 16:20     ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-02 16:25       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 16:39         ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 16:41         ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-02 17:34           ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 17:51             ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 18:51               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 20:23                 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 21:04                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 21:16                     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03  8:09     ` David Laight
2020-04-03 14:33       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 23:42   ` [patch " Rasmus Villemoes
2020-04-03 14:35     ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-03 15:21       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 16:12           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:16             ` David Laight
2020-04-03 16:39               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 16:40               ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:48                 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-03 17:21                   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 18:53         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-03 20:58           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-03 21:49             ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-03 11:29   ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 11:29     ` [patch 1/2] x86, module: " kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 14:43   ` [patch 1/2] x86,module: " kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 14:43     ` [patch 1/2] x86, module: " kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 16:36   ` [patch 1/2] x86,module: " Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 16:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 18:35       ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-06 12:23   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 14:40     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 15:18       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 15:22         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 18:27           ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-02 12:33 ` [patch 2/2] x86/kvm/vmx: Prevent split lock detection induced #AC wreckage Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 15:30   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 15:44     ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 16:04       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 16:56     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 15:55   ` [PATCH 0/3] x86: KVM: VMX: Add basic split-lock #AC handling Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 15:55     ` [PATCH 1/3] KVM: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write in emulator Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 15:55     ` [PATCH 2/3] x86/split_lock: Refactor and export handle_user_split_lock() for KVM Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 17:01       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 17:19         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 19:06           ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2020-04-10  4:39             ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-10 10:21               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-02 15:55     ` [PATCH 3/3] KVM: VMX: Extend VMX's #AC interceptor to handle split lock #AC in guest Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 17:19       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 17:40         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 20:07           ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 20:36             ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-02 20:48             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 20:51             ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 22:27               ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 22:40                 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 23:03                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 23:08                   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-02 23:16                     ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 23:18                       ` Jim Mattson
2020-04-03 12:16                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-10 10:23     ` [PATCH 0/3] x86: KVM: VMX: Add basic split-lock #AC handling Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-10 11:14       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 13:43 ` [patch 0/2] x86: Prevent Split-Lock-Detection wreckage on VMX hypervisors Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 14:32   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 14:41     ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 14:46       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 14:53         ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 14:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 14:47     ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 15:11       ` Peter Zijlstra

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87mu7tn1w8.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de \
    --to=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=jeyu@kernel.org \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=kenny@panix.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=namit@vmware.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
    --cc=thellstrom@vmware.com \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=wanpengli@tencent.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xiaoyao.li@intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.