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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 14:01:22 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87mvrtqvhp.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160125194722.GA10638@ubuntu-hedt> (Seth Forshee's message of "Mon, 25 Jan 2016 13:47:22 -0600")

Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> writes:

> On Mon, Jan 04, 2016 at 12:03:39PM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
>> These patches implement support for mounting filesystems in user
>> namespaces using fuse. They are based on the patches in the for-testing
>> branch of
>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git,
>> but I've rebased them onto 4.4-rc3. I've pushed all of this to:
>> 
>>  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sforshee/linux.git fuse-userns
>> 
>> The patches are organized into three high-level groups.
>> 
>> Patches 1-6 are related to security, adding restrictions for
>> unprivileged mounts and updating the LSMs as needed. Patches 1-2
>> (checking inode permissions for block device mounts) may not be strictly
>> necessary for fuseblk mounts since fuse doesn't do any IO on the block
>> device in the kernel, but it still seems like a good idea to fail the
>> mount if the user doesn't have the required permissions for the inode
>> (though this is a bit misleading with fuse since the mounts are done via
>> a suid-root helper).
>> 
>> Patches 7-14 update most of the vfs to translate ids correctly and deal
>> with inodes which may have invalid user/group ids. I've omitted patches
>> for anything not used by fuse - quota, fs freezing, some helper
>> functions, etc. - but if these are wanted for the sake of completeness I
>> can include them.
>> 
>> Patches 15-18 update fuse to deal with mounts from non-init pid and user
>> namespaces and enable mounting from user namespaces.
>> 
>> Changes since v1:
>>  - Drop patch for FIBMAP.
>>  - Use current_in_userns in fuse_allow_current_process.
>>  - Remove checks for uid/gid validity in fuse. Intead, ids from the
>>    backing store which do not map into s_user_ns will result in invalid
>>    ids in the vfs inode. Checks in the vfs will prevent unmappable ids
>>    from being passed in from above.
>>  - Update a couple of commit messages to provide more detail about
>>    changes.
>
> Now that the merge window is over, I'm wondering whether it might be
> possible to get some feedback on these patches this cycle?

Definitely.  Apologies for not giving you much feedback earlier.

I had been hoping this was the kind of thing I could just double check
to be certain you weren't doing anything silly and just apply.  After my
last round of looking at this I realized that for me to be comfortable
with these patches I will have to give them very close scrutiny, and
check every detail.

Unfortunatly last cycle I had failed to budget enough time to give these
patches the close scrutiny they need.

From a high level I am still very much in favor of this approach and
at least getting as far as safe unprivileged fuse mounts.

I have one or two little things to look at and then I hope to be going
through your patches one by one in detail.

Eric


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 14:01:22 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87mvrtqvhp.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160125194722.GA10638@ubuntu-hedt> (Seth Forshee's message of "Mon, 25 Jan 2016 13:47:22 -0600")

Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> writes:

> On Mon, Jan 04, 2016 at 12:03:39PM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
>> These patches implement support for mounting filesystems in user
>> namespaces using fuse. They are based on the patches in the for-testing
>> branch of
>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git,
>> but I've rebased them onto 4.4-rc3. I've pushed all of this to:
>> 
>>  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sforshee/linux.git fuse-userns
>> 
>> The patches are organized into three high-level groups.
>> 
>> Patches 1-6 are related to security, adding restrictions for
>> unprivileged mounts and updating the LSMs as needed. Patches 1-2
>> (checking inode permissions for block device mounts) may not be strictly
>> necessary for fuseblk mounts since fuse doesn't do any IO on the block
>> device in the kernel, but it still seems like a good idea to fail the
>> mount if the user doesn't have the required permissions for the inode
>> (though this is a bit misleading with fuse since the mounts are done via
>> a suid-root helper).
>> 
>> Patches 7-14 update most of the vfs to translate ids correctly and deal
>> with inodes which may have invalid user/group ids. I've omitted patches
>> for anything not used by fuse - quota, fs freezing, some helper
>> functions, etc. - but if these are wanted for the sake of completeness I
>> can include them.
>> 
>> Patches 15-18 update fuse to deal with mounts from non-init pid and user
>> namespaces and enable mounting from user namespaces.
>> 
>> Changes since v1:
>>  - Drop patch for FIBMAP.
>>  - Use current_in_userns in fuse_allow_current_process.
>>  - Remove checks for uid/gid validity in fuse. Intead, ids from the
>>    backing store which do not map into s_user_ns will result in invalid
>>    ids in the vfs inode. Checks in the vfs will prevent unmappable ids
>>    from being passed in from above.
>>  - Update a couple of commit messages to provide more detail about
>>    changes.
>
> Now that the merge window is over, I'm wondering whether it might be
> possible to get some feedback on these patches this cycle?

Definitely.  Apologies for not giving you much feedback earlier.

I had been hoping this was the kind of thing I could just double check
to be certain you weren't doing anything silly and just apply.  After my
last round of looking at this I realized that for me to be comfortable
with these patches I will have to give them very close scrutiny, and
check every detail.

Unfortunatly last cycle I had failed to budget enough time to give these
patches the close scrutiny they need.

>From a high level I am still very much in favor of this approach and
at least getting as far as safe unprivileged fuse mounts.

I have one or two little things to look at and then I hope to be going
through your patches one by one in detail.

Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2016-01-25 20:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-04 18:03 [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 01/18] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 10/18] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
     [not found] ` <1451930639-94331-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 02/18] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 03/18] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-15 12:09     ` [PATCH] fs: remove excess check for in_userns Pavel Tikhomirov
2016-03-15 13:45       ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-15 14:19         ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2016-03-15 14:19         ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2016-03-22 23:19         ` James Morris
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 04/18] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 05/18] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 06/18] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 07/18] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 08/18] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 09/18] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 11/18] fs: Ensure the mounter of a filesystem is privileged towards its inodes Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-03 17:02     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-04 22:43       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-06 15:48         ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-06 22:07           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-07 13:32             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-28 16:59         ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30  1:36           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-30 14:58             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30 20:18               ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 12/18] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 14/18] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 15/18] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 10:53     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:17       ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:29     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:18       ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 14:48         ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:48           ` Miklos Szeredi
     [not found]           ` <CAJfpegv5JmB15yHpjYxVeOYdWWkoLMftr9-e_iS93Y_7m=t4Zw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-09 15:25             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 15:25               ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 15:51               ` Miklos Szeredi
     [not found]                 ` <CAJfpegv5KR_Hi-79a8oyb+R+tv9W3RYqy5pngUKSyauVNk2ScQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-09 17:07                   ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 17:07                     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-14 20:58                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-25 20:31                       ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 17/18] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:40     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-01-04 18:03   ` [PATCH RESEND v2 18/18] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 13:08     ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-01-25 19:47 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-25 20:01   ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2016-01-25 20:01     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-25 20:36     ` Seth Forshee

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